FIRST
DIVISION
|
HON. HEHERSON ALVAREZ
substituted by HON. ELISEA G. GOZUN, in her capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Petitioner, - versus
- PICOP RESOURCES, INC.,
Respondent. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x PICOP
RESOURCES, INC.,
Petitioner, - versus
- HON. HEHERSON ALVAREZ
substituted by HON. ELISEA G. GOZUN, in her capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources Respondent. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x THE HON. ANGELO
T. REYES (formerly Hon. Elisea G. Gozun), in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
Petitioner, - versus
- PAPER INDUSTRIES CORP. OF THE
Respondent.
|
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G.R. No. 162243 G.R. No. 164516 G.R. No. 171875 Present: PANGANIBAN, C.J.
Chairperson, YNARES-SANTIAGO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO, SR., and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. Promulgated: |
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
On the line are three
consolidated Petitions, all arising from the
In G.R. No. 162243, then
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary Heherson T.
Alvarez, who was later successively substituted by subsequent DENR Secretaries
Elisea G. Gozun and Angelo T. Reyes, assails the
FACTS
The facts, culled from
the records of the three consolidated petitions, are as follows:
On
Allegedly sometime in
1969, the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued a presidential warranty to
BBLCI, confirming that TLA No. 43 “definitely establishes the boundary lines of
[BBLCI’s] concession area.”[5]
TLA No. 43, as amended,
expired on
On
In a
Acting on the
said letter, Forester III Trifino M. Peregrino, In-Charge, Office of the CENRO,
wrote a letter dated 1 September 2000 to PICOP’s resident manager in Tabon,
Bislig, Surigao del Sur, informing PICOP “that we will consider said letter as
an advance notice considering that it is yet premature to act on your request
since we are yet in CY 2000.”[9]
In a
The
Officer-In-Charge (OIC), Regional Executive Director Constantino A. Paye, Jr., in
a 6 March 2001 Memorandum, forwarded PICOP’s letter of intent dated 28 August
2000 to the DENR Secretary informing the latter that the DENR Caraga Region XIII
in Ambago, Butuan City, had created a team tasked to conduct a performance
evaluation on PICOP on the said TLA pursuant to DAO No. 99-53.[11]
Subsequently,
Elias R. Seraspi, Jr., RED, DENR, Caraga Region XIII in Ambago,
Hence, it is imperative to
chart a good forest policy direction for the management, development and
protection of TLA No. 43 after it expires on
Attached to
said Memorandum, inter alia, were the
11 July 2001 Report and 27 July 2001 Supplemental Report of the Performance
Evaluation Team created to conduct such performance evaluation indicating
violations by PICOP of existing DENR Rules and Regulations governing TLA No. 43,
such as the non-submission of its five-year forest protection plan and
seven-year reforestation plan as required by the DENR rules and
regulations. The said
Sometime in
September 2001, the DENR Secretary was furnished a copy of Forest Management
Specialist II (FMS II) Teofila L. Orlanes’
Said
Memorandum was referred to FMB Director Romeo T. Acosta, who directed FMB
Senior Forest Management Specialist (SFMS) Ignacio Evangelista to proceed to
Region 13 to gather forestry-related data and validate the report contained in
the respective Memoranda of Orlanes and Arayan.[15] SFMS Evangelista found that the P15,056,054.05.[16] Moreso, he discovered that from 1996 to
The overdue
and unpaid forest charges (including penalties, interests and surcharges) of
PICOP total P150,169,485.02. Its
silvicultural fees amount to P2,366,901.00 from 1996 up to P167,592,440.90 as of
Thus, FMB
Director Acosta submitted a
RECOMMENDATION
The conversion of the TLA into IFMA is
primarily aimed at sustaining the raw materials for the continuous operation of
the integrated wood processing plant of the company. However, the very complex issues presented
cannot just be ignored and have to be fully addressed to before further appropriate
action is taken on the application for conversion. In the absence of categorical comments and
recommendation of the regional office to resolve the issue, it is recommended
that a transition team composed of the following be created: x x x.[19]
In lieu of a transition team, the DENR
Secretary constituted a negotiating team by virtue of Special Order No.
2001-698 dated
The DENR Secretary sent a
Since PICOP
failed to send a representative, and considering that TLA No. 43 was about to
expire, DENR Undersecretary Paje called for a meeting on
On
On
In the next
TWC meeting on
MR. TEODORO G. BERNARDINO
President
PICOP Resources Incorporated
2nd Flr,
2280 Pasong Tamo Extension
Dear Mr. Bernardino:
Consistent with our attached Memorandum to
Her Excellency, the President, dated 17 October 2001 and in response to your
Letter of Intent dated 25 February 2001, we wish to inform you that, pursuant
to DENR Administrative Order No. 99-53, we have cleared the conversion of
PICOP’s Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 to Integrated Forest Management
Agreement (IFMA) effective from the expiration of said TLA on April 26, 2002.
In this regard, you are hereby requested
to designate PICOP’s representative(s) to discuss with the DENR Team, created
under Special Order No. 2001-638, the conditions and details of the said IFMA,
including the production sharing agreement between PICOP and the government.
For your information and guidance.
Very truly yours,
(sgd)
HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ
Secretary[27]
It was the
position of the DENR members of the TWC that PICOP’s application for the IFMA
conversion should undergo the process as provided in DAO No. 99-53. PICOP representative Atty. Caingat, however,
claimed that “the TLA has been converted” and suggested the suspension of the
meeting as they would submit a written position on the matter the following
day.[28]
On
On
The DENR
Secretary instructed the RED, Caraga Region, to coordinate with PICOP and
reiterate the requirements for conversion of TLA No. 43 into IFMA.
Thereafter,
the FMB Director received a letter dated
On
1.
Certificate
of Filing of Amended Articles of Incorporation issued on
2.
Proof
of Payment of forest charges;
3.
Proof
of Payment of Reforestation Deposit;
4.
Response
to social issues, particularly clearance from the NCIP; and
5.
Map
showing reforestation activities on an annual basis.[31]
PICOP
submitted its purported compliance with aforesaid undertaking through a letter
dated
a) PICOP did not submit the required NCIP
clearance;
b) The proof of payments for forest charges
covers only the production period from
c) The proof of payment of reforestation
deposits covers only the period from the first quarter of CY 1999 to the second
quarter of CY 2001;
d) The map of the areas planted through
supplemental planting and social forestry is not sufficient compliance per
Performance Evaluation Team’s 11 July 2001 report on PICOP’s performance on its
TLA No. 43, pursuant to Section 6.6 of DAO 79-87; and
e) PICOP failed to respond completely to all
the social issues raised.[32]
Accordingly, the Secretary
of DENR claims that further processing of PICOP’s application for the
conversion of TLA No. 43 cannot proceed until PICOP complies with the
requirements.
Insisting
that the conversion of its TLA No. 43 had been completed, PICOP filed a
Petition for Mandamus against then DENR Secretary Heherson T. Alvarez before
the RTC of Quezon City, which was raffled to Branch 220, presided by Hon. Jose
G. Paneda. The petition was docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-02-47764 (hereinafter referred to as the MANDAMUS CASE).
On
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the Petition for Mandamus is hereby GRANTED.
