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IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF CAMILO L. SABIO,
Petitioner, J. ERMIN ERNEST LOUIE R. MIGUEL,
Petitioner-Relator, - versus - HONORABLE
SENATOR RICHARD GORDON, in his capacity as Chairman, and the HONORABLE MEMBERS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISES and THE
COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SERVICES of the Senate, HONORABLE SENATOR JUAN
PONCE-ENRILE, in his official capacity as Member, HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR,
Senate President, SENATE SERGEANT-AT-ARMS, and the SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. x
------------------------------------------------ x PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG)
and CAMILO L. SABIO, Chairman, NARCISO S. NARIO, RICARDO M. ABCEDE, TERESO L.
JAVIER and NICASIO A. CONTI, Commissioners, MANUEL ANDAL and JULIO JALANDONI,
PCGG nominees to Philcomsat
Holdings Corporation,
Petitioners, - versus - RICHARD GORDON, in his capacity as Chairman, and
MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISES,
MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SERVICES, SENATOR JUAN PONCE-ENRILE, in
his capacity as member of both said Committees, MANUEL VILLAR, Senate
President, THE SENATE SERGEANT-AT-ARMS, and SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. x-------------------------------------------------x PHILCOMSAT HOLDINGS CORPORATIONS, PHILIP G.
BRODETT, LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., ROBERTO V. SAN JOSE, DELFIN P. ANGCAO, ROBERTO
L. ABAD, ALMA KRISTINA ALOBBA, and JOHNNY TAN, Petitioners, - versus -
SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS and
PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, its MEMBERS and CHAIRMAN, the HONORABLE SENATOR RICHARD
GORDON and SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SERVICES, its Members and Chairman, the
HONORABLE SENATOR JOKER P. ARROYO, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 174340 G.R. No. 174318 G.R. No. 174177 Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J. Puno,
QUISUMBING, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CARPIO MORALES, CALLEJO, SR., AZCUNA,
TINGA, nazario, garcia, and VELASCO,JJ. Promulgated: |
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DECISION
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SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
J.:
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Two decades ago, on
Aquino
installed her regime by issuing Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1,[1]
creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). She entrusted upon this Commission the herculean task of recovering the ill-gotten wealth
accumulated by the deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates.[2]
Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 provides
that: “No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or
produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning
matters within its official cognizance.” Apparently, the purpose is to
ensure PCGG’s unhampered performance of its task.[3]
Today, the constitutionality of
Section 4(b) is being questioned on the ground that it tramples upon the
Senate’s power to conduct legislative inquiry under Article VI, Section 21 of
the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of
its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected
by such inquiries shall be respected.
The facts are undisputed.
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate Resolution
No. 455 (Senate Res. No. 455),[4]
“directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by
the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the
alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of
Directors.”
The
pertinent portions of the Resolution read:
WHEREAS, in the last quarter of 2005, the representation
and entertainment expense of the PHC skyrocketed to P4.3 million, as compared
to the previous year’s mere P106 thousand;
WHEREAS, some board members
established wholly owned PHC subsidiary called Telecommunications Center, Inc.
(TCI), where PHC funds are allegedly siphoned; in 18 months, over P73 million
had been allegedly advanced to TCI without any accountability report given to
PHC and PHILCOMSAT;
WHEREAS, the Philippine
Star, in its 12 February 2002 issue reported that the executive committee
of Philcomsat has precipitately released P265 million
and granted P125 million loan to a relative of an executive committee member;
to date there have been no payments given, subjecting the company to an
estimated interest income loss of P11.25 million in 2004;
WHEREAS, there is an urgent
need to protect the interest of the Republic of the Philippines in the PHC,
PHILCOMSAT, and POTC from any anomalous transaction, and to conserve or salvage
any remaining value of the government’s equity position in these corporations
from any abuses of power done by their respective board of directors;
WHEREFORE, be it resolved
that the proper Senate Committee shall conduct an inquiry in aid of
legislation, on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippine Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and Philcomsat Holdings
Corporations (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in the operations by their
respective board of directors.
Adopted.
