THIRD DIVISION
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REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION and SOCIAL
SECURITY SYSTEM,
Petitioners, - versus - ASIAPRO
COOPERATIVE, Respondent. |
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G.R. No.
172101 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
AZCUNA, CHICO-NAZARIO, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO,
J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to annul and set aside the Decision[1]
and Resolution[2] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87236, dated 5 January 2006 and 20 March
2006, respectively, which annulled and set aside the Orders of the Social
Security Commission (SSC) in SSC Case No. 6-15507-03, dated 17 February 2004[3]
and 16 September 2004,[4]
respectively, thereby dismissing the petition-complaint dated 12 June 2003
filed by herein petitioner Social Security System (SSS) against herein
respondent.
Herein
The
antecedents of this case are as follows:
Respondent Asiapro, as a cooperative,
is composed of owners-members. Under its
by-laws, owners-members are of two categories, to wit: (1) regular member, who
is entitled to all the rights and privileges of membership; and (2) associate
member, who has no right to vote and be voted upon and shall be entitled only
to such rights and privileges provided in its by-laws.[8] Its primary objectives are to provide savings
and credit facilities and to develop other livelihood services for its
owners-members. In the discharge of the
aforesaid primary objectives, respondent cooperative entered into several
Service Contracts[9] with
Stanfilco - a division of DOLE Philippines, Inc. and a company based in
Bukidnon. The owners-members do not
receive compensation or wages from the respondent cooperative. Instead, they receive a share in the service
surplus[10]
which the respondent cooperative earns from different areas of trade it engages
in, such as the income derived from the said Service Contracts with
Stanfilco. The owners-members get their
income from the service surplus generated by the quality and amount of services
they rendered, which is determined by the Board of Directors of the respondent
cooperative.
In order to enjoy the benefits under
the Social Security Law of 1997, the owners-members of the respondent
cooperative, who were assigned to Stanfilco requested the services of the
latter to register them with petitioner SSS as self-employed and to remit their
contributions as such. Also, to comply
with Section 19-A of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended by Republic Act No.
8282, the SSS contributions of the said owners-members were equal to the share
of both the employer and the employee.
On 26 September 2002, however,
petitioner SSS through its Vice-President for Mindanao Division, Atty. Eddie A.
Jara, sent a letter[11]
to the respondent cooperative, addressed to its Chief Executive Officer (CEO)
and General Manager Leo G. Parma, informing the latter that based on the
Service Contracts it executed with Stanfilco, respondent cooperative is
actually a manpower contractor supplying employees to Stanfilco and for that
reason, it is an employer of its owners-members working with Stanfilco. Thus, respondent cooperative should register
itself with petitioner SSS as an employer and make the corresponding report and
remittance of premium contributions in accordance with the Social Security Law
of 1997. On
Accordingly, petitioner SSS, on 12
June 2003, filed a Petition[14] before
petitioner SSC against the respondent cooperative and Stanfilco praying that
the respondent cooperative or, in the alternative, Stanfilco be directed to
register as an employer and to report respondent cooperative’s owners-members
as covered employees under the compulsory coverage of SSS and to remit the
necessary contributions in accordance with the Social Security Law of
1997. The same was docketed as SSC Case
No. 6-15507-03. Respondent cooperative
filed its Answer with Motion to Dismiss alleging that no employer-employee
relationship exists between it and its owners-members, thus, petitioner SSC has
no jurisdiction over the respondent cooperative. Stanfilco, on the other hand, filed an Answer
with Cross-claim against the respondent cooperative.
On
Intending to appeal the above Orders,
respondent cooperative filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition
for Review before the Court of Appeals.
Subsequently, respondent cooperative filed a Manifestation stating that
it was no longer filing a Petition for Review.
In its place, respondent cooperative filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 87236, with the following assignment of errors:
I.
The Orders dated
A. [Petitioner] SSC arbitrarily proceeded with the case as if it has jurisdiction over the petition a quo, considering that it failed to first resolve the issue of the existence of an employer-employee relationship between [respondent] cooperative and its owners-members.