The Respondent DENR
Secretary Hon. Heherson Alvarez is hereby ordered:
1.
to
sign, execute and deliver the IFMA contract and/or documents to PICOP and issue
the corresponding IFMA assignment number on the area covered by the IFMA,
formerly TLA No. 43, as amended;
2.
to
issue the necessary permit allowing petitioner to act and harvest timber from
the said area of TLA No. 43, sufficient to meet the raw material requirements
of petitioner’s pulp and paper mills in accordance with the warranty and agreement
of July 29, 1969 between the government and PICOP’s predecessor-in-interest;
and
3.
to
honor and respect the Government Warranties and contractual obligations to
PICOP strictly in accordance with the warranty and agreement dated July 29,
1999 (sic) between the government and PICOP’s predecessor-in-interest (Exhibits
“H”, “H-1” to “H-5”, particularly the following:
a) the area coverage of TLA No. 43, which
forms part and parcel of the government warranties;
b) PICOP tenure over the said area of TLA No.
43 and exclusive right to cut, collect and remove sawtimber and pulpwood for
the period ending on April 26, 1977; and said period to be renewable for [an]other
25 years subject to compliance with constitutional and statutory requirements
as well as with existing policy on timber concessions; and
c) The peaceful and adequate enjoyment by
PICOP of the area as described and specified in the aforesaid amended Timber
License Agreement No. 43.
The Respondent Secretary
Alvarez is likewise ordered to pay petitioner the sum of P10 million a
month beginning May 2002 until the conversion of TLA No. 43, as amended, to
IFMA is formally effected and the harvesting from the said area is granted.[33]
On
PICOP filed
an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Writ of Mandamus and/or Writ of Mandatory
Injunction.[35]
On
On
On 6 November
2002, then NCIP Chairperson Atty. Evelyn S. Dunuan sent a letter to the DENR
(1) informing the DENR Secretary that after validation by the NCIP, it was
found out that the area of 47,420 hectares covered by PICOP’s TLA No. 43
conflicts with the ancestral domains of the Manobos; and (2) reiterating the
information that no NCIP certification was sought by PICOP to certify that the
area covered by TLA No. 43, subject of its IFMA conversion, does not overlap
with any ancestral domain. Accordingly,
she “strongly urge[d] the revocation of the one-year permit granted to PICOP
until the full provisions of [the] IPRA are followed and the rights of our
Indigenous Peoples over their ancestral land claims are respected.”[39]
On
On
In said NULLITY
CASE, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining respondents
therein[41]
from implementing the questioned issuances.
The DENR Secretary and her co-respondents in said case filed on 6
February 2003 an Omnibus Motion (1) To Dissolve the Temporary Restraining Order
dated 3 February 2003; and (2) To Dismiss (With Opposition to the Issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction).[42]
The trial
court issued a Resolution dated
Meanwhile, in
the MANDAMUS CASE, the RTC denied the DENR Secretary’s Motion for Reconsideration
and granted the Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Mandamus and/or Writ of
Mandatory Injunction via a
On 28
February 2003, the DENR Secretary filed before the Court of Appeals, a Petition
for Certiorari With a Most Urgent
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction insofar as the trial court ordered the execution of its
11 October 2002 Decision pending appeal.
The petition (hereinafter referred to as the INJUNCTION CASE) was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 75698, which was assigned to the Special 13th
Division thereof.
On
On
On
WHEREFORE, the appealed
Decision is AFFIRMED with modification that the order directing then DENR
Secretary Alvarez “to pay petitioner-appellee the sum of P10 million a month
beginning May, 2002 until the conversion to IFMA of TLA No. 43, as amended, is
formally effected and the harvesting from the said area is granted” is hereby
deleted. [53]
PICOP filed a
Motion for Partial Reconsideration[54]
of this Decision, which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Meanwhile, in
a
The DENR
Secretary and PICOP filed with this Court separate Petitions for Review on the
On
WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated
The Writ of Preliminary
Injunction dated
Upon denial
of its Motion for Reconsideration in a
On
ISSUES
In G.R. No.
162243, the DENR Secretary brought forth the following issues for our
consideration:
I
WHETHER THE PRESIDENTIAL WARRANTY IS A
CONTRACT WHICH CONSTITUTES A LEGAL BAR TO THE EXERCISE BY THE STATE OF ITS FULL
CONTROL AND SUPERVISION REGARDING THE EXPLORATION DEVELOPMENT AND UTILIZATION
OF ITS NATURAL RESOURCES.
II
WHETHER [PICOP] HAD ACQUIRED A VESTED
RIGHT OVER ITS
III
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION
TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THIS CASE BECAUSE THE SUBJECT MATTER THEREOF PERTAINS TO
THE EXCLUSIVE ADMINISTRATIVE DOMAIN OF [THE DENR SECRETARY].
IV
WHETHER [PICOP’S] PETITION FOR MANDAMUS
SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (1) FOR LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION; AND (2) BECAUSE THE
SUBJECT MATTER THEREOF IS NOT CONTROLLABLE BY CERTIORARI.
V
WHETHER [PICOP] HAS FAITHFULLY COMPLIED
WITH ALL THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND OTHER STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS ENTITLING IT TO AN
IFMA CONVERSION.
VI
WHETHER [PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 605][62]
HAS BEEN PARTLY REPEALED BY [REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8975].[63]
In G.R. No.
164516, PICOP submits the sole issue:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY
DELETED THE AWARD OF DAMAGES TO PETITIONER BY THE TRIAL COURT.[64]
Finally, in G.R.
No. 171875, the DENR Secretary submits the following arguments:
A.
[PICOP]
DID NOT ACTUALLY FILE A MOTION FOR EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL.
B.
THERE
ARE NO GOOD REASONS FOR THE GRANT OF EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL.[65]
THIS COURT’S RULING
Whether or not outright dismissal was proper
Since the
third, fourth and sixth issues raised by the DENR Secretary, if determined in
favor of the DENR Secretary, would have warranted an outright dismissal of the
MANDAMUS CASE as early as the trial court level, it is proper to resolve these
issues first.
The DENR
Secretary alleges that the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the MANDAMUS
CASE pertains to the exclusive administrative domain of the DENR, and therefore,
the RTC had been in error in taking cognizance thereof. The DENR Secretary adds that, assuming arguendo that the RTC properly took
cognizance of the MANDAMUS CASE, it committed a reversible error in not
dismissing the same (1) for lack of cause of action; and (2) because the
subject matter thereof is not controllable by mandamus.
The Petition
filed before the trial court was one for mandamus with prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction with
damages. Specifically, it sought to
compel the DENR Secretary to: (1) sign,
execute and deliver the IFMA documents to PICOP; (2) issue the corresponding
IFMA number assignment; and (3) approve the harvesting of timber by PICOP from
the area of TLA No. 43. The DENR
Secretary contends that these acts relate to the licensing regulation and
management of forest resources, which task belongs exclusively to the DENR[66]
as conveyed in its mandate:
SECTION 4. Mandate. – The
Department shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development and proper use of the country’s environment and natural
resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral
resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the
public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources
as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the
benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future
generations of Filipinos.[67]
The Court of
Appeals ruled:
The contention does not
hold water. In its petition for
mandamus, [PICOP] asserted that “DENR Secretary Alvarez acted with grave abuse
of discretion or in excess of his jurisdiction in refusing to perform his
ministerial duty to sign, execute and deliver the IFMA contract and to issue
the corresponding IFMA number to it.”
The cited jurisdiction of the DENR on licencing regulation and
management of our environment and natural resources is not disputed. In fact, the petition seeks to compel it to
properly perform its said functions in relation to [PICOP]. What is at stake is not the scope of the DENR
jurisdiction but the manner by which it exercises or refuses to exercise that
jurisdiction.