(Sgd) MIRIAM DEFENSOR
On the same date,
On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under the authority of Senator
Richard J. Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo L. Sabio of the PCGG, one of the herein petitioners, inviting
him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted
by the Committee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee
on Public Services. The purpose of the public meeting was to
deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455.[6]
On
On
Again, Chairman Sabio refused
to appear. In his letter to Senator Gordon dated
Thereafter, Chief of Staff Ma. Carissa
O. Coscolluela, under the authority of Senator
Gordon, sent another notice[10]
to Chairman Sabio requiring him to appear and testify
on the same subject matter set on
Once more, Chairman Sabio did
not comply with the notice. He sent a
letter[11]
dated
This prompted
Senator Gordon to issue an Order dated
Doubtless, there are laudable intentions of the
subject inquiry in aid of legislation. But the rule of law requires that even the best
intentions must be carried out within the parameters of the Constitution and
the law. Verily, laudable purposes must be carried out by legal methods. (Brillantes, Jr., et al. v. Commission on
Elections, En Banc [G.R. No. 163193,
On this score, Section 4(b)
of E.O. No. 1 should not be ignored as it explicitly provides:
No member or staff of the Commission shall be required
to testify or produce evidence in any judicial legislative or administrative
proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.
With all due respect,
Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 constitutes a limitation on the power of legislative
inquiry, and a recognition by the State of the need to provide protection to
the PCGG in order to ensure the unhampered performance of its duties under its
charter. E.O. No. 1 is a law, Section
4(b) of which had not been amended, repealed or revised in any way.
To say the least, it would
require both Houses of Congress and Presidential fiat to amend or repeal the
provision in controversy. Until then, it
stands to be respected as part of the legal system in this jurisdiction. (As
held in People v. Veneracion, G.R. Nos.
119987-88,
x x x
x x x
Relevantly, Chairman Sabio’s letter to Sen. Gordon dated August 19, 2006 pointed
out that the anomalous transactions referred to in the P.S. Resolution No. 455
are subject of pending cases before the regular courts, the Sandiganbayan
and the Supreme Court (Pending cases
include: a. Samuel Divina v.
Manuel Nieto, Jr., et al., CA-G.R. No. 89102; b. Philippine Communications
Satellite Corporation v. Manuel Nieto, et al.; c. Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation v. Manuel D. Andal,
Civil Case No. 06-095, RTC, Branch 61, Makati City; d. Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v.
PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation, et al., Civil Case No. 04-1049) for which
reason they may not be able to testify thereon under the principle of sub judice. The
laudable objectives of the PCGG’s functions,
recognized in several cases decided by the Supreme Court, of the PCGG will be
put to naught if its recovery efforts will be unduly impeded by a legislative
investigation of cases that are already pending before the Sandiganbayan
and trial courts.
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, (203 SCRA 767, 784 [1991])
the Honorable Supreme Court held:
“…[T]he issues sought to be
investigated by the respondent Committee is one over which jurisdiction had
been acquired by the Sandiganbayan. In short, the issue has been pre-empted by
that court. To allow the respondent
Committee to conduct its own investigation of an issue already before the Sandigabayan would not only pose the possibility of
conflicting judgments between a legislative committee and a judicial tribunal,
but if the Committee’s judgment were to be reached before that of the Sandiganbayan, the possibility of its influence being made
to bear on the ultimate judgment of the Sandiganbayan
can not be discounted.
x x x
x x x
IT IS IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS that the Commission decided not to attend the Senate inquiry to testify
and produce evidence thereat.
Unconvinced with the above Compliance
and Explanation, the Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and the Committee on Public Services issued an Order[13]
directing Major General Jose Balajadia (Ret.), Senate
Sergeant-At-Arms, to place Chairman Sabio and his
Commissioners under arrest for contempt of the Senate. The Order bears the
approval of Senate President Villar and the majority
of the Committees’ members.
On
Hence, Chairman Sabio
filed with this Court a petition for habeas corpus against the Senate Committee
on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on
Public Services, their Chairmen, Senators Richard Gordon and Joker P. Arroyo
and Members. The case was docketed as
G.R. No. 174340.
Chairman Sabio, Commissioners Abcede, Conti,
Nario, and
Javier, and the PCGG’s nominees to Philcomsat Holdings Corporation, Manuel Andal
and Julio Jalandoni, likewise filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition against the same respondents, and also against
Senate President Manuel Villar, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, the Sergeant-at-Arms, and the entire Senate. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 174318.
