PUNO, J., Concurring:
I concur with the path-breaking ponencia of Mr. Justice Panganiban which is pro-people and pierces the myopia of legalism. Upholding the sovereign will of the people which is the be-all and the end-all of republicanism, it rests on a foundation that will endure time and its tempest.
The sovereignty of our people is the primary postulate of the 1987 Constitution. For this reason, it
appears as the first in our declaration of principles and state policies. Thus,
Section 1 of Article II of our fundamental law proclaims that "[t]he
Borne out of the 1986 people power EDSA revolution, our 1987
Constitution is more people-oriented. Thus, Section 4 of Article II provides as
a state policy that the prime duty of the Government is "to serve and protect the people." Section 1,
Article XI also provides that "x x x public officers x x x must at all times be accountable to the people x x x" Sections 15 and 16 of
Article XIII define the role and rights of people's organizations. Section 5(2)
of Article XVI mandates that "[t]he state shall strengthen the patriotic
spirit and nationalist consciousness of the military, and respect for people's
rights in the performance of their duty." And Section 2 of Article XVII
provides that "amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative x x x" All these provisions and more are intended to
breathe more life to the sovereignty of our people.
To be sure, the sovereignty of our people is not a kabalistic
principle whose dimensions are buried in mysticism. Its metes and bounds are
familiar to the framers of our Constitutions. They knew that in its broadest
sense, sovereignty is meant to be supreme, the
jus summi imperu, the absolute right to govern.3 Former Dean Vicente Sinco4 states that an essential quality of
sovereignty is legal omnipotence, viz: "Legal
theory establishes certain essential qualities inherent in the nature of
sovereignty. The first is legal omnipotence. This means that the sovereign is
legally omnipotent and absolute in relation to other legal institutions. It has
the power to determine exclusively its legal competence. Its powers are
original, not derivative. It is the sole
judge of what it should do at any given time."5 Citing Barker,6
he adds that a more amplified definition of sovereignty is that of "a
final power of final legal adjustment of all legal issues." The
In our Constitution, the people established a representative democracy as distinguished from a pure democracy. Justice Isagani Cruz explains:8
"xxx xxx xxx
A republic is a representative government, a government run by and for the people. It is not a pure democracy where the people govern themselves directly. The essence of republicanism is representation and renovation, the selection by the citizenry of a corps of public functionaries who derive their mandate from the people and act on their behalf, serving for a limited period only, after which they are replaced or retained, at the option of their principal. Obviously, a republican government is a responsible government whose officials hold and discharge their position as a public trust and shall, according to the Constitution, 'at all times be accountable to the people' they are sworn to serve. The purpose of a republican government it is almost needless to state, is the promotion of the common welfare according to the will of the people themselves. "
I appreciate the vigorous dissent of Mr. Justice Davide. I agree that sovereignty is indivisible but it need not always be exercised by the people together,
all the time.9 For this reason, the Constitution and our laws
provide when the entire electorate or only some of them can elect those who
make our laws and those who execute our laws. Thus, the entire electorate votes
for our senators but only our district
electorates vote for our congressmen, only our provincial electorates vote for
the members of our provincial boards, only our city electorates vote for our
city councilors, and only our municipal electorates vote for our councilors.
Also, the entire electorate votes for our President and Vice-President but only
our provincial electorates vote for our governors, only our city electorates
vote for our mayors, and only our municipal electorates vote for our mayors. By
defining and delimiting the classes of voters who can exercise the sovereignty
of the people in a given election, it cannot be claimed that said sovereignty has
been fragmented.
It is my respectful submission that the issue in the case at bar
is not whether the people of Sorsogon should be given
the right to defy the law by allowing
Frivaldo to sit as their governor. Rather, the issue
is: whether the will of the voters of
Sorsogon clearly choosing Frivaldo
as governor ought to be given a decisive
value considering the uncertainty of
the law on when a candidate ought to satisfy the qualification of citizenship.
The uncertainty of law and jurisprudence, both here and abroad, on this legal
issue cannot be denied. In the
I emphasize the honest-to-goodness difference in interpreting our
law on the matter for this is vital to dispel the fear of Mr. Justice Davide that my opinion can bring about ill effects to the
State. Mr. Justice Davide's fear is based on the assumption that Frivaldo
continues to be disqualified and we cannot allow him to sit as governor without transgressing the law. I do not concede
this assumption for as stressed above, courts have been sharply divided by this
mind boggling issue. Given this schism, I do not see how we can derogate on the
sovereignty of the people by according more weight to the votes of the people
of Sorsogon.
Mr. Justice Davide warns that should the people of Batanes stage a rebellion, we cannot prosecute them "because of the doctrine of people's sovereignty." With due respect, the analogy is not appropriate. In his hypothetical case, rebellion is concededly a crime, a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, an offense against the sovereignty of our people. In the case at bar, it cannot be held with certitude that the people of Sorsogon violated the law by voting for Frivaldo as governor. Frivaldo's name was in the list of candidates allowed by COMELEC to run for governor. At that time too, Frivaldo was taking all steps to establish his Filipino citizenship. And even our jurisprudence has not settled the issue when a candidate should possess the qualification of citizenship. Since the meaning of the law is arguable then and now, I cannot imagine how it will be disastrous for the State if we tilt the balance in the case at bar in favor of the people of Sorsogon.
In sum, I respectfully submit that the sovereign will of our
people should be resolutory of the case at bar which
is one of its kind, unprecedented in our political history. For three (3)
times, Frivaldo ran as governor of the
1 The 1987 Constitution added the word
"democratic" in the statement of the principle.
2 Section
24(a) of the Tydings-McDuffie Law which authorized
the Filipino people to draft a Constitution in 1934 required that the
"constitution formulated and drafted shall be republican in form."
This Court has observed that even before the Tydings-McDuffie Law, the Philippine Bill and the Jones Law
have "x x x extended
the powers of a republican form of government modeled after that of the United
States to the Philippines." Roa v. Collector of
Customs, 23 Phil. 315, 340 [19l2], Severino v. Gov. General, 16 Phil. 366, 383 [1910], US v. Bull, 15 Phil. 7, 27 [1910].
3 Words and Phrases, Vol. 39 A., p. 68 citing Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kan. R. Co., 33
F. 900, 906.
4 Dean of the UP
5 Sinco, Philippine
Political Law, Principles and Concepts, 1954, ed., p. 22.
6 Barker, Principles of Social and Political
Theory, p. 59 (1952 ed.).
7 118 US 356.
8 Cruz, Philippine Political Law, p. 49, [1991 ed].
9 Sinco, op. cit., pp. 23-24.
9 Sinco, op. cit., pp. 23-24.
10 3 AM JUR 2d 889-890; 63 AM JUR 2d 653; 67
CSJ 926.
11 Moyav. delFierro, 69 Phil. 199.