THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 118883.
January 16, 1998]
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF SAN
ANDRES, CATANDUANES, Represented by VICE MAYOR NENITO AQUINO and MAYOR LYDIA T.
ROMANO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and AUGUSTO T. ANTONIO, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Although a
resignation is not complete without an acceptance thereof by the proper
authority, an office may still be deemed relinquished through voluntary
abandonment which needs no acceptance.
Statement of the Case
Before us is a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking a reversal of
the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] promulgated on January 31, 1995 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 34158, which modified the Decision dated February 18, 1994 of
the Regional Trial Court[3] of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 42,
in Sp. Civil Case No. 1654.
The dispositive
portion of the assailed Decision of the appellate court reads:
WHEREFORE,
the judgment appealed from is hereby MODIFIED such that paragraphs 1, 2 and 4
thereof are deleted. Paragraph 3 is
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
costs.[4]
Antecedent Facts
Private
Respondent Augusto T. Antonio was elected barangay captain of Sapang Palay, San
Andres, Catanduanes in March 1989. He
was later elected president of the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC)[5] for the Municipality of San Andres,
Catanduanes. In that capacity and
pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1983, he was appointed by the
President as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of San
Andres.
Meanwhile, then
Secretary Luis T. Santos of the Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG) declared the election for the president of the Federation of the
Association of Barangay Councils (FABC) of the same province, in which private
respondent was a voting member, void for want of a quorum. Hence, a reorganization of the provincial
council became necessary. Conformably,
the DILG secretary designated private respondent as a temporary member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Catanduanes, effective June 15,
1990.
In view of his
designation, private respondent resigned as a member of the Sangguniang
Bayan. He tendered his resignation[6] dated June 14, 1990 to Mayor Lydia
T. Romano of San Andres, Catanduanes, with copies furnished to the provincial
governor, the DILG and the municipal treasurer. Pursuant to Section 50 of the 1983 Local Government Code[7] (B.P. Blg. 337), Nenito F.
Aquino, then vice-president of the ABC, was subsequently appointed by the
provincial governor as member of the Sangguniang Bayan[8] in place of private
respondent. Aquino assumed office on
July 18, 1990 after taking his oath.[9]
Subsequently,
the ruling of DILG Secretary Santos annulling the election of the FABC
president was reversed by the Supreme Court in Taule vs. Santos.[10] In the same case, the appointment
of Private Respondent Antonio as sectoral representative to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan was declared void, because he did not possess the basic
qualification that he should be president of the federation of barangay
councils.[11] This ruling of the Court became
final and executory on December 9, 1991.
On March 31,
1992, private respondent wrote to the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of San
Andres advising them of his re-assumption of his original position, duties and
responsibilities as sectoral representative[12] therein. In response thereto, the Sanggunian issued Resolution No. 6,
Series of 1992, declaring that Antonio had no legal basis to resume office as a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan.[13]
On August 13,
1992, private respondent sought from the DILG a definite ruling relative to his
right to resume his office as member of the Sangguniang Bayan.[14] Director Jacob F. Montesa,
department legal counsel of the DILG, clarified Antonios status in this wise:
Having
been elected President of the ABC in accordance with the Departments
Memorandum Circular No. 89-09,[15] you became an ex-officio
member in the sanggunian. Such
position has not been vacated inasmuch as you did not resign nor abandon said office
when you were designated as temporary representative of the Federation to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Catanduanes on June 7, 1990. The Supreme Court in Triste vs. Leyte State College Board of
Trustees (192 SCRA 327), declared that: designation implies temporariness.
Thus, to designate a public officer to another position may mean to
vest him with additional duties while he performs the functions of his
permanent office. In some cases, a
public officer may be designated to a position in an acting capacity as when
an undersecretary is designated to discharge the functions of the Secretary
pending the appointment of a permanent Secretary.