Meanwhile, Philcomsat
Holdings Corporation and its officers and directors, namely: Philip G. Brodett, Luis K. Lokin, Jr.,
Roberto V. San Jose, Delfin P. Angcao,
Roberto L. Abad, Alma Kristina Alobba and Johnny Tan filed
a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the Senate Committees on Government Corporations and
Public Enterprises and Public
Services, their Chairmen, Senators Gordon and Arroyo, and Members. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 174177.
In G.R. No. 174340 (for habeas corpus) and
G.R. No. 174318 (for certiorari and
prohibition) Chairman Sabio, Commissioners Abcede, Conti, Nario, and Javier; and the PCGG’s
nominees Andal and Jalandoni
alleged: first, respondent Senate
Committees disregarded Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 without any justifiable
reason; second, the inquiries conducted
by respondent Senate Committees are not
in aid of legislation; third, the
inquiries were conducted in the absence of duly published Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation; and fourth, respondent Senate Committees are
not vested with the power of contempt.
In G.R. No. 174177, petitioners Philcomsat
Holdings Corporation and its directors and officers alleged: first, respondent Senate Committees have
no jurisdiction over the subject matter stated in Senate Res. No. 455; second, the same inquiry is not in
accordance with the Senate’s Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation; third, the subpoenae against the
individual petitioners are void for having been issued without authority; fourth,
the conduct of legislative inquiry pursuant to Senate Res. No. 455 constitutes
undue encroachment by respondents into justiciable
controversies over which several courts and tribunals have already acquired
jurisdiction; and fifth, the subpoenae violated petitioners’ rights to privacy and against
self-incrimination.
In
their Consolidated Comment, the above-named respondents countered: first, the issues raised in the
petitions involve political questions over which this Court has no jurisdiction;
second, Section 4(b) has been
repealed by the Constitution; third,
respondent Senate Committees are vested with contempt power; fourth, Senate’s Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation have been duly published; fifth,
respondents have not violated any civil right of the individual petitioners,
such as their (a) right to privacy; and (b) right against
self-incrimination; and sixth, the inquiry
does not constitute undue encroachment into justiciable
controversies.
During the oral arguments held on
Crucial to the resolution of the present
petitions is the fundamental issue of whether Section 4(b) of E.O.
No. 1 is repealed by the 1987 Constitution. On this lone issue hinges the merit of the
contention of Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners
that their refusal to appear before respondent Senate Committees is justified. With the resolution of this issue, all the
other issues raised by the parties have become inconsequential.
Perched on one arm of the scale of justice is
Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution granting respondent Senate
Committees the power of legislative inquiry. It reads:
The Senate
or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries
shall be respected.
On the other arm of the scale is Section 4(b) of
E.O. No.1 limiting such power of legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG
members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative
proceeding, thus:
No member or staff of the Commission
shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative
or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.
To determine whether there exists a clear and
unequivocal repugnancy between the two quoted provisions that warrants a declaration
that Section 4(b) has been repealed by the 1987 Constitution, a brief
consideration of the Congress’ power of inquiry is imperative.
The Congress’
power of inquiry has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions long before it
reached our shores through McGrain v. Daugherty,[15]
cited in Arnault v. Nazareno.[16] In those earlier days, American courts considered
the power of inquiry as inherent in the power to legislate. The 1864
case of Briggs v. MacKellar[17]
explains the breath and basis of the power, thus:
Where no constitutional limitation or restriction exists, it is
competent for either of the two bodies composing the legislature to do, in their separate capacity, whatever
may be essential to enable them to legislate….It is well-established
principle of this parliamentary law, that either house may institute any
investigation having reference to its own organization, the conduct or
qualification of its members, its proceedings, rights, or privileges or any
matter affecting the public interest upon which it may be important that it
should have exact information, and in respect to which it would be competent
for it to legislate. The right to pass
laws, necessarily implies the right to obtain information upon any matter which
may become the subject of a law. It is
essential to the full and intelligent exercise of the legislative function….In
American legislatures the investigation of public matters before committees,
preliminary to legislation, or with the view of advising the house appointing
the committee is, as a parliamentary usage, well established as it is in
England, and the right of either
house to compel witnesses to appear and testify before its committee, and to
punish for disobedience has been frequently enforced….The right of inquiry, I think, extends to
other matters, in respect to which it may be necessary, or may be deemed
advisable to apply for legislative aid.