B. While indeed, the [petitioner] SSC has jurisdiction over all disputes arising under the SSS Law with respect to coverage, benefits, contributions, and related matters, it is respectfully submitted that [petitioner] SSC may only assume jurisdiction in cases where there is no dispute as to the existence of an employer-employee relationship.
C. Contrary to the holding of the [petitioner] SSC, the legal issue of employer-employee relationship raised in [respondent’s] Motion to Dismiss can be preliminarily resolved through summary hearings prior to the hearing on the merits. However, any inquiry beyond a preliminary determination, as what [petitioner SSC] wants to accomplish, would be to encroach on the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission [NLRC], which is the more competent body clothed with power to resolve issues relating to the existence of an employment relationship.
II. At any rate, the [petitioner] SSC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition a quo.
A. [Respondent] is not an employer within the contemplation of the Labor Law but is a multi-purpose cooperative created pursuant to Republic Act No. 6938 and composed of owners-members, not employees.
B. The rights and obligations of the owners-members of [respondent] cooperative are derived from their Membership Agreements, the Cooperatives By-Laws, and Republic Act No. 6938, and not from any contract of employment or from the Labor Laws. Moreover, said owners-members enjoy rights that are not consistent with being mere employees of a company, such as the right to participate and vote in decision-making for the cooperative.
C. As found by the Bureau of Internal Revenue [BIR], the owners-members of [respondent] cooperative are not paid any compensation income.[15] (Emphasis supplied.)
On
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated [
Aggrieved by the aforesaid Decision,
petitioner SSS moved for a reconsideration, but it was denied by the appellate
court in its Resolution dated
Hence, this Petition.
In its Memorandum, petitioners raise
the issue of whether or not the Court of
Appeals erred in not finding that the SSC has jurisdiction over the subject
matter and it has a valid basis in denying respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. The said issue is supported by the following
arguments:
I.
The
[petitioner SSC] has jurisdiction over the petition-complaint filed before it
by the [petitioner SSS] under R.A. No. 8282.
II.
Respondent
[cooperative] is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of petitioner SSC
after invoking its jurisdiction by filing an [A]nswer with [M]otion to
[D]ismiss before it.
III.
The
[petitioner SSC] did not act with grave abuse of discretion in denying
respondent [cooperative’s] [M]otion to [D]ismiss.
IV.
The
existence of an employer-employee relationship is a question of fact where
presentation of evidence is necessary.
V.
There is an
employer-employee relationship between [respondent cooperative] and its
[owners-members].
Petitioners claim that SSC has
jurisdiction over the petition-complaint filed before it by petitioner SSS as
it involved an issue of whether or not a worker is entitled to compulsory
coverage under the SSS Law. Petitioners
avow that Section 5 of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended by Republic Act No.
8282, expressly confers upon petitioner SSC the power to settle disputes on
compulsory coverage, benefits, contributions and penalties thereon or any other
matter related thereto. Likewise,
Section 9 of the same law clearly provides that SSS coverage is compulsory upon
all employees. Thus, when petitioner SSS
filed a petition-complaint against the respondent cooperative and Stanfilco
before the petitioner SSC for the compulsory coverage of respondent
cooperative’s owners-members as well as for collection of unpaid SSS contributions,
it was very obvious that the subject matter of the aforesaid petition-complaint
was within the expertise and jurisdiction of the SSC.
Petitioners similarly assert that granting arguendo that there is a prior
need to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship between
the respondent cooperative and its owners-members, said issue does not preclude
petitioner SSC from taking cognizance of the aforesaid petition-complaint. Considering that the principal relief sought
in the said petition-complaint has to be resolved by reference to the Social
Security Law and not to the Labor Code or other labor relations statutes,
therefore, jurisdiction over the same solely belongs to petitioner SSC.
Petitioners further claim that the
denial of the respondent cooperative’s Motion to Dismiss grounded on the
alleged lack of employer-employee relationship does not constitute grave abuse
of discretion on the part of petitioner SSC because the latter has the
authority and power to deny the same. Moreover,
the existence of an employer-employee relationship is a question of fact where
presentation of evidence is necessary.