Furthermore, incumbent ABC
presidents are mandated by the Rules and Regulations Implementing the 1991 Local
Government Code to continue to act as president of the association and to serve
as ex-officio members of the sangguniang bayan, to wit:
Article 210 (d) (3), Rule XXIX of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Rep. Act No. 7160, provides that:
The incumbent presidents of the
municipal, city and provincial chapters of the liga shall continue to
serve as ex-officio members of the sanggunian concerned until the
expiration of their term of office, unless sooner removed for cause.
(f) x x x Pending election of the
presidents of the municipal, city, provincial and metropolitan chapters of the liga,
the incumbent presidents of the association of barangay councils in the
municipality, city, province and Metropolitan Manila, shall continue to act as
president of the corresponding liga chapters under this Rule.
In view
of the foregoing, considering that the annuled designation is only an
additional duty to your primary function, which is the ABC President, we find
no legal obstacle if you re-assume your representation in the sanggunian
bayan as ex-officio member.[16]
Despite this
clarification, the local legislative body issued another resolution[17] reiterating its previous stand.
In response to
private respondents request,[18] Director Montesa opined that
Antonio did not relinquish or abandon his office; and that since he was the duly elected ABC president, he could
re-assume his position in the Sanggunian.[19] A copy of said reply was sent to
the members of the local legislative body.
Notwithstanding,
the Sanggunian refused to acknowledge the right of private respondent to
re-assume office as sectoral representative.
On December 10,
1992, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus
with preliminary mandatory injunction and/or restraining order before the
RTC. On February 18, 1994, the trial
court rendered its decision holding that Augusto T. Antonios resignation from
the Sangguniang Bayan was ineffective and inoperative, since there was
no acceptance thereof by the proper authorities. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner and against
the respondents and ordering the latter:
(1) to pay the petitioner
jointly and severally the amount of P10,000.00 as attorneys fees and
the cost of the suit;
(2) to allow petitioner to
assume his position as sectoral representative of the Sangguniang Bayan
of San Andres, Catanduanes;
(3) to pay the petitioner
jointly and severally his uncollected salaries similar to those received by the
other members of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres, Catanduanes as
certified to by the Municipal Budget Officer and Municipal Treasurer of the
same municipality from April 8, 1992 up to the date of this judgment; and
(4) declaring
Resolution No[s]. 7 & 28 series of 1992 null and void and to have no
effect.[20]
Petitioners
appealed this judgment to the Court of Appeals.
Appellate Courts Ruling
Respondent Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial courts ruling but deleted the first, second and
fourth paragraphs of its dispositive portion.
It held that private respondents resignation was not accepted by the
proper authority, who is the President of the Philippines. While the old Local Government Code is
silent as to who should accept and act on the resignation of any member of the
Sanggunian, the law vests in the President the power to appoint members of the
local legislative unit. Thus,
resignations must be addressed to and accepted by him. It added that, though the secretary of the
DILG is the alter ego of the President and notice to him may be considered
notice to the President, the records are bereft of any evidence showing that
the DILG secretary received and accepted the resignation letter of Antonio.
Moreover,
granting that there was complete and effective resignation, private respondent
was still the president of the ABC and, as such, he was qualified to sit in the
Sangguniang Bayan in an ex officio capacity by virtue of Section 494[21] of R.A. 7160[22] and Memorandum Circular No. 92-38.[23] In view, however, of the May 1994
elections in which a new set of barangay officials was elected, Antonios
reassumption of office as barangay representative to the Sangguniang Bayan was
no longer legally feasible.
The appellate
court added that private respondent could not be considered to have abandoned
his office. His designation as member
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was merely temporary and not incompatible with
his position as president of the ABC of San Andres, Catanduanes.
Finally, Respondent
Court deleted the award of attorneys fees for being without basis, and held
that Resolution Nos. 6 and 28 of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres involved a
valid exercise of the powers of said local body. It thus modified the trial courts judgment by affirming
paragraph 3 and deleting the other items.