The courts have the duty
and power to strike down any official act or omission tainted with grave abuse
of discretion. The 1987 Constitution is
explicit in providing that judicial power includes not only the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there
has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.[68]
The Court of
Appeals is correct. Since PICOP alleges
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DENR Secretary, it behooves the
court to determine the same. An outright
dismissal of the case would have prevented such determination.
For the same reason, the MANDAMUS
CASE could not have been dismissed outright for lack of cause of action. A motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of
action hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the complaint.[69] In ruling upon the DENR Secretary’s Motion to
Dismiss, PICOP’s allegation that it has a contract with the government should,
thus, be hypothetically admitted.
Necessarily, the DENR Secretary’s argument that there was no such
contract should be considered in the trial of the case and should be
disregarded at this stage of the proceedings.
The DENR
Secretary, however, counters that he/she has not yet exercised his/her
exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, i.e., either to approve or disapprove
PICOP’s application for IFMA conversion.
Hence, it is argued that PICOP’s immediate resort to the trial court was
precipitate based on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.[70]
The Court of
Appeals ruled that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
disregarded when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention,[71]
which are averred to be extant in this case, citing PICOP’s employment of a
sizable number of workers and its payment of millions in taxes to the
government.[72] The Court of Appeals appends:
Moreover, contrary to [the
DENR Secretary’s] claim, the approval of an application for IFMA conversion is
not purely discretionary on the part of the DENR Secretary since the approval
of an IFMA conversion depends upon compliance with the requirements provided
under DAO No. 99-53.
Of course, as earlier
intimated, even assuming, arguendo, that the approval of an IFMA conversion
involves the exercise of discretion by the DENR Secretary, the writ of mandamus
may be issued to compel the proper exercise of that discretion where it is
shown that there was grave abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable
excess of authority.[73]
While the Court of
Appeals is correct in making such rulings, such accuracy applies only insofar as the RTC assessment that the
MANDAMUS CASE should not have been subjected to outright dismissal. The issue of whether there was indeed an
urgency of judicial intervention (as to warrant the issuance of a writ of
mandamus despite the exclusive jurisdiction of the DENR) is ultimately
connected to the truth of PICOP’s assertions, which were hypothetically
admitted in the motion to dismiss stage.
In other words, it all boils down to whether the DENR Secretary
committed grave abuse of discretion in not executing
the IFMA documents and in not approving PICOP’s harvesting of timber from the
area of TLA No. 43.
The sixth issue raised by
the DENR Secretary concerns Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 605 which,
according to the Court of Appeals had been partly repealed by Republic Act No.
8975. Section 1 of Presidential Decree
No. 605 provides:
SECTION 1. No court of the Philippines shall have
jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction or
preliminary mandatory injunction in any case involving or growing out of the
issuance, approval or disapproval, revocation or suspension of, or any action
whatsoever by the proper administrative
official or body on concessions, licenses, permits, patents, or public grants
of any kind in connection with the disposition, exploitation, utilization,
exploration and/or development of the natural resources of the Philippines.
According to the Court of
Appeals,
Section 1 of PD 605 has been partly repealed by RA No.
8975, enacted on
“(a) Acquisition, clearance and development of the
right-of-way and/or site of location of any national government project;
“(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the
national government as defined under Section 2 hereof;
“(c) Commencement, prosecution, execution,
implementation, operation of any such contract or project;
“(d) Termination or rescission of any such
contract/project; and
“(e) The undertaking or authorization of any other
lawful activity necessary for such contract/project.”
Noticeably, the subject coverage on
concessions, licenses and the like contemplated in Section 1 of PD 605 is not
reproduced in the foregoing enumeration under Section 3 of R.A. 8975. The effect of the non-reenactment is a
partial repeal of Section 1 of PD 605.
It is a rule of legal hermenuetics (sic) that an act which purports to
set out in full all that it intends to contain operates as a repeal of anything
omitted which was contained in the old act and not included in the act as
revised. As the repealing clause of R.A.
8975 states:
“Sec. 9. Repealing Clause – All laws, decrees
including Presidential Decree Nos. 605, 1818 and Republic Act No. 7160, as
amended, orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with this
act are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.”[74]
The
DENR Secretary claims that since Republic Act No. 8975 simply declares that
Presidential Decree No. 605 or parts thereof “inconsistent with this Act are
hereby repealed or amended accordingly,” then, there should be an inconsistency
between Presidential Decree No. 605 and Republic Act No. 8975 before there can
be a partial repeal of Presidential Decree No. 605.
We agree
with the DENR Secretary. Republic Act
No. 8975 was not intended to set out in full all laws concerning the
prohibition against temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions and
preliminary mandatory injunctions. Republic
Act No. 8975 prohibits lower courts from issuing such orders in connection with
the implementation of government infrastructure projects, while Presidential Decree
No. 605 prohibits the issuance of the same, in any case involving licenses,
concessions and the like, in connection with the natural resources of the
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8975
AN ACT TO ENSURE THE EXPEDITIOUS
IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLETION OF GOVERNMENT INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS BY
PROHIBITING LOWER COURTS FROM ISSUING TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS, PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTIONS OR PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTIONS, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR
VIOLATIONS THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO.
605
BANNING THE ISSUANCE BY COURTS OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS IN CASES INVOLVING CONCESSIONS, LICENSES, AND OTHER
PERMITS ISSUED BY PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIALS OR BODIES FOR THE
EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES.
However,
when the licenses, concessions and the like also
entail government infrastructure projects, the provisions of Republic Act No.
8975 should be deemed to apply,[76]
and, thus, Presidential Decree No. 605 had been modified in this sense.
Nevertheless,
despite the fact that Presidential Decree No. 605 subsists, the DENR Secretary
must have missed our ruling in Datiles
and Co. v. Sucaldito,[77]
wherein we held that the prohibition in Presidential Decree No. 605 “pertains
to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders by courts against administrative acts in controversies
involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases,
because to allow courts to judge these matters could disturb the smooth
functioning of the administrative machinery.
But on issues definitely
outside of this dimension and involving questions of law, courts are
not prevented by Presidential Decree No. 605 from exercising their power to
restrain or prohibit administrative acts.”
While
there are indeed questions of facts in the present Petitions, the overriding
controversy involved herein is one of law: whether the Presidential Warranty
issued by former President Marcos are contracts within the purview of the
Constitution’s Non-Impairment Clause.
Accordingly, the prohibition in Presidential Decree No. 605 against the
issuance of preliminary injunction in cases involving permits for the
exploitation of natural resources does not apply in this case.
Moreover,
as we held in Republic v. Nolasco,[78] statutes
such as Presidential Decree No. 605, Presidential Decree No. 1818 and Republic Act
No. 8975 merely proscribe the issuance of temporary restraining orders and
writs of preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction. They cannot, under pain of violating the
Constitution, deprive the courts of authority to take cognizance of the issues
raised in the principal action, as long as such action and the relief sought
are within their jurisdiction. We
further held in Nolasco:
However, it must be clarified that
Republic Act No. 8975 does not ordinarily warrant the outright dismissal of any
complaint or petition before the lower courts seeking permanent injunctive
relief from the implementation of national government infrastructure projects.
What is expressly prohibited by the statute is the issuance of the provisional
reliefs of temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions, and preliminary
mandatory injunctions. It does not preclude the lower courts from assuming
jurisdiction over complaints or petitions that seek as ultimate relief the
nullification or implementation of a national government infrastructure
project. A statute such as Republic
Act No. 8975 cannot diminish the constitutionally mandated judicial power
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government. x x x.[79]
As the
disposition of these consolidated Petitions will be dispositions of the
principal actions, any applicability of the prohibitions in Presidential Decree
No. 605 will be mooted.
