SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124927. May 18, 1999]
MORE MARITIME AGENCIES, INC., OCEAN BULK MARITIME, and ALPHA
INSURANCE & SURETY CO., INC., petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION and SERGIO F. HOMICILLADA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO,
J.:
MORE MARITIME AGENCIES,
INC., Ocean Bulk Maritime, and Alpha Insurance and Surety Co., Inc., in this
petition for certiorari, seek to reverse and set aside the decision of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated 21 February 1996[1] affirming with modification the decision of
the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) dated 7 September 1995 which
ordered petitioners to pay private respondent Sergio F. Homicillada disability
and medical benefits in the increased amount of US$7,465.00.[2]
On 17 January 1994
private respondent Sergio Homicillada entered into an overseas employment
contract with petitioner More Maritime Agencies, Inc., (MORE MARITIME), then
acting as local agent of its principal, its herein co-petitioner Ocean Bulk
Maritime (OCEAN BULK), a foreign corporation organized under the laws of
Greece. The contract stipulated that
Homicillada was to be employed as oiler on board the vessel MV Rhine
with a basic monthly salary of US$287.00 plus allowance of US$76.00 per month,
open overtime and vacation pay for a period of nine (9) months.[3] On 5 February 1994, pursuant to their
employment contract, Homicillada boarded the vessel MV Rhine at Port
Sete, France.
On 18 March 1994, while
the MV Rhine was anchored at a port in Brazil, respondent Homicillada
was directed to open and clean the main engine as well as the first and second
cylinders of the air trunk.[4] To accomplish this, Homicillada had to enter
a manhole, an entrance that was accessible only in a crouching position, and
had to carry a weighty 20-liter canister in order to collect the carbon, mud
and oil deposited inside the cylinders and bring them out for proper disposal.
After working for four
(4) consecutive days, Homicillada started experiencing pain on his left leg
transcending upward to his waist and lower back. His left foot swelled.
Due to the excruciating pain, he decided to inform his Chief Engineer
who insisted however that he continue with his work. He was given only a “salonpas” plaster to relieve his pain.
On 29 March 1994
Homicillada’s condition worsened. He
finally told his ship Captain who forthwith had him examined by their ship
doctor. In his medical report the
doctor certified that Homicillada was not fit for work for five (5) days. But that notwithstanding, the ship Captain
still required him to work. He was
never given any rest from work. After
the vessel sailed out of Brazil, the pain intensified and became unbearable.
Upon his return to France
Homicillada had himself medically examined again. On 27 April 1994 he was repatriated to the Philippines where he
underwent a series of physical examinations at the Physician’s Diagnostic Service
Center, the same clinic that cleared him for work prior to his deployment to
the MV Rhine.
Initial examination
indicated that Homicillada’s manifestations of limping and lower back pain were
probably due to a slipped-disc.[5] This diagnosis was later confirmed in a
Medical Evaluation Certificate dated 4 May 1994 prepared by the same clinic.[6] ACT-scan image of the lower back of
Homicillada revealed a “Degeneration Osteo Arthropathy, lumbar spine, with Disc
Bulge,” or simply a slipped-disc.[7] The diagnostic center recommended
laminectomy and dissection on Homicillada’s lower back to alleviate his pain.[8] However, upon learning that the surgery
would cost approximately P40,000.00 petitioner MORE MARITIME
disregarded the recommendation and proposed instead a pelvic traction treatment
which was a less costly procedure. But
this did not improve the condition of private respondent.
Thus on 6 December 1994
Homicillada filed a complaint with the POEA against petitioners for disability
and medical benefits as well as for payment of his two (2) months basic salary
which petitioners had withheld.[9] In their answer petitioners countered that
Homicillada was not entitled to the benefits he was demanding because “his
illness was pre-existing, concealed from respondents, unrelated to his
employment, or is otherwise baseless.”[10]
The POEA sustained
Homicillada and ordered petitioners jointly and severally to pay the former
US$1,642.30 or 14.93% of US$11,000.00 pursuant to Appendix I-A of the Standard
Employment Contract Governing the Employment of All Filipino Seamen on Board
Ocean-Going Vessels at the exchange rate prevailing during actual
payment. The POEA also held Alpha
Insurance Company liable as surety of MORE MARITIME.
From this ruling both
parties appealed to the NLRC with Homicillada insisting that he was entitled to
more than the amount decreed by the POEA.
For their part, petitioners asserted that Homicillada was not entitled
to disability benefits, reiterating that his sickness was not work-connected
and was in fact already in existence prior to his deployment abroad. Petitioners further made reference to the
quitclaim which was allegedly made by Homicillada in consideration of the
post-repatriation medical treatment extended to him at the expense of the
maritime agency and that, as a consequence, he was deemed to have released and
absolved petitioners from any liability which would have been adjudged against
them.