Unsatisfied, petitioners brought the present recourse.[24]
Issues
The petitioner,
in its memorandum,[25] submits before this Court the
following issues:
I. Whether or not respondents resignation as ex-officio member of
Petitioner Sangguniang Bayan ng San Andres, Catanduanes is deemed complete so
as to terminate his official relation thereto;
II. Whether or not respondent had totally abandoned his ex-officio
membership in Petitioner Sangguniang Bayan;
III. Whether or
not respondent is entitled to collect salaries similar to those received by
other members of Petitioner Sangguniang Bayan from April 8, 1992 up to date of
judgment in this case by the Regional Trial Court of Virac, Catanduanes.[26]
In sum, was
there a complete and effective resignation?
If not, was there an abandonment of office?
This Courts Ruling
The petition is
meritorious. Although the terms of
office of barangay captains, including private respondent, elected in March
1989 have expired, the Court deemed it necessary to resolve this case, as the
Court of Appeals had ordered the payment of the uncollected salaries allegedly
due prior to the expiration of Respondent Antonios term.
First Issue: Validity
of Resignation
The petitioner
submits that the resignation of private respondent was valid and effective
despite the absence of an express acceptance by the President of the
Philippines. The letter of resignation
was submitted to the secretary of the DILG, an alter ego of the President, the
appointing authority. The acceptance of
respondents resignation may be inferred from the fact that the DILG secretary
himself appointed him a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Catanduanes.[27]
In Ortiz vs.
COMELEC,[28] we defined resignation as the act
of giving up or the act of an officer by which he declines his office and
renounces the further right to use it.
It is an expression of the incumbent in some form, express or implied,
of the intention to surrender, renounce, and relinquish the office and the
acceptance by competent and lawful authority.
To constitute a complete and operative resignation from public office,
there must be: (a) an intention to
relinquish a part of the term; (b) an act of relinquishment; and (c) an
acceptance by the proper authority.[29] The last one is required by reason of Article 238 of the
Revised Penal Code.[30]
The records are
bereft of any evidence that private respondents resignation was accepted by
the proper authority. From the time
that he was elected as punong barangay up to the time he resigned as a member
of Sangguniang Bayan, the governing law was B.P. 337 or the Local Government
Code of 1983. While said law was silent
as to who specifically should accept the resignation of an appointive member of
the Sangguniang Bayan, Sec. 6 of Rule XIX of its implementing rules states that
the [r]esignation of sanggunian members shall be acted upon by the sanggunian
concerned, and a copy of the action taken shall be furnished the official
responsible for appointing a replacement and the Ministry of Local
Government. The position shall be
deemed vacated only upon acceptance of the resignation.
It is not
disputed that private respondents resignation letter was addressed only to the
municipal mayor of San Andres, Catanduanes.
It is indicated thereon that copies were furnished the provincial
governor, the municipal treasurer and the DILG. Neither the mayor nor the officers who had been furnished copies
of said letter expressly acted on it.
On hindsight, and assuming arguendo that the aforecited Sec. 6 of Rule
XIX is valid and applicable, the mayor should have referred or endorsed the
latter to the Sangguniang Bayan for proper action. In any event, there is no evidence that the resignation was
accepted by any government functionary or office.
Parenthetically,
Section 146 of B.P. Blg. 337 states:
Sec. 146. Composition. -
(1) The sangguniang bayan shall
be the legislative body of the municipality and shall be composed of the municipal
mayor, who shall be the presiding officer, the vice-mayor, who shall be the
presiding officer pro tempore, eight members elected at large, and the
members appointed by the President consisting of the president of the katipunang
bayan and the president of the kabataang barangay municipal
federation. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
Under
established jurisprudence, resignations, in the absence of statutory provisions
as to whom they should be submitted, should be tendered to the appointing
person or body.[31] Private respondent, therefore,
should have submitted his letter of resignation to the President or to his
alter ego, the DILG secretary. Although
he supposedly furnished the latter a copy of his letter, there is no
showing that it was duly received, much less, that it was acted upon. The third requisite being absent, there was
therefore no valid and complete resignation.