Whether or not the presidential warranty was a contract
PICOP’s ground for the
issuance of a writ of mandamus is the supposed contract entered into by the
government in the form of a Presidential Warranty, dated
The Court of Appeals has
this brief statement concerning the main issue of the MANDAMUS CASE:
The questioned warranty is a valid
contract. It was freely entered into by
the government and [PICOP]. Mutual
considerations were taken into account in the execution of that contract. [PICOP] invested billions of pesos in its
concession areas. In return, the
government assured [PICOP] of its tenurial rights over TLA No. 43, as amended,
as well as its exclusive right to cut, collect and saw timber and pulpwood
therein. The DENR must perforce honor
and respect the warranty by maintaining the area alloted (sic) to [PICOP] under
TLA No. 43, as amended.[80]
We are constrained to
disagree. In unequivocal terms, we have
consistently held that such licenses concerning the harvesting of timber in the
country’s forests cannot be considered contracts that would bind the Government
regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare.[81] Such unswerving verdict is synthesized in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,[82]
where we held:
In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for
obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment
clause. If he had done so, he would have
acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and
unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he
would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses
according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the
demands of public interest and welfare.
He was aware that as correctly pointed out by petitioners, into every
timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No.
705) which provides:
“x x x
Provided, that when the national interest so requires, the President may
amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or
any other form of privilege granted herein
x x x.”
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or
rescinded by executive action. It is not
a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of
the constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, [125 SCRA
302, 325 (1983)] this Court held:
“x
x x A timber license is an instrument by
which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources
to the end that public welfare is promoted.
A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process
clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn
whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.
“A
license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful,
and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal,
granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a
property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J.
168). Thus, this Court held that the
granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property
or property rights. (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576). x x x”
We
reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe
Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary [190 SCRA 673,
684 (1990)]:
“x x x Timber licenses, permits and license agreements
are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid
that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified
entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the
particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified,
replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so
require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts
within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20
of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R.
No. L-24548,
Since
timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
“SEC. 10. No
law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed.”
cannot be invoked.
PICOP, however, argues
that these rulings laid down in Tan v.
Director of Forestry,[83] Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. v. Deputy
Executive Secretary[84]
and Oposa do not find application in
the present case allegedly because the issue here is the unlawful refusal of
then DENR Secretary Alvarez to issue an IFMA to PICOP and not the matter of a
timber license being merely a license or privilege.[85]
We are not
persuaded. PICOP filed the MANDAMUS CASE
against then DENR Secretary Alvarez on the ground that Secretary Alvarez’s
refusal to issue an IFMA in its favor allegedly violated its vested right over
the area covered by its TLA No. 43 and presidential warranty, and impaired the
obligation of contract under said agreement and warranty.[86]
The argument that the
Presidential Warranty is a contract on the ground that there were mutual
considerations taken into account consisting in investments on PICOP’s part is
preposterous. All licensees put up
investments in pursuing their businesses.
To construe these investments as consideration in a contract would be to
stealthily render ineffective the settled jurisprudence that “a license or a
permit is not a contract between the sovereignty and the licensee or permittee,
and is not a property in the constitutional sense, as to which the
constitutional proscription against the impairment of contracts may extend.”[87] Neither shall we allow a circumvention of
such doctrine by terming such permit as a “warranty.”
Whether or not there was compliance with the requirements for the
conversion of TLA No. 43 as amended into an IFMA
DAO No. 99-53 enumerates
the requirements for the grant of the IFMA conversion:
Sec. 9.
Qualifications of Applicants. The
applicants for IFMA shall be:
(a)
A Filipino
citizen of legal age; or
(b)
Partnership,
cooperative or corporation whether public or private, duly registered under
Philippine laws.
However, in the case of application for
conversion of TLA into IFMA, an automatic conversion after proper evaluation
shall be allowed, provided the TLA holder shall have signified such intention
prior to the expiry of the TLA, PROVIDED further, the TLA holder has shown
satisfactory performance and have complied with the terms and conditions of the
TLA and pertinent rules and regulations.
Therefore, the following
are the requisites for the automatic conversion of the TLA into an IFMA, to wit:
1.
The
TLA holder had signified its intent to convert its TLA into an IFMA prior to
the expiration of its TLA;
2.
Proper
evaluation was conducted on the application; and
3.
The
TLA holder has satisfactorily performed and complied with the terms and
conditions of the TLA and the pertinent rules and regulations.
The Court of Appeals
held:
From the foregoing provision, it can be
gleaned that as long as an applicant-corporation has signified its intention to
convert its TLA into an IFMA prior to the expiration of its TLA, has shown
satisfactory performance as a TLA holder and has complied with the terms and
conditions of the TLA and pertinent rules and regulations, conversion follows
as a matter of course. It becomes
automatic.
[PICOP] has complied with the
administrative requirements. In its
letter dated
x x x x
Apparently, [the DENR Secretary]
refuses to sign the documents on the grounds that [PICOP] has not secured and
submitted a clearance from the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)
showing that its TLA areas do not overlap with existing ancestral domains: and
that [PICOP] has outstanding and overdue obligation in forest charges.
The two reasons last cited by the
Secretary for refusing to sign and deliver the IFMA documents are not real nor
valid.
Section 59 of RA 8371, which requires
prior certification from the NCIP that the areas affected do not overlap with
any ancestral domain before any IFMA can be entered into by the government,
should be read in conjunction with Sections 3 (a) and 56 of the same law.
Section 3 (a) of RA 8371 describes
ancestral domains as “areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands,
inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim
of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their
ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to
the present xxx.” On the other hand,
Section 56 of the same law provides:
“Sec. 56. Existing Property Rights Regimes. – Property
rights within the ancestral domains already existing and/or vested upon
effectivity of this Act, shall be recognized and respected.”
It can thus be deduced that Section 59
can only be interpreted to refer to ancestral domains which have been duly
established as such (i.e., the concerned indigenous people must have been in
continuous possession or occupation of the area concerned since time immemorial
up to the present). Too, existing
property rights over the areas sought to be declared as part of an ancestral
domain must be recognized and respected.
[PICOP] has already acquired property
rights over its concession areas. It has
been in exclusive, continuous and uninterrupted possession and occupation of
TLA No. 43 areas since 1952 to present.
From the time it managed and operated TLA No. 43, it has made huge
investments on its concession areas.
These include the planting of millions of trees and the scientific silvicultural
treatment of the forest to make it more productive. Having acquired property rights over TLA No.
43 areas, [PICOP] need not be required to secure clearance from the NCIP
pursuant to Section 59 of RA 8371.
[The DENR Secretary’s] claim that
[PICOP] failed to settle its outstanding obligations to the government in the
form of unpaid forest charges do not inspire belief. Under Sec. 3 (3.5) of DENR Memorandum
Circular No. 96-04 dated March 14, before an Integrated Annual Operations Plan
(IAOP) can be issued, it is a condition precedent that the licensee has no
pending forestry accounts. If it were
true that [PICOP] had unpaid forest charges, why was it issued IAOP for
calendar year 2001-2002 by Secretary Alvarez himself?[88]
Upon close scrutiny of the
records, this Court observes that these findings of compliance by PICOP are
negated by the very evidence on which they are supposedly moored.