Petitioners also maintain that the respondent cooperative is already
estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the petitioner SSC because it has
already filed its Answer before it, thus, respondent cooperative has already
submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the petitioner SSC.
Finally, petitioners contend that
there is an employer-employee relationship between the respondent cooperative
and its owners-members. The respondent
cooperative is the employer of its owners-members considering that it undertook
to provide services to Stanfilco, the performance of which is under the full
and sole control of the respondent cooperative.
On the other hand, respondent
cooperative alleges that its owners-members own the cooperative, thus, no
employer-employee relationship can arise between them. The persons of the employer and the employee
are merged in the owners-members themselves.
Likewise, respondent cooperative’s owners-members even requested the
respondent cooperative to register them with the petitioner SSS as
self-employed individuals. Hence,
petitioner SSC has no jurisdiction over the petition-complaint filed before it
by petitioner SSS.
Respondent cooperative further avers
that the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that petitioner SSC acted with grave
abuse of discretion when it assumed jurisdiction over the petition-complaint
without determining first if there was an employer-employee relationship
between the respondent cooperative and its owners-members. Respondent cooperative claims that the
question of whether an employer-employee relationship exists between it and its
owners-members is a legal and not a factual issue as the facts are undisputed
and need only to be interpreted by the applicable law and jurisprudence.
Lastly, respondent cooperative
asserts that it cannot be considered estopped from assailing the jurisdiction
of petitioner SSC simply because it filed an Answer with Motion to Dismiss,
especially where the issue of jurisdiction is raised at the very first instance
and where the only relief being sought is the dismissal of the
petition-complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
From the foregoing arguments of the
parties, the issues may be summarized into:
I.
Whether the
petitioner SSC has jurisdiction over the petition-complaint filed before it by
petitioner SSS against the respondent cooperative.
II.
Whether the
respondent cooperative is estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of
petitioner SSC since it had already filed an Answer with Motion to Dismiss
before the said body.
Petitioner SSC’s jurisdiction is
clearly stated in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8282 as well as in Section 1,
Rule III of the 1997 SSS Revised Rules of Procedure.
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8282
provides:
SEC. 5. Settlement of Disputes. – (a) Any dispute arising under this Act with respect to coverage, benefits, contributions and penalties thereon or any other matter related thereto, shall be cognizable by the Commission, x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
Similarly, Section 1, Rule III of the
1997 SSS Revised Rules of Procedure states:
Section 1. Jurisdiction. – Any dispute arising under the Social Security Act with respect to coverage, entitlement of benefits, collection and settlement of contributions and penalties thereon, or any other matter related thereto, shall be cognizable by the Commission after the SSS through its President, Manager or Officer-in-charge of the Department/Branch/Representative Office concerned had first taken action thereon in writing. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear then from the aforesaid
provisions that any issue regarding the compulsory coverage of the SSS is well
within the exclusive domain of the petitioner SSC. It is important to note, though, that the
mandatory coverage under the SSS Law is premised on the existence of an
employer-employee relationship[17]
except in cases of compulsory coverage of the self-employed.
It is axiomatic that the allegations in the complaint, not the defenses
set up in the Answer or in the Motion to Dismiss, determine which court has
jurisdiction over an action; otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would
depend almost entirely upon the defendant.[18] Moreover, it is well-settled that once
jurisdiction is acquired by the court, it remains with it until the full
termination of the case.[19] The said principle may be applied even to
quasi-judicial bodies.
In this case, the petition-complaint
filed by the petitioner SSS before the petitioner SSC against the respondent cooperative
and Stanfilco alleges that the owners-members of the respondent cooperative are
subject to the compulsory coverage of the SSS because they are employees of the
respondent cooperative. Consequently,
the respondent cooperative being the employer of its owners-members must
register as employer and report its owners-members as covered members of the
SSS and remit the necessary premium contributions in accordance with the Social
Security Law of 1997. Accordingly, based on the aforesaid allegations in the
petition-complaint filed before the petitioner SSC, the case clearly falls
within its jurisdiction. Although the
Answer with Motion to Dismiss filed by the respondent cooperative challenged
the jurisdiction of the petitioner SSC on the alleged lack of employer-employee
relationship between itself and its owners-members, the same is not enough to
deprive the petitioner SSC of its jurisdiction over the petition-complaint
filed before it. Thus, the petitioner
SSC cannot be faulted for initially assuming jurisdiction over the
petition-complaint of the petitioner SSS.