In its challenged
decision of 21 February 1996 the NLRC modified the appealed judgment by
increasing the disability award to US$7,465.00 based on POEA Memorandum
Circular No. 5, which took effect 20 March 1994, upgrading the basis for
disability allowance to US$50,000.00.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration which the NLRC denied in its
resolution of 19 April 1996.
In this recourse,
petitioners allege that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
completely ignored a “Receipt and Release” dated 16 August 1994
purportedly signed by Homicillada in favor of More Maritime Agencies while the
case was pending in POEA, and affirming the finding of the POEA that the
illness of Homicillada was work-connected.
In that “Receipt and
Release” Homicillada supposedly acknowledged receipt of the amount of P15,750.00
“in complete and final settlement of (his) wages, bonuses, overtime pay, leave
pay, allotments and all other entitlements as well as sickness wages,
reimbursement of medical expenses, medicines and other benefits due (him) x x x
accruing from (his) services and employment on the vessel MV Bulk Rhine
x x x x” and that “(he) hereby declare(s) and confirm(s) that (he) (has) no other claims against said
vessel, Master, Owners, Operators and Agents and (he) hereby discharge(s) and
release(s) them from any other liability whatsoever x x x x"[11]Contrary to the finding of the NLRC,
petitioners maintain that they attached this quitclaim to their position paper
with motion to dismiss which was received by the POEA on 10 April 1995.[12]
Whether the quitclaim was
actually filed and formed part of the records which the POEA and the NLRC
decided to ignore, as petitioners would want to impress on us, is largely a
question of fact which we choose not to dwell on in this special civil action
for certiorari. Besides, as
aptly observed by the NLRC:
“Further, granting the existence of the said quitclaim, it cannot
effectively free the respondents from liability as the fact remains that
complainant was not afforded the proper medical treatment per physician’s
advice, it appearing from the records that the respondents only approved the
procedure for a pelvic traction on the complaint which was not however the
recommended recourse, the Medical Evaluation Certificate dated May 4, 1994
showing that the complainant was advised to undergo laminectomy and dissection
of his disc herniation. This is further
buttressed by the fact that, even after the complainant was administered with a
pelvic traction, the medical certificate dated June 23, 1994 indicated no
improvement in the herniation and that the complainant will just the same
suffer from a partial permanent disability in the absence of the previously
advised surgery. If at all, the only
visible help extended by the respondents was diagnostic in nature which answers
to the cost of CT-Scan of complainant’s lumbo-sacral area in the amount of
Three Thousand Eight Hundered Pesos (P3,800.00). Certainly this is not an amount to justify a
waiver of the claim to which the complainant’s entitlement has been upheld.”[13]
Indeed, it is appalling
that Homicillada would settle for a measly consideration of P15,570.00,
which is grossly inadequate, that it could not have given rise to a valid
waiver on the part of the disadvantaged employee. In American Home Assurance Co. v. NLRC[14] this Court held:
“The law does not consider as valid any agreement to receive less compensation than what a worker is entitled to recover nor prevent him from demanding benefits to which he is entitled. Quitclaims executed by the employees are thus commonly frowned upon as contrary to public policy and ineffective to bar claims for the full measure of the worker’s legal rights, considering the economic disadvantage of the employee and the inevitable pressure upon him by financial necessity.”
Thus it is never enough
to assert that the parties have voluntarily entered into such a quitclaim. There are other requisites, to wit: (a) That
there was no fraud or deceit on the part of any of the parties; (b) That the
consideration of the quitclaim is credible and reasonable; and, (c) That the
contract is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good
customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.[15] Although some of the requisites mentioned
were satisfied, it cannot be said that the quitclaim executed by Homicillada
was a fairly reasonable settlement of his claims. He was shortchanged by a not so insignificant amount. The financial terms were so unconscionable
that we have no hesitance to strike down the “Receipt and Release” dated
16 August 1994 as a complete nullity.[16]
Petitioners likewise aver
that Homicillada’s illness was diagnosed as “chronic low back pain” in the
medical report of Dr. Mario Ver of the St. Luke’s Orthopedic Institute.[17] Citing Black’s Law dictionary which defines
“chronic” as “(w)ith reference to diseases, of long duration, or characterized
by slow progressive symptoms; deep seated and obstinate, or threatening a long
continuance; -distinguished from acute,”[18] petitioners submit that the use of the word
“chronic” as characterizing Homicillada’s malady supports their position that
the same was not work-related but already pre-existing long before his overseas
employment with petitioners.
Petitioner’s reliance on
Black’s Law Dictionary is misplaced.
Its definition of “chronic” does not state a definite span of time to
qualify the duration of the existence of the illness as “chronic.” As aptly observed by the NLRC, the
definition does not discount the fact that a period of more than five (5)
months from the time Homicillada started to work for petitioners until such
finding of “chronic low back pain” on 15 July 1994 may be considered long
enough to describe his ailment as “chronic” since it could have traced its
inception to the date of his actual employment.