As clearly shown by the
Hence, it is imperative to chart a good
forest policy direction for the management, development and protection of TLA
No. 43 after it expires on
Administrative Requirements
There was actually no way
by which RED Seraspi could have come up with a satisfactory performance finding
since the very Performance Evaluation Team tasked to make the evaluation found
PICOP to have violated existing DENR rules and regulations. According to the
Section 6. Payment of
6.1 When
timber and other forest products are intended for export.– x x x x
6.2 When
timber and other forest products are to be removed for domestic sales. – The
forest charges shall be due and payable within thirty (30) days from removal
thereof at the cutting area, or where the forest products are gathered;
Provided, that such date of removal shall in no case be beyond thirty (30) days
when the products are cut, gathered and removed.
As testified to by FMB
SFMS Ignacio M. Evangelista, PICOP failed to pay its regular forest charges
covering the period from 22 September 2001 to 26 April 2002 in the total amount
of P15,056,054.05.[91] PICOP was also late in paying most of its
forest charges from 1996 onwards for which it is liable for a surcharge of 25%
per annum on the tax due and interest of 20% per annum which now amounts to P150,169,485.02.[92] Likewise, it has overdue and unpaid
silvicultural fees in the amount of P2,366,901.00 as of P167,592,440.90 as of
PICOP’s failure to pay
its regular forest charges, interests, penalties and surcharges and
silvicultural fees amounting to P167,592,440.90 as of 30 August 2002 is
further evidenced by the collection letters sent to PICOP and the absence of official
receipts in the DENR records in Bislig City evidencing payment of the overdue
amounts stated in the said collection letters.[95] As can be gleaned from SFMS Evangelista’s
tabulation, all the official receipts evidencing payments of PICOP with their
corresponding periods are indicated.
However, there are no similar official receipts for the period covering
With the DENR Secretary’s
presentation of its positive and categorical evidence showing PICOP’s failure
to pay its forest charges amounting to P167,592,440.90 as of
Despite the foregoing
evidence, the Court of Appeals declared that if it were true that PICOP has
unpaid forest charges, it should not have been issued an IAOP for the year
2001-2002 by Secretary Alvarez himself.[96] In doing so, the Court of Appeals disregarded
the part of the very evidence presented by PICOP itself, which shows that the
IAOP was approved subject to several conditions, not the least of which was the
submission of proof of updated payment of forest charges from April 2001 to
June 2001.[97]
Neither was this the only
evidence presented by PICOP which showed that it has unpaid forest
charges. PICOP presented the
certification of CENRO Calunsag which refers only to its alleged payment of
regular forest charges covering the period from
The P53,603,719.85 paid by PICOP without indicating the
corresponding volume and date of production of the logs. This is in contrast to the findings of SFMS
Evangelista which cover the period from CY 1996 to 30 August 2002 which includes
penalties, interests, and surcharges for late payment pursuant to DAO 80,
series of 1987.
Per request of PICOP, a
certification dated P15,056,054.05.[99] The same certification also shows delayed
payment of forest charges, thereby corroborating the testimony of SFMS
Evangelista and substantiating the imposition of penalties and surcharges.
Finally, even if we
consider for the sake of argument that the IAOP should not have been issued if
PICOP had existing forestry accounts, the issuance of the IAOP cannot be
considered proof that PICOP has paid the same.
Firstly, the best evidence of payment is the receipt thereof. PICOP has not presented any evidence that such
receipts had been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court.[100] Secondly, it is a well known and settled rule
in our jurisdiction that the Republic, or its government, is usually not
estopped by mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents.[101] If PICOP had been issued an IAOP in violation
of the law allegedly because it may not be issued if PICOP had existing
forestry accounts, the government cannot be estopped from collecting such
amounts and providing the necessary sanctions therefor, including the
withholding of the IFMA until such amounts are paid.
Statutory Requirements
To recap, the Court of
Appeals had relied on RED Seraspi’s certification in concluding that there was
satisfactory performance on the part of PICOP as a TLA holder, despite said
certification showing non-compliance with the required Five-Year Forest
Protection Plan and Seven-Year Reforestation Plan. The Court of Appeals also declared that PICOP
has paid its outstanding obligations based on an inference that the IAOP would
not have been issued if PICOP had unpaid forest charges, contrary to the
conditions laid down in the IAOP itself, and in violation of the Best Evidence
Rule and the doctrine disallowing the estoppel of the government from the acts
of its officers.
On the statutory
requirement of procuring a clearance from the NCIP, the Court of Appeals held
that PICOP need not comply with the same at all. As quoted above, the Court of Appeals held
that Section 59 of Republic Act No. 8371, which requires prior certification
from the NCIP that the areas affected do not overlap with any ancestral domain
before any IFMA can be entered into by government, should be interpreted to
refer to ancestral domains which have been duly established as such by the
continuous possession and occupation of the area concerned by indigenous
peoples since time immemorial up to the present. According to the Court of Appeals, PICOP has
acquired property rights over the TLA No. 43 areas, being in exclusive,
continuous and uninterrupted possession and occupation of TLA No. 43 areas
since 1952 up to the present.
This ruling defies the
settled jurisprudence we have mentioned earlier, including that of Oposa and Tan which held that “[a] license is merely a permit or privilege to
do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the
authority, federal, state or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it
is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested
right; x x x.”[102]
The Court of Appeals’ resort
to statutory construction is, in itself, misplaced. Section 59 of Republic Act No. 8371 is clear
and unambiguous:
SEC. 59. Certification
Precondition. – All departments and other governmental agencies shall henceforth be
strictly enjoined from issuing, renewing or granting any concession, license or
lease, or entering into any production-sharing agreement, without prior
certification from the NCIP that the area affected does not overlap with any
ancestral domain. Such
certification shall only be issued after a field-based investigation is
conducted by the Ancestral Domains Office of the area concerned: Provided, That
no certification shall be issued by the NCIP without the free and prior
informed and written consent of the ICCs/IPs concerned: Provided, further, That
no department, government agency or government-owned or controlled corporation
may issue new concession, license, lease, or production sharing agreement while
there is a pending application for a CADT: Provided, finally, That the ICCs/IPs
shall have the right to stop or suspend, in accordance with this Act, any
project that has not satisfied the requirement of this consultation process.
The court may not
construe a statute that is clear and free from doubt. Time and again, it has been repeatedly
declared by this Court that where the law speaks in clear and categorical
language, there is no room for interpretation.
There is only room for application.[103] PICOP’s intent to put a cloud of ambiguity in
Section 59 of Republic Act No. 8371 by invoking Section 3(a) thereof fails
miserably. Section 3(a) of Republic Act
No. 8371 defines ancestral domain as follows:
a) Ancestral domains – Subject to
Section 56 hereof, refers to all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs
comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held
under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or
through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial,
continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force,
deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary
dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations,
and which are necessary to ensure their economic, social and cultural
welfare. It shall include ancestral
lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands
individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting
grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other
natural resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by
ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence
and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are
still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators;
Ancestral domains remain
as such even when possession or occupation of the area has been interrupted by
causes provided under the law such as voluntary dealings entered into by the
government and private individuals/corporation.
Therefore, the issuance of TLA No. 43 in 1952 did not cause the
Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples to lose their possession
or occupation over the area covered by TLA No. 43.