Remarkably, in Arnault,
this Court adhered to a similar theory. Citing McGrain,
it recognized that the power of inquiry is “an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function,” thus:
Although there is no provision in the “Constitution expressly investing
either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony
to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and
effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to
be implied. In other words, the power
of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function. A
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to
affect or change; and where the legislation body does not itself possess the
requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had
to others who possess it.”
Dispelling any doubt as to the
Philippine Congress’ power of inquiry, provisions on such power made their
maiden appearance in Article VIII, Section 12 of the 1973 Constitution.[18]
Then came the 1987 Constitution incorporating
the present Article VI, Section 12. What
was therefore implicit under the
1935 Constitution, as influenced by American jurisprudence, became explicit under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.[19]
Notably, the
1987 Constitution recognizes the power of investigation, not just of Congress,
but also of “any of its committee.” This is significant because it constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory power upon the committees and it
means that the mechanisms which the Houses can take in order to effectively
perform its investigative function are also available to the committees.[20]
It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry
has gained more solid existence and expansive construal. The Court’s high regard to
such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita,[21]
where it categorically ruled that “the
power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch.”
Verily, the Court reinforced the
doctrine in Arnault that
“the operation of government, being a
legitimate subject for legislation, is a
proper subject for investigation” and that “the power of inquiry is
co-extensive with the power to legislate.”
Considering these jurisprudential instructions, we
find Section 4(b) directly repugnant with Article VI, Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts
the PCGG members and staff from the Congress’ power of inquiry. This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision
granting such exemption. The Congress’ power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the
administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed
statutes.[22]
It even extends “to government
agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power
of Congress to regulate or even abolish.”[23] PCGG belongs to this class.
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a
limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the absence of any constitutional
basis.
Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution stating that: “Public
office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.”
The provision presupposes that since an
incumbent of a public office is invested with certain powers and charged with
certain duties pertinent to sovereignty, the powers so delegated to the officer
are held in trust for the people and
are to be exercised in behalf of the
government or of all citizens who
may need the intervention of the officers. Such trust extends to all matters within the range of duties pertaining
to the office. In other words, public officers are but the servants of the
people, and not their rulers.[24]
Section
4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with the principle
of public accountability. It places the PCGG members and staff beyond
the reach of courts, Congress and other administrative bodies. Instead
of encouraging public accountability, the same provision only institutionalizes
irresponsibility and non-accountability. In Presidential
Commission on Good Government v. Peńa,[25]
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano characterized as “obiter” the portion of the
majority opinion barring, on the basis of Sections 4(a) and (b) of E.O. No. 1,
a civil case for damages filed against the PCGG and its Commissioners. He
eloquently opined:
The above underscored portions are, it is respectfully
submitted, clearly obiter. It is important to make clear that the Court
is not here interpreting, much less upholding as valid and constitutional, the
literal terms of Section 4 (a), (b) of Executive Order No.1. If Section 4
(a) were given its literal import as immunizing the PCGG or any member thereof
from civil liability “for anything done
or omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by this Order,” the
constitutionality of Section 4 (a) would, in my submission, be open to most
serious doubt. For so viewed, Section 4 (a) would institutionalize the
irresponsibility and non-accountability of members and staff of the PCGG, a
notion that is clearly repugnant to both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution and a
privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic under the
1987 Constitution. x x x.
x x x x x x
It would seem constitutionally offensive to suppose
that a member or staff member of the PCGG could not be required to testify
before the Sandiganbayan or that such members were
exempted from complying with orders of this Court.
Chavez v. Sandiganbayan[26] reiterates the same view. Indeed, Section 4(b) has been frowned
upon by this Court even before the filing of the present petitions.
Corollarily,
Section 4(b) also runs counter to the following constitutional provisions
ensuring the people’s access to information:
Article II, Section 28
Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts
and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest.
Article III, Section 7
The right of the people to
information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as
basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
These twin provisions of
the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the
operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient
information to enable them to exercise effectively their constitutional rights.
Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in public
discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and their
effective implementation. In Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.[27]
the Court explained that an informed
citizenry is essential to the existence and proper functioning of any democracy,
thus:
An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a
continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the
people. It is in the interest of the
State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that
the government may perceive and be responsive to the people’s will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective
only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate
its will intelligently. Only when the
participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to
information relating thereto can such bear fruit.