Nonetheless, since the existence of
an employer-employee relationship between the respondent cooperative and its
owners-members was put in issue and considering that the compulsory coverage of
the SSS Law is predicated on the existence of such relationship, it behooves
the petitioner SSC to determine if there is really an employer-employee
relationship that exists between the respondent cooperative and its
owners-members.
The question on the existence of an
employer-employee relationship is not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
Article 217 of the Labor Code enumerating the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters
and the NLRC provides that:
ART. 217. JURISDICTION OF LABOR ARBITERS AND THE COMMISSION. - (a) x x x.
x x x x
6.
Except claims for Employees
Compensation, Social Security,
Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims, arising from employer-employee
relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service,
involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless
of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.[20]
Although
the aforesaid provision speaks merely of claims for Social Security, it would
necessarily include issues on the coverage thereof, because claims are
undeniably rooted in the coverage by the system. Hence, the question on the existence of an
employer-employee relationship for the purpose
of determining the coverage of the Social Security System is explicitly
excluded from the jurisdiction of the NLRC and falls within the jurisdiction of
the SSC which is primarily charged with the duty of settling disputes arising
under the Social Security Law of 1997.
On the basis thereof, considering
that the petition-complaint of the petitioner SSS involved the issue of
compulsory coverage of the owners-members of the respondent cooperative, this
Court agrees with the petitioner SSC when it declared in its Order dated 17
February 2004 that as an incident to the issue of compulsory coverage, it may
inquire into the presence or absence of an employer-employee relationship
without need of waiting for a prior pronouncement or submitting the issue to
the NLRC for prior determination. Since
both the petitioner SSC and the NLRC are independent bodies and their
jurisdiction are well-defined by the separate statutes creating them,
petitioner SSC has the authority to inquire into the relationship existing
between the worker and the person or entity to whom he renders service to
determine if the employment, indeed, is one that is excepted by the Social
Security Law of 1997 from compulsory coverage.[21]
Even before the petitioner SSC could
make a determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship,
however, the respondent cooperative already elevated the Order of the
petitioner SSC, denying its Motion to Dismiss, to the Court of Appeals by
filing a Petition for Certiorari. As a consequence thereof, the petitioner SSC
became a party to the said Petition for Certiorari
pursuant to Section 5(b)[22]
of Republic Act No. 8282. The appellate
court ruled in favor of the respondent cooperative by declaring that the
petitioner SSC has no jurisdiction over the petition-complaint filed before it
because there was no employer-employee relationship between the respondent
cooperative and its owners-members.
Resultantly, the petitioners SSS and SSC, representing the Republic of
the
Although as a rule, in the exercise
of the Supreme Court’s power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and
the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the
Court,[23]
said rule is not without exceptions.
There are several recognized exceptions[24]
in which factual issues may be resolved by this Court. One of these exceptions finds application in
this present case which is, when the findings of fact are conflicting. There are, indeed, conflicting findings
espoused by the petitioner SSC and the appellate court relative to the
existence of employer-employee relationship between the respondent cooperative
and its owners-members, which necessitates a departure from the oft-repeated
rule that factual issues may not be the subject of appeals to this Court.
In determining the existence of an
employer-employee relationship, the following elements are considered: (1) the
selection and engagement of the workers; (2) the payment of wages by whatever
means; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the worker’s
conduct, with the latter assuming primacy in the overall consideration.[25] The
most important element is the employer’s control of the employee’s conduct, not
only as to the result of the work to be done, but also as to the means and
methods to accomplish.[26] The power of control refers to the existence
of the power and not necessarily to the actual exercise thereof. It is not essential for the employer to
actually supervise the performance of duties of the employee; it is enough that
the employer has the right to wield that power.[27] All the aforesaid elements are present in
this case.