The issuance of a
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title is merely a formal recognition of the
ICCs/IPs’ rights of possession and ownership over their ancestral domain
identified and delineated in accordance with the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act,[104]
and therefore, cannot be considered a condition precedent for the need for an
NCIP certification. In the first place,
it is manifestly absurd to claim that the subject lands must first be proven to
be part of ancestral domains before a certification that they are not part of
ancestral domains can be required. In Cruz v. Secretary of DENR,[105] where
no single member of the Court penned a majority opinion (since the petition to
declare Republic Act No. 8371 unconstitutional was dismissed for the reason
that the votes were equally divided), Mr. Justice Reynato Puno, who voted to
dismiss the petition, wrote in his separate opinion:
As its subtitle suggests, [Section 59
of R.A. No. 8371] requires as a precondition for the issuance of any
concession, license or agreement over natural resources, that a certification
be issued by the NCIP that the area subject of the agreement does not lie with
any ancestral domain. The provision does
not vest the NCIP with power over the other agencies of the State as to
determine whether to grant or deny any concession or license or agreement. It merely gives the NCIP the authority to
ensure that the ICCs/IPs have been informed of the agreement and that their
consent thereto has been obtained. Note
that the
certification applies to agreements over natural resources that do not necessarily
lie within the ancestral domains. For
those that are found within the said domains, Sections 7(b) and 57 of the IPRA
apply.
Another requirement
determined by the Court of Appeals to have been complied with by PICOP, albeit impliedly this time by not
mentioning it at all, is the requirement posed by Sections 26 and 27 of the
Local Government Code:
SEC. 26. Duty of
National Government Agencies in the Maintenance of Ecological Balance. – It
shall be the duty of every national agency or government-owned or controlled
corporation authorizing or involved in the planning and implementation of any
project or program that may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of
non-renewable resources, loss of crop land, rangeland, or forest cover, and extinction
of animal or plant species, to consult with the local government units,
nongovernmental organizations, and other sectors concerned and explain the
goals and objectives of the project or program, its impact upon the people and
the community in terms of environmental or ecological balance, and the measures
that will be undertaken to prevent or minimize the adverse effects thereof.
SEC. 27. Prior
Consultation Required. – No project or program shall be implemented by
government authorities unless the consultations mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and
26 hereof are complied with, and prior approval of the sanggunian
concerned is obtained: Provided, That occupants in areas where such
projects are to be implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate relocation
sites have been provided, in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution.
These provisions are
clear: the prior approval of local
government units affected by the proposed conversion of a TLA into an IFMA is
necessary before any project or program can be implemented by the government
authorities that may cause “depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of crop
land, rangeland or forest cover, and extinction of animal or plant species.”
The common evidence of
the DENR Secretary and PICOP, namely the
7. During the conduct of the
performance evaluation of TLA No. 43 issues/complaints against PRI were
submitted thru Resolutions and letters.
It is important that these are included in this report for assessment of
what are their worth, viz:
x x x x
7.2 Joint
Resolution (unnumbered), dated March 19, 2001 of the Barangay Council and
Barangay Tribal Council of Simulao, Boston, Davao Oriental (ANNEX F) opposing
the conversion of TLA No. 43 into IFMA over the 17,112 hectares allegedly
covered with CADC No. 095.
7.3
Resolution Nos.
10, s-2001 and 05, s-2001 (ANNEXES G & H) of the Bunawan Tribal Council of
Elders (BBMTCE) strongly demanding none renewal of PICOP TLA. They claim to be the rightful owner of the
area it being their alleged ancestral land.
7.4
Resolution No. 4,
S-2001 of Sitio Linao,
7.5
Resolution No.
22, S-2001 (ANNEX J) of the Sanguniang Bayan, Lingig, Surigao del Sur not to
grant the conversion of TLA 43 citing the plight of former employees of PRI who
were forced to enter and farm portion of TLA No. 43, after they were laid off.
7.6
SP Resolution No.
2001-113 and CDC Resolution Nos. 09-2001 of the Sanguniang Panglungsod of
Bislig City (ANNEXES K & L) requesting to exclude the area of TLA No. 43
for watershed purposes.
7.7
Resolution No.
2001-164, dated
As stated in RED Seraspi’s
PICOP merely submitted a
purported resolution[108]
of the
Finally, the DENR, by
withholding the conversion of PICOP’s TLA No. 43 into an IFMA, has made a
factual finding that PICOP has not yet complied with the requirements for such
a conversion. Findings of facts of administrative
agencies are generally accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts
because of the special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their
jurisdiction.[110] Such finality of the DENR’s factual finding,
supported as it is by substantial evidence, can only be overcome by grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess in jurisdiction, which is even more
pronounced in a Petition for Mandamus.
Whether or not there has already been a conversion of TLA No. 43
into an IFMA
The
Court of Appeals declared that there exists no legal impediment to the
conversion of respondent’s TLA No. 43 into an IFMA as evidenced by petitioner’s
letters dated
Moreover,
[the DENR Secretary’s] own letters to [PICOP] confirm that it has established a
clear right to the automatic conversion of TLA No. 43 to IFMA. Thus, on
We
disagree. Then DENR Secretary Alvarez’s
Dear Mr. Bernardino:
Consistent with your attached Memorandum to her
Excellency, the President, dated 17 October 2001 and in response to your Letter
of Intent dated 25 January 2001, we wish to inform you that, pursuant to DENR
Administrative Order No. 99-53, we have cleared the conversion of PICOP’s
Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 to Integrated Forest Management Agreement
(IFMA) effective from the expiration of said TLA on April 26, 2002.
In this regard, you are hereby requested to designate
PICOP’s representative(s) to discuss with the DENR Team, created under Special
Order No. 2001-638, the conditions and details of the said IFMA, including the
production sharing arrangement between PICOP and the government.[111]
By
giving this clearance for the conversion of PICOP’s TLA into an IFMA, the DENR
Secretary cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be claimed to have granted the
conversion itself. The letter is clear
that the “conversion” could not be final since its conditions and details still
have to be discussed as stated in the second paragraph of said letter; hence,
the same letter could not have reduced to a mere formality the approval of the
conversion of PICOP’s TLA No. 43 into an IFMA.
Likewise,
then DENR Secretary Alvarez’s 26 April 2002 letter approving PICOP’s Transition
Development and Management Plan (TDMP) cannot be considered as an approval of
PICOP’s application for IFMA conversion.
Again, the aforesaid letter is quoted in full:
MR. WILFREDO D. FUENTES
Vice President – Resident Manager
PICOP Resources, Incorporated
2nd Floor,
2280 Pasong Tamo Extension
Dear Mr. Fuentes:
This refers to your request for approval of the
submitted Two-year Transition Development and Management Plan of PICOP
Resources, Inc. (PRI) for the areas under TLA No. 43 which expires on
Pending the formal approval of your IFMA
and consistent with our letter to the
PRI President dated 25 October 2002, we hereby grant your Transition
Development and Management Plan (TDMP) for a period of one (1) year, effective
26 April 2002.
Within such period we expect PRI to
submit/comply with all the necessary requisites for the final conversion of TLA
43 into IFMA, as provided for under
DENR Administrative Order No. 99-53, including the settlement of certain
obligations such as taxes, if any, and submission of plans and programs for
evaluation and approval of item number 1 of your proposal contained in your
letter dated February 4, 2002.
All other proposed activities in your TDMP,
particularly items 2 – 7 of your letter dated
For your information and guidance.
Very truly yours,
(sgd)
HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ
Secretary
Cc: Mr. Teodoro
G. Bernardino
President
The
Director, FMB
The
aforesaid letter speaks for itself.