Consequently, the conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation is not only intended to benefit Congress but also the
citizenry. The people are equally
concerned with this proceeding and have the right to participate therein in
order to protect their interests. The
extent of their participation will largely depend on the information gathered
and made known to them. In other words,
the right to information really goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional
policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public service. It is meant to enhance the widening role of
the citizenry in governmental decision-making as well as in checking abuse in
the government.[28] The cases of Tańada v. Tuvera[29]
and Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission[30]
have recognized a citizen’s interest and personality to enforce a public duty
and to bring an action to compel public officials and employees to perform that
duty.
Section 4(b) limits or obstructs the
power of Congress to secure from PCGG members and staff information and other
data in aid of its power to legislate. Again,
this must not be countenanced. In Senate v. Ermita,[31]
this Court stressed:
To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted
in public, however, any executive
issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such
investigations necessarily deprives the people of information which, being
presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public
concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to information which they
can use in formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress –
opinions which they can then communicate to their representatives and other
government officials through the various legal means allowed by their freedom
of expression.
A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it
is not within the legislative power to enact; or it creates or establishes
methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; or its purpose or effect
violates the Constitution or its basic principles.[32]
As shown in the above discussion, Section 4(b) is inconsistent with Article
VI, Section 21 (Congress’ power of inquiry), Article XI, Section 1 (principle
of public accountability), Article II, Section 28 (policy of full
disclosure) and Article III, Section 7 (right to public information).
Significantly,
Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:
All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of
instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this
Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.
The clear import of this provision is that all existing
laws, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other
executive issuances inconsistent or repugnant to the Constitution are repealed.
Jurisprudence
is replete with decisions invalidating laws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances inconsistent
with the Constitution. In Pelaez v. Auditor General,[33]
the Court considered repealed Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code of
1917 authorizing the Executive to change the seat of the government of any
subdivision of local governments, upon the approval of the 1935 Constitution.
Section 68 was adjudged incompatible and inconsistent with the Constitutional grant
of limited executive supervision over local governments. In Islamic Da’wah
Council of the Philippines, Inc., v. Office of the Executive Secretary,[34]
the Court declared Executive Order No. 46, entitled “Authorizing the Office on Muslim Affairs to Undertake Philippine Halal Certification,” void for encroaching on the
religious freedom of Muslims. In The Province of Batangas v. Romulo,[35] the Court declared some provisions of the
General Appropriations Acts of 1999, 2000 and 2001 unconstitutional for
violating the Constitutional precept on local autonomy. And in Ople v. Torres,[36]
the Court likewise declared unconstitutional Administrative Order No. 308,
entitled “Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System,” for being violative of the right to privacy protected by the
Constitution.
These Decisions, and many others,
highlight that the Constitution is the highest law of the land. It is “the
basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all
persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer. No act shall
be valid, however noble its intentions, if it conflicts with the Constitution.”[37] Consequently, this Court has no recourse but
to declare Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 repealed by the 1987 Constitution.
Significantly, during the oral
arguments on
CHIEF JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
Okay. Now, if the Supreme Court rules that Sec. 4(b)
is unconstitutional or that it does not apply to the Senate, will you answer
the questions of the Senators?
CHAIRMAN SABIO:
Your
Honor, my father was a judge, died being a judge. I was here in the Supreme
Court as Chief of Staff of Justice Feria. I would
definitely honor the Supreme Court and the rule of law.
CHIEF JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
You
will answer the questions of the Senators if we say that?
CHAIRMAN SABIO:
Yes,
Your Honor. That is the law already as
far as I am concerned.
With his admission, Chairman Sabio is not fully convinced that he and his Commissioners
are shielded from testifying before respondent Senate Committees by Section
4(b) of E.O. No. 1. In effect, his
argument that the said provision exempts him and his co-respondent
Commissioners from testifying before respondent Senate Committees concerning
Senate Res. No. 455 utterly lacks merit.
Incidentally, an
argument repeated by Chairman Sabio is that
respondent Senate Committees have no power to punish him and his Commissioners
for contempt of the Senate.
The argument is misleading.
Article VI, Section 21 provides:
The Senate or the House of
Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.
The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.
It must
be stressed that the Order of Arrest for “contempt of Senate Committees and the
Philippine Senate” was approved by
Senate President Villar and signed by fifteen (15) Senators. From this, it can be concluded
that the Order is under the authority, not only of the respondent Senate
Committees, but of the entire Senate.