Second Issue: Abandonment
of Office
While we agree
with Respondent Court that the resignation was not valid absent any acceptance
thereof by the proper authority, we nonetheless hold that Private Respondent
Antonio has effectively relinquished his membership in the Sangguniang Bayan
due to his voluntary abandonment of said post.
Abandonment of
an office has been defined as the voluntary relinquishment of an office by the
holder, with the intention of terminating his possession and control thereof.[32] Indeed, abandonment of office is a
species of resignation; while
resignation in general is a formal relinquishment, abandonment is a voluntary relinquishment through nonuser.[33] Nonuser refers to a neglect to use
a privilege or a right (Cyclopedic Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.) or to exercise an
easement or an office (Blacks Law Dictionary, 6th ed.).
Abandonment
springs from and is accompanied by deliberation and freedom of choice.[34] Its concomitant effect is that the
former holder of an office can no longer legally repossess it even by forcible
reoccupancy.[35]
Clear intention
to abandon should be manifested by the officer concerned. Such intention may be express or inferred
from his own conduct.[36] Thus, the failure to perform the
duties pertaining to the office must be with the officers actual or imputed
intention to abandon and relinquish the office.[37] Abandonment of an office is not wholly
a matter of intention; it results from a complete abandonment of duties of such
a continuance that the law will infer a relinquishment.[38] Therefore, there are two essential
elements of abandonment: first, an intention to abandon and, second, an overt
or external act by which the intention is carried into effect. [39]
Petitioner
argues that the following clearly demonstrate private respondents abandonment
of his post in the Sangguniang Bayan:
Admittedly, the designation of
respondent as member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Catanduanes was worded
temporary, but his acts more than clearly established his intention to
totally abandon his office, indicating an absolute relinquishment thereof. It bears to emphasize that respondent
actually tendered his resignation and subsequently accepted an ex-officio
membership in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Catanduanes. He performed his duties and functions of
said office for almost two (2) years, and was completely aware of the
appointment and assumption on July 18, 1990 of Nenito F. Aquino, who was
then Vice-President of the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) of San
Andres, Catanduanes, as ex-officio member of petitioner Sangguniang Bayan
representing the ABC.
x x x x x
x x x
x
Moreover,
it may be well-noted that ABC Vice President Nenito Aquino assumed respondents
former position for twenty (20) months, without him questioning the term of
office of the former if indeed respondents designation as ex-officio member of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was only temporary. Likewise, for almost eight (8) months after knowledge of the
decision in Taule vs. Santos, et. al., Ibid., nullifying his designation
as representative to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, respondent opted to remain
silent, and in fact failed to seasonably act for the purpose of reassuming his
former position. Evidently, respondent
had clearly abandoned his former position by voluntary relinquishment of his
office through non-user.[40] [Underscoring supplied.]
We agree with
petitioner. Indeed, the following
clearly manifest the intention of private respondent to abandon his position:
(1) his failure to perform his function
as member of the Sangguniang Bayan, (2)
his failure to collect the corresponding remuneration for the position,
(3) his failure to object to the appointment of Aquino as his replacement in
the Sangguniang Bayan, (4) his
prolonged failure to initiate any act to reassume his post in the Sangguniang
Bayan after the Supreme Court had nullified his designation to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan.
On the other
hand, the following overt acts demonstrate that he had effected his intention:
(1) his letter of resignation from the Sangguniang Bayan;[41] (2) his assumption of office as
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, (3) his faithful discharge of his
duties and functions as member of said Sanggunian, and (4) his receipt of the
remuneration for such post.