PICOP’s application for IFMA conversion is still pending approval. Indeed,
there could have been no approval of PICOP’s application for IFMA conversion
because DAO No. 99-53 (which governs application for IFMA conversion) requires
full and complete compliance with the requirements for conversion before it may
be approved. As stated in the letter
itself of then DENR Secretary Alvarez, PICOP has yet to “submit/comply with all the necessary requisites for final conversion
of TLA No. 43 into IFMA.”
Even assuming, however,
that the IFMA has already been converted, this is all purely academic because
of the above-discussed settled jurisprudence that logging permits are not
contracts within the Non-Impairment Clause and thus, can be amended, modified,
replaced or rescinded when the national interest so requires. If the DENR Secretary, therefore, finds that
the IFMA would be in violation of statutes, rules and regulations, particularly
those protecting the rights of the local governments and the indigenous peoples
within the IFMA area, then it behooves the DENR Secretary to revoke such
IFMA. These same statutes, rules and
regulations are the very same requirements mentioned above for the conversion
of the TLA No. 43 into an IFMA.
Whether or not it is proper to determine the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 297 in these consolidated
petitions
Another reason why the
DENR Secretary wishes to further withhold the conversion of PICOP’s TLA No. 43 into
an IFMA is the 25 November 2002 Proclamation No. 297 excluding an area of 8,100
hectares, more or less, from the coverage of TLA No. 43, as amended, and which
declared the same as a mineral reservation and as an environmentally critical area. The DENR Secretary claims that said
Presidential Proclamation is rendered nugatory by the Court of Appeals’
disposition that the DENR should honor and respect the area allotted to PICOP
under TLA No. 43.[112]
PICOP claims that
Proclamation No. 297 is a new matter which the DENR Secretary cannot raise
before this Court without offending the basic rules of fair play, justice and
due process.[113]
The DENR Secretary
counters that it did not take up the issue of Proclamation No. 297 before the
trial court precisely because said proclamation was issued more than one month
after the trial court rendered its
While not giving in to
the DENR Secretary’s argument, PICOP claims that Proclamation No. 297 is
violative of the Constitution and an encroachment on the legislative powers of
Congress.[114]
We agree with PICOP that
this constitutional issue cannot be decided upon in this case. This Court will not touch the issue of
unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis
mota. It is a well-established rule
that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to
be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties
and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon
which the court may raise its judgment, that course will be adopted and the
constitutional question will be left for consideration until such question will
be unavoidable.[115]
The constitutional
question presented by PICOP is not the very lis
mota in these consolidated cases, as the preceding discussions very well
give us adequate grounds to grant the Petition in G.R. No. 162243, deny the Petition
in G.R. No. 164516, and dismiss the Petition in G.R. No. 171875. Moreover, PICOP has filed a separate petition
for the declaration of nullity of Proclamation No. 297, wherein the issue of
the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 297 is properly ventilated.
Consequently, all actions
and reliefs sought by either PICOP or the DENR Secretary which has Proclamation
No. 297 as its ground or subject should be ventilated either in the pending
petition for the declaration of its nullity, or in another proper suit
instituted for that matter.
EPILOGUE AND DISPOSITION
In sum, the DENR
Secretary has adequately proven that PICOP has, at this time, failed to comply
with the administrative and statutory requirements for the conversion of TLA
No. 43 into an IFMA. The Petition in
G.R. No. 162243 should therefore be granted.
On the other hand, as
PICOP is not yet entitled to such conversion, then Secretary Alvarez had been
correct in withholding the same and thus cannot be held liable for damages
therefor. Thus, the Petition in G.R. No.
164516 should be dismissed.
Finally, the DENR
Secretary’s Petition in G.R. No. 171875, assailing the lifting by the Court of
Appeals of the Preliminary Injunction in its favor, is now mooted.
PICOP’s noncompliance with the requirements for the
conversion of their TLA is so glaring, that we almost see a reluctance to
uphold the law in light of PICOP’s sizeable investments in its business, a fact
repeatedly stressed by PICOP in its pleadings.
In applying the judicial policy of nurturing prosperity, consideration
should also be given to the long-term effects of the judicial evaluations
involved, particularly to our nation’s greatest wealth, our vast natural
resources.
Our country has been blessed with rich, lush and verdant rain
forests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be
found.[116] The legislative policy has been to preserve
and nourish these natural resources as they are not only for our benefit but
more so for the countless future generations to which we are likewise
responsible. It has also been
legislative policy to let the citizens of this country reap their benefits,
foremost the citizens in close proximity to such resources, through the local
governments and the NCIP.
In working for the legislative policy of environmental
preservation, the requirements of a five-year forest protection plan and
seven-year reforestation plan had been laid down, together with the levy of
forest charges for the regulation of forestry activities. In pursuing, on the other hand, the benefit
distribution policy, the Local Government Code requires prior Sanggunian
approval to ensure that local communities partake in the fruits of their own
backyard, while R.A. No. 8371 provides for the rights of the indigenous
peoples, who have been living in, managing, and nourishing these forests since
time immemorial.
PICOP has been fortunate to have been awarded an enormous
concession area and thus, a huge chunk of the benefits of this country’s
natural resources. Attached to this
fortune is the responsibility to comply with the laws and regulations
implementing the stated legislative policies of environmental preservation and
benefit distribution. These laws and
regulations should not be ignored, and the courts should not condone such
blatant disregard by those who believe they are above the law because of their
sizable investments and significant number of workers employed. PICOP has only itself to blame for the
withholding of the conversion of its TLA.
But while this disposition confers another chance to comply with the
foregoing requirements, the DENR Secretary can rightfully grow weary if the
persistence on noncompliance will continue.
The judicial policy of nurturing prosperity would be better served by
granting such concessions to someone who will abide by the law.
WHEREFORE, the Petition in G.R. No. 162243 is GRANTED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it affirmed the RTC Decision
granting the Petition for Mandamus filed by Paper Industries Corporation of the
Philippines (PICOP) is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Petition in G.R. No. 164516 seeking the
reversal of the same Decision insofar as it nullified the award of damages in
favor of PICOP is DENIED for lack of
merit. The Petition in G.R. No. 171875, assailing
the lifting of the Preliminary Injunction in favor of the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources is DISMISSED
on the ground of mootness.
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
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ROMEO J.
CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
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Pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Resolution were reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN Chief Justice |
[1] Penned by Judge Jose G. Pineda,
Quezon City RTC, Branch 220.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Ruben
T. Reyes with Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Noel G. Tijam concurring; rollo of G.R. No. 162243, pp. 229-258.
[3] Penned by Associate Justice Juan
Q. Enriquez, Jr. with Associate Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Vicente Q.
Roxas concurring; rollo of G.R. No.
171875, pp. 67-78.
[4] CA rollo, pp. 176-183.
[5] CA rollo, p. 321.
[6] Folder of Exhibits, Exhibit G-25,
p. 114; Records, Vol. 1.
[7] Records, Vol. 1, pp. 41-55.
[8] Folder of Exhibits, Exhibit 7-B, Records, Vol. 1, p. 82; Records, Vol. 3, p. 469.
[9] Records, Vol. 1, p. 83; Folder of Exhibits, Exhibit 7-C, Vol. 3, p. 470.
[10] Records, Vol. 1, pp. 84-85; Folder of Exhibits, Exhibits 7-D and 7-E, pp. 471 and 472; Records, Vol. 3.
[11] Folder of Exhibits, Exhibit 7-F, Records, Vol. 3, p. 473.
[12] Rollo of G.R. No. 162243, pp. 361-363.