At any
rate, Article VI, Section 21 grants the power of inquiry not only to the Senate
and the House of Representatives, but also to any of their respective committees. Clearly, there is a direct conferral of
power to the committees. Father
Bernas, in his Commentary on the 1987 Constitution, correctly pointed out its
significance:
It should also be noted that
the Constitution explicitly recognizes the power of investigation not just of
Congress but also of “any of its committees.” This is significant because it constitutes a
direct conferral of investigatory power upon the committees and it means that
the means which the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its
investigative function are also available to the Committees.[38]
This is a
reasonable conclusion. The conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon
any committee of Congress must carry with it all powers necessary and proper for
its effective discharge. Otherwise,
Article VI, Section 21 will be meaningless. The indispensability and usefulness
of the power of contempt in a legislative inquiry is underscored in a catena of
cases, foreign and local.
In the 1821 case of Anderson v. Dunn,[39] the function of the Houses of Congress with respect to the contempt power was likened to that of a
court, thus:
…But the court in its reasoning goes beyond this, and though the
grounds of the decision are not very clearly stated, we take them to be: that there is in some cases a power in each
House of Congress to punish for contempt; that this power is analogous to that
exercised by courts of justice, and that it being the well established doctrine
that when it appears that a prisoner is held under the order of a court of
general jurisdiction for a contempt of its authority, no other court will
discharge the prisoner or make further inquiry into the cause of his
commitment. That this is the general
rule…as regards the relation of one court to another must be conceded.
In McGrain,[40] the U.S. Supreme Court held: “Experience
has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and
also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to
obtain what is needed.” The Court, in Arnault v. Nazareno,[41] sustained the Congress’ power of contempt
on the basis of this observation.
In Arnault v. Balagtas,[42] the Court further
explained that the contempt power of
Congress is founded upon reason and policy and that the power of inquiry will
not be complete if for every contumacious act, Congress has to resort to
judicial interference, thus:
The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant
witnesses is founded upon reason and policy.
Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the exercise of
legislative power. How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge and information on
which to base intended legislation if it cannot require and compel the
disclosure of such knowledge and information if it is impotent to punish a
defiance of its power and authority? When the framers of the Constitution
adopted the principle of separation of powers, making each branch supreme
within the realm of its respective authority, it must have intended each
department’s authority to be full and complete, independently of the other’s
authority or power. And how could the
authority and power become complete if for every act of refusal, every act of
defiance, every act of contumacy against it, the legislative body must resort
to the judicial department for the appropriate remedy, because it is impotent
by itself to punish or deal therewith, with the affronts committed against its
authority or dignity.[43]
In Negros
Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Sangguniang Panlungsod
of Dumaguete,[44] the Court characterized contempt power as a
matter of self-preservation, thus:
The exercise by the
legislature of the contempt power is a matter of self-preservation as
that branch of the government vested with the legislative power, independently
of the judicial branch, asserts its authority and punishes contempts
thereof. The contempt power of the
legislature is, therefore, sui generis x x x.
Meanwhile, with respect to G.R. No.
174177, the petition of Philcomsat Holdings
Corporation and its directors and officers, this Court holds that the
respondent Senate Committees’ inquiry does not violate their right to privacy
and right against self-incrimination.
One important limitation on the Congress’ power of
inquiry is that “the rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.” This is just another way of saying that the
power of inquiry must be “subject to the limitations placed by the Constitution
on government action.” As held in Barenblatt
v. United States,[45] “the Congress, in common with all the other
branches of the Government, must exercise its powers subject to the limitations
placed by the Constitution on governmental action, more particularly in the
context of this case, the relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights.”
First is the right to privacy.
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws.[46] Within these zones, any form of intrusion is
impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with customary legal
process. The meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not only from
our conviction that the right to privacy is a “constitutional right” and “the right
most valued by civilized men,”[47]
but also from our adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which
mandates that, “no one shall be subjected
to arbitrary interference with his privacy” and “everyone has the right to the
protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”[48]
Our Bill
of Rights, enshrined in Article III of the Constitution, provides at least two
guarantees that explicitly create zones of privacy. It highlights a person’s “right to be let alone” or the “right to determine what, how much, to whom
and when information about himself shall be disclosed.”[49] Section
2 guarantees “the right
of the people
to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose.” Section 3 renders
inviolable the “privacy of
communication and correspondence” and further
cautions that “any
evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.”