It must be
stressed that when an officer is designated to another post, he is usually
called upon to discharge duties in addition to his regular
responsibilities. Indeed, his
additional responsibilities are prescribed by law to inhere, as it were, to his
original position. A Supreme Court
justice, for instance, may be designated member of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal. In some cases, a
public officer may be designated to a position in an acting capacity, as when
an undersecretary is tasked to discharge the functions of a secretary for a
temporary period.[42] In all cases, however, the law does
not require the public servant to resign from his original post. Rather, the law allows him to concurrently
discharge the functions of both offices.
Private
respondent, however, did not simultaneously discharge the duties and
obligations of both positions. Neither
did he, at that time, express an intention to resume his office as member of
the Sangguniang Bayan. His overt acts,
silence, inaction and acquiescence, when Aquino succeeded him to his original
position, show that Antonio had abandoned the contested office. His immediate and natural reaction upon
Aquinos appointment should have been to object or, failing to do that, to file
appropriate legal action or proceeding.
But he did neither. It is
significant that he expressed his intention to resume office only on March 31,
1992, after Aquino had been deemed resigned on March 23, 1992, and months after this Court had nullified
his designation on August 12, 1991.
From his passivity, he is deemed to have recognized the validity of
Aquinos appointment and the latters discharge of his duties as a member of
the Sangguniang Bayan.
In all, private
respondents failure to promptly assert his alleged right implies his loss of
interest in the position. His overt
acts plainly show that he really meant his resignation and understood its
effects. As pointed out by the eminent
American commentator, Mechem:[43]
Public offices are held upon the
implied condition that the officer will diligently and faithfully execute the
duties belonging to them, and while a temporary or accidental failure to
perform them in a single instance or during a short period will not operate as
an abandonment, yet if the officer refuses or neglects to exercise the
functions of the office for so long a period as to reasonably warrant the
presumption that he does not desire or intend to perform the duties of the
office at all, he will be held to have abandoned it, not only when his refusal
to perform was wilful, but also where, while he intended to vacate the office,
it was because he in good faith but mistakenly supposed he had no right to hold
it.
Lastly, private
respondent, who remained ABC president, claims the legal right to be a member
of the Sangguniang Bayan by virtue of Section 146 of B.P. Blg. 337. However, his right thereto is not
self-executory, for the law itself requires another positive act -- an
appointment by the President or the secretary of local government per E.O. 342.[44] What private respondent could have
done in order to be able to reassume his post after Aquinos resignation was to
seek a reappointment from the President or the secretary of local
government. By and large, private
respondent cannot claim an absolute right to the office which, by his own
actuations, he is deemed to have relinquished.[45]
We reiterate our
ruling in Aparri vs. Court of Appeals: [46]
A public office is the right, authority, and duty
created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law
or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested
with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised
by him for the benefit of the public x x x.
The right to hold a public office under our political system is
therefore not a natural right. It
exists, when it exists at all, only because and by virtue of some law expressly
or impliedly creating and conferring it x x x.
There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office,
or even an absolute right to hold office.
Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as
regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an
office or its salary x x x.
Third Issue: Salary
Having ruled
that private respondent had voluntarily abandoned his post at the Sangguniang
Bayan, he cannot be entitled to any back salaries. Basic is the no work, no pay[47] rule. A public officer is entitled to receive compensation for services
actually rendered for as long as he has the right to the office being claimed.[48] When the act or conduct of a public
servant constitutes a relinquishment of his office, he has no right to receive
any salary incident to the office he had abandoned.[49]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the
Assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J.,
(Chairman), Romero, Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 20-31.
[2]
Seventh Division composed of J. Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis, ponente; and JJ.
Antonio M. Martinez (chairman) and Fermin A. Martin, Jr., concurring.
[3]
Presided by Judge Nilo B. Barsaga.
[4]
Assailed Decision, p. 12; Rollo, p. 31.
[5]
Sometimes referred to as the Association of Barangay Captains.