But even assuming that
the ailment of Homicillada was contracted prior to his employment with the MV
Rhine, this fact would not exculpate petitioners from liability. Compensability of an ailment does not depend
on whether the injury or disease was pre-existing at the time of the employment
but rather if the disease or injury is work-related or aggravated his
condition. It is indeed safe to
pressume that, at the very least, the arduous nature of Homicillada’s
employment had contributed to the aggravation of his injury, if indeed it was
pre-existing at the time of his employment.
Therefore, it is but just that he be duly compensated for it. It is not necessary, in order for an
employee to recover compensation, that he must have been in perfect condition
or health at the time he received the injury, or that he be free from
disease. Every workman brings with him
to his employment certain infirmities, and while the employer is not the
insurer of the health of his employees, he takes them as he finds them, and
assumes the risk of having a weakened condition aggravated by some injury which
might not hurt or bother a perfectly normal, healthy person. If the injury is the proximate cause of his
death or disability for which compensation is sought, the previous physical
condition of the employee is unimportant and recovery may be had for injury
independent of any pre-existing weakness or disease.
In the instant case, the
Court is more inclined to believe the findings of the POEA, which are supported
by substantial evidence:
“The contention of respondent (herein petitioners) that the
sickness of the complainant (herein private respondent) was pre-existing and
was concealed from the respondent is untenable. The fact is before the complainant was made to sign the contract,
he was required to undergo medical examination and declared fit to work
otherwise the respondent would not have accomodated him. The respondent cannot avoid liability by
saying that complainant’s sickness was concealed from it. Being an employer, respondent had all the
opportunity to pre-qualify, screen and choose their applicants and whether they
are medically, psychologically and mentally fit. The moment it has chosen an applicant it is deemed to have
subjected its applicant to the required pre-qualification standard. Thus, the respondent cannot now claim that
complainant’s sickness was pre-existing and concealed from it. Further, the defense of the respondent that
the disease of the complainant is not connected or related to his work does not
deserve merit. The nature of the job of
the complainant, as an oiler, is to clean the engine. Complainant was assigned to get in through the manhole to clean
the engine taking with him containers in which the mud and waste oil shall be
placed and carrying them out of the manhole for disposal. This is the regular job of the complainant
resulting in “Disc Herniation” as diagnosed by the physician. Moreover, even granting for the sake of
argument that the sickness is not work related, still the complainant is entitled
to disability benefits provided the disease occurred during the effectivity of
the contract because the Standard Contract for seamen approved by the POEA does
not qualify whether the sickness is work related or not.”[19]
In sum, the instant
petition fails to show that the NLRC has committed grave abuse of discretion to
warrant the reversal of its decision of 21 February 1996 and its resolution of
19 April 1996. The injury sustained by
Homicillada is compensable the same having resulted from the rigors of carrying
heavy canisters in a crouching position which logically strained his lower back
that lead to his slipped-disc.
Migrant workers are the
modern-day heroes of our time. Quite
often they find themselves laboring in the scorching heat and the freezing cold
in foreign lands. Their woes often
remain unheard, their tears unnoticed.
It is time that the arms of justice reach out to them workers and cradle
them gently in her bosom.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed decision and resolution of
public respondent National Labor Relations Commissions dated 21 February 1996
and 19 April 1996, respectively, ordering petitioners More Maritime Agencies,
Inc., Ocean Bulk Maritime and Alpha Insurance and Surety Co., Inc. jointly and
severally to pay private respondent Sergio F. Homicillada the sum of
US$7,465.00 at the exchange rate in Philippine Peso prevailing at the time of
actual payment are AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Mendoza, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
Buena, J., on leave.
[1]
Decision penned by Presiding Commissioner Bartolome S. Carale, concurred in by
Commissioners Vicente S.E. Veloso and Alberto R. Quimpo, NLRC-NCR-CA No.
009825-95.
[2]
Decision penned by POEA Administrator Felicisimo O. Joson, Jr., POEA Case No.
ADJ(M) 94-0702258, 7 September 1995.
[3]
Records, p. 77.
[4]
Rollo, p. 27.
[5]
Records, p. 23.
[6]
Records, p. 22.
[7]
Ibid.
[8]
Ibid.
[9]
Id., pp. 67-68.
[10]
Id., pp. 51-52.
[11]
Rollo, p. 25.
[12]
Id., p. 171.
[13]
Id., pp. 32-34.
[14]
G.R. No. 120043, 24 July 1996, 259 SCRA 280, 293.
[15]
See Periquet v. NLRC, G.R. No. 91298, 22 June 1990, 186 SCRA 724, 730.
[16]
Id.
[17]
Records, p. 124.
[18]
Rollo, p. 168.
[19]
Records, pp. 78-80.