In
evaluating a claim for violation of the right to privacy, a court must
determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy
and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable
government intrusion.[50] Applying this determination to these cases,
the important inquiries are: first, did the directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation exhibit a reasonable
expectation of privacy?; and second, did the government violate
such expectation?
The
answers are in the negative. Petitioners were invited in the Senate’s public
hearing to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455, particularly “on
the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications
Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT), and Philcomsat Holdings Corporations
(PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in the operations by their respective
board of directors.” Obviously, the inquiry focus on petitioners’
acts committed in the discharge of their duties as officers and directors of
the said corporations, particularly Philcomsat Holdings
Corporation. Consequently, they have no
reasonable expectation of privacy over matters involving their offices in a
corporation where the government has interest. Certainly, such matters are of
public concern and over which the people have the right to information.
This
goes to show that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an
overriding compelling state interest. In Morfe v. Mutuc,[51] the
Court, in line with Whalen v. Roe,[52]
employed the rational basis relationship test when it held that there was no
infringement of the individual’s right to privacy as the requirement to
disclosure information is for a valid purpose, i.e., to curtail and minimize
the opportunities for official corruption, maintain a standard of honesty in
public service, and promote morality in public administration.[53]
In Valmonte v. Belmonte,[54]
the Court remarked that as public figures, the Members of the former Batasang
Pambansa enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to
ordinary individuals, and their actions are subject to closer scrutiny. Taking this into consideration, the Court
ruled that the right of the people to access information on matters of public
concern prevails over the right to privacy of financial transactions.
Under
the present circumstances, the alleged anomalies in the PHILCOMSAT, PHC and
POTC, ranging in millions of pesos, and the conspiratorial participation of the
PCGG and its officials are compelling reasons
for the Senate to exact vital
information from the directors and officers of Philcomsat
Holdings Corporations, as well as from Chairman Sabio
and his Commissioners to aid it in crafting the necessary legislation to
prevent corruption and formulate remedial measures and policy determination
regarding PCGG’s efficacy. There being no reasonable expectation of
privacy on the part of those directors and officers over the subject covered by
Senate Res. No. 455, it follows that their right to privacy has not been
violated by respondent Senate Committees.
Anent the right
against self-incrimination, it must be emphasized that this right maybe invoked
by the said directors and officers of Philcomsat
Holdings Corporation only when the
incriminating question is being asked, since they have no way of knowing
in advance the nature or effect of the
questions to be asked of them.”[55] That this right may possibly be violated or abused is no ground for denying respondent
Senate Committees their power of inquiry. The consolation is that when this power is
abused, such issue may be presented before the courts. At this juncture, what
is important is that respondent Senate Committees have sufficient Rules to guide them when the right
against self-incrimination is invoked. Sec. 19 reads:
Sec. 19.
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
A witness can invoke his right against
self-incrimination only when a question tends to elicit an answer that will
incriminate him is propounded to him. However, he may offer to answer any
question in an executive session.
No person can refuse to testify or be placed under
oath or affirmation or answer questions before an incriminatory question is
asked. His invocation of such right does not by itself excuse him from his duty
to give testimony.
In such a case, the Committee, by a majority vote of
the members present there being a quorum, shall determine whether the right has
been properly invoked. If the Committee decides otherwise, it shall resume its
investigation and the question or questions previously refused to be answered
shall be repeated to the witness. If the latter continues to refuse to answer
the question, the Committee may punish him for contempt for contumacious
conduct.
The same
directors and officers contend that the Senate is barred from inquiring into
the same issues being litigated before the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan.
Suffice it to state that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provide that the filing or pendency of any
prosecution of criminal or administrative action should not stop or abate any
inquiry to carry out a legislative purpose.
Let it be stressed at
this point that so long as the
constitutional rights of witnesses, like Chairman Sabio
and his Commissioners, will be respected
by respondent Senate Committees, it their duty to cooperate with them in their
efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action. The
unremitting obligation of every citizen is to respond to subpoenae, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its
Committees, and to testify fully with respect to matters within the realm of
proper investigation.
In fine, PCGG Chairman Camilo Sabio and Commissioners Ricardo Abcede,
Narciso Nario, Nicasio
Conti, and Tereso Javier; and Manuel Andal and Julio Jalandoni, PCGG’s nominees to Philcomsat Holdings
Corporation, as well as its directors and officers, must comply with the Subpoenae Ad Testificandum
issued by respondent Senate Committees directing them to appear and testify
in public hearings relative to Senate Resolution No. 455.