[6] His resignation reads:
In view of my designation
as Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the province of Catanduanes by the
Secretary of the Department of Local Government, effective June 15, 1990, I am
tendering my resignation as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres,
Catanduanes effective June 15, 1990. Records, pp. 28, 52, 66 and 153.
[7] It states:
Sec. 50.
Permanent Vacancies in Local Sanggunians. - In case of permanent vacancy
in the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, sangguniang bayan,or
sangguniang barangay, the President of the Philippines, upon recommendation of
the Minister of Local Government, shall appoint a qualified person to fill the
vacancy in the sangguniang panlalawigan and the sangguniang panlungsod; the
governor, in the case of sangguniang bayan members; or the city or municipal
mayor, in the case of sangguniang barangay, the appointee shall come from the
political party of the sanggunian member who caused the vacancy, and shall
serve the unexpired term of the vacant office.
[8]
Records, p. 53.
[9]
Records, pp. 54-55.
[10]
200 SCRA 512, August 12, 1991.
[11]
Id., pp. 528-529.
[12]
Records, pp. 12-13.
[13]
Records, pp. 8-9.
[14]
Records, p. 14.
[15]
Re: Reorganization of the
Katipunan ng mga Barangay at All Levels; Guidelines on the Election of Their
Officers and for Other Purposes.
[16]
Records, pp. 17-18.
[17]
Resolution No. 28, s. of 1992; records, pp. 10-11.
[18]
Records, pp. 19-20.
[19]
Records, pp. 21-23.
[20]
Decision of the RTC, pp. 6-7; records, pp. 230-231.
[21] It states:
The duly elected
presidents of the liga at the municipal, city and provincial levels, including
the component cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, shall serve as
ex-officio members of the sangguniang bayan, sangguniang panlungsod, and
sangguniang panlalawigan, respectively.
They shall serve as such only during their term of office as presidents
of the liga chapters, which in no case shall be beyond the term of office of
the sanggunian concerned.
[22]
The law took effect on January 1, 1992.
(See Section 536.)
[23] Issued by then DILG Secretary Cesar N. Sarino on June
29, 1992. The relevant portion thereof
reads:
x x x being actually and in legal contemplation,
part of the principal office, it follows that the incumbent president of the
ABC may likewise be allowed to continue his ex-officio membership in the
sanggunian concerned as a consequence of his continuance in office as liga president,
until such time that his successor thereto shall have been elected and duly
qualified.
[24]
This case was deemed submitted for decision upon this Courts receipt of
private respondents Memorandum on May 8, 1996.
[25]
Rollo, pp. 70-82.
[26]
Petitioners Memorandum, p. 5; Rollo, p. 74. (All caps in the original.)
[27]
Memorandum for the Petitioner, pp. 5-8; Rollo, pp. 74-77.
[28]
162 SCRA 812, 819, June 28, 1988.
See also Gamboa vs. Court of Appeals, 108 SCRA 1, 8-9, September
30, 1981.
[29]
Gamboa vs. Court of Appeals, 108 SCRA 1, 9-10, September 30,
1981. See also Gonzales vs.
Hernandez, 2 SCRA 228, 232, May 30, 1961; 63 Am Jur 2d, 161, pp. 727-728.
[30] It states:
Any public
officer who, before the acceptance of his resignation, shall abandon his office
to the detriment of the public service shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor.
If such office shall have
been abandoned in order to evade the discharge of the duties of preventing,
prosecuting or punishing any of the crime falling within Title One, and Chapter
One of Title Three of Book Two of this Code, the offender shall be punished by
prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, and by arresto mayor if
the purpose of such abandonment is to evade the duty of preventing, prosecuting
or punishing any other crime.