[13] Rollo of G.R. No. 162243, pp. 364-392.
[14] Rollo of G.R. No. 162243, pp. 393-395.
[15] Rollo of G.R. No. 162243, p. 396.
[16] Records, pp. 433-434.
[17]
[18]
[19] Rollo of G.R. No. 162243, p. 421.
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27] Folder of Exhibits, Exhibit 9, p.
512; RTC records, Vol. 3.
[28] Rollo
of G.R. No. 162243, pp. 440-441.
[29]
[30]
[31] Folder of Exhibits, Exhibit 7, Vol.
3, pp. 466-467.
[32]
[33] Rollo
of G.R. No. 162243, pp. 221-222.
[34] Records, Vol. 2, pp. 393-456.
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39] Rollo
of G.R. No. 162243, pp. 470-472.
[40]
[41] The respondents in this case are
the following: Alberto G. Romulo, as Executive Secretary, and Elisea Gozun, as
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
[42] Records, Vol. 5, p. 1892.
[43]
[44] The
For the Court’s resolution are petitioner’s twin motions, “Motion for
Reconsideration” and “Motion for Inhibition” dated
Anent the Motion for Inhibition, while the Court refutes the grounds
relied upon by the petitioner in support of said move, for the peace of mind of
the petitioner, the Court deems it proper to inhibit itself from taking
cognizance of this case.
For reason of propriety, the merits or demerits of petitioner’s
“Motion for Reconsideration” will not be ruled upon and shall be left to be
dealt with by the
Accordingly, this Court INHIBITS, and let the expediente of this case
be transmitted to the Executive Judge, through the Office of the Clerk of
Court,
[45] Records, Vol. 4, pp. 1349-1575.
[46] The dispositive portion of the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion
for Reconsideration dated
1.
to sign, execute and
deliver the IFMA contract and/or documents to PICOP and issue the corresponding
IFMA assignment number on the area covered by the IFMA, formerly TLA No. 43, as
amended;
2.
to issue the necessary
permit allowing petitioner to act and harvest timber from the said area of TLA
No. 43, sufficient to meet the raw material requirements of petitioner’s pulp
and paper mills in accordance with the warranty and agreement of July 29, 1969
between the government and PICOP’s predecessor-in-interest; and
3.
to honor and respect
the Government Warranties and contractual obligations to PICOP strictly in
accordance with the warranty and agreement dated July 29, 1999 (sic) between
the government and PICOP’s predecessor-in-interest (Exhibits “H”, “H-1” to
“H-5”, particularly the following:
a)
The area coverage of
TLA No. 43, which forms part and parcel of the government warranties;
b)
PICOP tenure over the
said area of TLA No. 43 and exclusive right to cut, collect and remove
sawtimber and pulpwood for the period ending on April 26, 1977; and said period
renewable for [an]other 25 years subject to compliance with constitutional and
statutory requirements as well as with existing policy on timber concessions;
and
c)
The peaceful and adequate enjoyment by PICOP of
the area as described and specified in the aforesaid amended Timber License
Agreement No. 43. (Records, Vol. 4, pp. 1374-1375.)
[47] Records, Vol. 2, p. 611.
[48] Rollo of G.R. No. 171875, pp. 272-275.
[49]
[50]
[51]
[52] Rollo of G.R. No. 162243, pp. 229-258.
[53]
[54] Rollo of G.R. No. 164516, pp. 107-119.
[55]
[56] Rollo of G.R. No. 171875, pp. 340-341.
[57]
[58]
[59]
[60]
[61]
[62] The DENR Secretary’s statement of the issues in its G.R. No. 162243 Memorandum mistakenly interchanged the two laws:
“WHETHER
REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 8975 HAS BEEN PARTLY REPEALED BY PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 605”
[63] Rollo of G.R. No. 162243, pp. 1013-1015.
[64] Rollo of G.R. No. 164516, p. 646.
[65] Rollo of G.R. No. 171875, pp. 42 and 46.
[66] DENR Secretary’s Memorandum, rollo of G.R. No. 162243, p. 54.
[67] Executive Order No. 192, otherwise known as the “Reorganization Act of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,” Section 4.
[68] Rollo of G.R. No. 162243, pp. 243-244.
[69] Sta. Clara Homeowners’ Association v. Spouses Gaston, 425 Phil. 221, 227 (2002).
[70] DENR Secretary’s Memorandum, rollo of G.R. No. 162243, p. 61.
[71] The Court of Appeals cites Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato, G.R. No. 92541, 13 November 1991, 203 SCRA 515, 520-521; Pagara v. Court of Appeals, 325 Phil. 66, 81 (1996).
[72] Rollo of G.R. No. 162243, pp. 245-246.
[73]
[74]
[75] Phil.
Const. Section 26(1), Art. VI: “Every bill passed by Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.”
[76] Consequently, in these cases, the prohibition against temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions and preliminary mandatory injunctions apply in cases instituted by a private party. The prohibition shall not apply when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise. The applicant should then file a bond, in an amount to be fixed by the court, which bond shall accrue in favor of the government if the court should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled to the relief sought (Republic Act No. 8975, Section 3, par. 2).
[77] G.R. No. 42380,
[78] G.R. No. 155108,
[79] Republic v. Nolasco, id. at 420-421.
[80] Rollo of G.R. No. 162243, pp. 253-254.
[81] Oposa
v. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 101083,
[82]
[83] 210 Phil. 244 (1983).
[84] G.R. No. 79538,
[85] PICOP’s Comment, pp. 3-4, rollo of G.R. No. 162243.
[86] PICOP’s Petition for Mandamus, pp. 1-38.
[87] Gonzalo
Sy Trading v. Central Bank, G.R. No. L-41480,
[88] Rollo of G.R. No. 162243, pp. 248-252.
[89] Exhibit O-2-D, Folder of Exhibits, Volume 2, p. 177; Exhibit 7-g-1-a, Folder of Exhibits, Vol. 3, p. 476.
[90] Exhibit 7-g-2, Folder of Exhibits, Vol. 3, pp. 480-482.
[91] Folder of Exhibits, Vol. 3, pp. 433-434.
[92] Exhibit 6, Folder of Exhibits, Vol. 3, p. 440.
[93]
[94]
[95] TSN,
[96] Rollo of G.R. No. 162243, p. 252.
[97] Folder of Exhibits, Vol. 2, pp. 398-399.
[98] Exhibit NN, Folder of Exhibits, Vol. 2, p. 349.
[99] Records, Vol. 2, pp. 457-458.
[100] See Rules of Court, Rule 130, Section 3(a).
[101] Luciano v. Estrella, 145 Phil. 454, 461 (1970).
[102] Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., supra note 81 at 812; Tan v. Director of Forestry, supra note 83 at 325.
[103] Cebu
Portland Cement Co. v.
[104] Republic Act No. 8371, Section 3(c):
[105] G.R. No. 135385,
[106] Folder of Exhibits, Exhibit O-1, Vol. 2, p. 176; Exhibit 7-g, Vol. 3, p. 475.
[107]
[108]
[109] Rollo of G.R. No. 162243, p. 230.
[110] JMM Promotions and Management v. Court of Appeals, 439 Phil. 1, 10-11 (2002); Calvo v. Bernardito, 423 Phil. 939, 947 (2001).
[111] Rollo of G.R. No. 162243, p. 426.
[112]
[113]
[114]
[115] Sotto v. Commission on Elections, 76 Phil. 516, 522 (1946).
[116] Petition in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., supra note 81.