WHEREFORE, the
petition in G.R. No. 174340 for habeas corpus is DISMISSED, for being moot.
The petitions in G.R Nos. 174318 and 174177 are likewise DISMISSED.
Section
4(b) of E.O. No. 1 is declared REPEALED by the 1987
Constitution. Respondent Senate
Committees’ power of inquiry relative to Senate Resolution 455 is upheld. PCGG Chairman Camilo
L. Sabio and Commissioners Ricardo Abcede, Narciso Nario, Nicasio Conti and Tereso Javier; and
Manuel Andal and Julio Jalandoni,
PCGG’s nominees to Philcomsat
Holdings Corporation, as well as its directors and officers, petitioners in
G.R. No. 174177, are ordered to comply with the Subpoenae
Ad Testificandum issued by respondent Senate
Committees directing them to appear and testify in public hearings relative to
Senate Resolution No. 455.
SO ORDERED.
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
|
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Chief Justice
|
|
|
REYNATO S. PUNO Associate Justice CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice MINITA CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO
Associate Justice
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief
Justice
[1] E.O. No. 1 was issued by Former President Aquino in
the exercise of her legislative power under the Provisional (Freedom)
Constitution. Thus, it is of the same
category and has the same binding force as a statute. (Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1998 citing Legaspi v. Ministry of Finance, 115 SCRA 418
[1982]; Garcia-Padilla v. Ponce Enrile, G.R. No. 61388, April 20, 1983; Aquino v. Commission on Elections, 62 SCRA 275 [1975] )
[2] Section 2 (a), Executive Order No.1.
[3] See Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Pena,
[4] Annex “E” of the Petition in G.R. No. 174318.
[5]
[6] Annex “F” of the Petition in G.R. No. 174318.
[7] Annex “G” of the Petition in G.R. No. 174318.
[8] Annex “A” of the Petition in G.R. No. 174318.
[9] Petition in G.R. No. 174177 at p. 15.
[10] Annex “B” of the Petition in G.R. No. 174318.
[11] Annex “I” of the Petition in G.R. No. 174318.
[12] Annex “J” of the Petition in G.R. No. 174318.
[13] Annex “D” of the petition in G.R. No. 174318.
[14] En Banc Resolution dated
[15] 273
[16] No. L- 3820, 87 Phil. 29 (1950).
[17] 2 Abb. Pr. 30 (N.Y. 1864).
[18] Puno, Lecture on Legislative Investigations and the Right to
Privacy, at p. 22.
[19] Bernas S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, 2003 Ed. at p.737.
[20] Bernas S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 2003 Ed. at p.739.
[21] G.R. No. 169777,
[22] Watkins
v.
[23] Senate v.
[24] De Leon, De Leon, Jr. The Law on Public Officers and Election Law, p. 2.
[25] No. L-77663,
[26] 193 SCRA 282 (1991).
[27] G.R.
No. 74930,
[28] Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.,
supra.
[29] 136
SCRA 27.
[30] 150
SCRA 530.
[31] Supra.
[32] Agpalo, Statutory
Construction, 1998 citing In re Cunanan, 94 Phil. 534 (1954).
[33] No.
L-23825,
[34] G.R.
No. 153888,
[35] G.R. No. 152774,
[36] 293 SCRA 141 (1998).
[37] Cruz, Constitutional Law, 2003, p. 4.
[38] Bernas, S.J., The 1987
Constitution of the Republic of the
[39] 19
[40] Supra.
[41] Supra.
[42] 97 Phil. 358 [1955].
[43] Id.
[44] No. L-72492,
[45] 360
[46] Marquez
v. Desierto, G.R. No. 135882,
[47] See
Morfe v. Mutuc No. L-20387,
[48] Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See also Article 17 (1) and (2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
[49] Constitutional and Legal Systems of
ASEAN Countries, Sison, Academy of ASEAN Law and
Jurisprudence, 1990, at 221, citing I.R. Cortes, The Constitutional Foundations
of Privacy, 7 (1970).
[50] Burrows
v.
[51] Supra.
[52] 429
[53] Justice Puno, Lecture on Legislative Inquiry and Right to Privacy, p. 60.
[54] 170 SCRA 256 (1989)
[55] Cruz, Constitutional Law, 2003, p. 307.