[31]
Supra note 29. See also
Martin and Martin, Administrative Law, Law of Public Offices and Election Law,
1983 edition, p. 176-177, citing Edward vs. U.S. 103 US 471; Nachura,
Outline/Reviewer in Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 266; and, Sibal, The law on
Public Offices and Officers, 1993 edition, p. 167. See also 63 Am Jur 2d 163, p. 729 and 67 CJS 703, p. 451.
[32]
Words and Phrases, Vol. 1, p. 127, citing Board of Comrs of Dearbon
County v Droege, Ind.App., 66 N.E. 2d 134, 138.
[33]
Words and Phrases, Vol. 1, p. 126, citing State ex rel. Flynn v.
Ellis, 98 P.2d 879, 881, 110 Mont. 43; People ex el. Warren v.
Christian, 123 P.2d 368, 375, 377, 58 Wyo. 39; Steingruber v. City of
San Antonio, Tex.Com.App., 220 S.W. 77,78.
[34]
Jorge vs. Mayor, 10 SCRA 331, 335, February 28, 1964, citing
Teves vs. Sindiong, 81 Phil. 658, 664-665, October 21, 1948.
[35]
Sibal, The Law on Public Offices and Officers, 1993 ed., p. 190. See also 63 Am Jur 2d, 168, p. 732.
[36]
Sibal, op. cit., p. 185.
[37]
Words and Phrases, Vol. 1, p. 126, citing McCall v. Cull, 75 P.2d
696, 698, 51 Ariz. 237. See also
Santiago vs. Agustin, 46 Phil. 14, 18, July 19, 1924.
[38]
Ibid., pp. 125-126, citing Wilkinson v. City of
Birmingham, 68 So. 999, 1002, 193 Ala. 139.
See also Airoso vs. De Guzman, 49 Phil. 371, 373, September 7,
1926.
[39]
Ibid., pp. 102-102, citing Tucker v. Edwards, Okl.m 376
P.2d 253, 255; Conway v. Fabian, 89 P.2d 1022, 1029, 108 Mont. 287;
Glotzer v. Keyes, 5 A.2d 1, 3, 4, 125 Conn. 227; Sharkiewiez v.
Lepone, 96 A.2d 796, 797, 139 Conn. 706; Collins vs. Lewis, 149 A. 668,
669, 111 Conn. 299; Billings v. Mcdaniel 60 S.E.2d 592, 594, 217 S.C.
261; Cottrell v. Caniel, 205 S.W.2d 973, 975, 30 Tennn.App. 339; Kizziar
v. Pierce, 226 P.2d 941, 945, 204 Okl. 51; Holly Hill Lumber Co. vs.
Grooms, 16 S.E.2d 816, 821. 198 S.C. 118; Edwards v. Edwards, 66 So.2d
919, 921, 259 Ala. 374; Hoff v. Girdler Corp. Doherty v. Russell,
101 A. 305, 306, 116 Me. 269.
[40]
Memorandum for Petitioner, pp. 9-10; Rollo, pp. 78-79.
[41]
Resignation is not a requisite in abandonment. However, it is viewed as an express manifestation of ones
intention to relinquish his right to office.
[42]
Triste vs. Leyte State College Board of Trustee, 192 SCRA 326,
335, December 17, 1990
[43]
In his book The Law of Offices and Officers, 435, pp. 278-279.
[44]
Issued on November 28, 1988, by then President Corazon C. Aquino
delegating to the Secretary of Local Government the power to appoint certain
local officials under Sections 42(4), 48(3), 49(2), 146(1) and (2), 173(1) and
(5), and 205(2) of the Local Government Code, as amended.
[45]
Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should
have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. (Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, 35, April 15, 1968.)
[46]
127 SCRA 231, 237-238, January 31, 1984, per Makasiar, J.
[47]
Celerian vs. Tantuico, Jr., 190 SCRA 1, 6, September 24, 1990.
[48]
63 Am Jur 2d, 361, p. 845 and 401, pp. 874-875.
[49]
63 Am Jur 2d, 401, pp. 874-875.