First. It is expressly provided in the Service
Contracts that it is the respondent cooperative which has the exclusive discretion in the selection and engagement of the
owners-members as well as its team leaders who will be assigned at Stanfilco.[28] Second. Wages
are defined as “remuneration or earnings, however designated, capable of
being expressed in terms of money, whether fixed or ascertained, on a time,
task, piece or commission basis, or other method of calculating the same, which
is payable by an employer to an employee
under a written or unwritten contract of employment for work done or to be done,
or for service rendered or to be rendered.”[29] In this case, the weekly stipends or the so-called shares in the service surplus
given by the respondent cooperative to its owners-members were in reality wages,
as the same were equivalent to an amount not lower than that prescribed by existing
labor laws, rules and regulations, including the wage order applicable to the
area and industry; or the same shall not be lower than the prevailing rates of
wages.[30] It cannot be doubted then that those stipends
or shares in the service surplus are indeed wages, because these are given to
the owners-members as compensation in rendering services to respondent
cooperative’s client, Stanfilco. Third.
It is also stated in the above-mentioned Service Contracts that it is
the respondent cooperative which has the power
to investigate, discipline and remove the owners-members and its team leaders
who were rendering services at Stanfilco.[31] Fourth. As earlier opined, of the four elements of
the employer-employee relationship, the “control test” is the most
important. In the case at bar, it is the
respondent cooperative which has the
sole control over the manner and means of performing the services under the
Service Contracts with Stanfilco as well as the means and methods of work.[32] Also, the respondent cooperative is solely
and entirely responsible for its owners-members, team leaders and other
representatives at Stanfilco.[33] All these clearly prove that, indeed, there
is an employer-employee relationship between the respondent cooperative and its
owners-members.
It is true that the Service Contracts
executed between the respondent cooperative and Stanfilco expressly provide
that there shall be no employer-employee relationship between the respondent
cooperative and its owners-members.[34] This Court, however, cannot give the said
provision force and effect.
As previously pointed out by this
Court, an employee-employer relationship actually exists between the respondent
cooperative and its owners-members. The
four elements in the four-fold test for the existence of an employment
relationship have been complied with.
The respondent cooperative must not be allowed to deny its employment
relationship with its owners-members by invoking the questionable Service
Contracts provision, when in actuality, it does exist. The
existence of an employer-employee relationship cannot be negated by expressly
repudiating it in a contract, when the terms and surrounding circumstances show
otherwise. The employment status of a
person is defined and prescribed by law and not by what the parties say it
should be.[35]
It is settled that the contracting
parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they
want, and their agreement would have the force of law between them. However, the agreed terms and conditions must not be contrary to law, morals,
customs, public policy or public order.[36] The Service Contract provision in question
must be struck down for being contrary to law and public policy since it is
apparently being used by the respondent cooperative merely to circumvent the
compulsory coverage of its employees, who are also its owners-members, by the
Social Security Law.
This Court is not unmindful of the
pronouncement it made in Cooperative
Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja[37]
wherein it held that:
A cooperative, therefore, is by its nature different from an ordinary business concern, being run either by persons, partnerships, or corporations. Its owners and/or members are the ones who run and operate the business while the others are its employees x x x.
An employee therefore of such a cooperative
who is a member and co-owner thereof cannot invoke the right to collective
bargaining for certainly an owner cannot bargain with himself or his co-owners.
In the opinion of
However, in so far as it involves cooperatives with employees who are not members or co-owners thereof, certainly such employees are entitled to exercise the rights of all workers to organization, collective bargaining, negotiations and others as are enshrined in the Constitution and existing laws of the country.
The situation in the aforesaid case
is very much different from the present case.
The declaration made by the Court in the aforesaid case was made in the
context of whether an employee who is also an owner-member of a cooperative can
exercise the right to bargain collectively with the employer who is the
cooperative wherein he is an owner-member.
Obviously, an owner-member cannot bargain collectively with the
cooperative of which he is also the owner because an owner cannot bargain with
himself. In the instant case, there is
no issue regarding an owner-member’s right to bargain collectively with the
cooperative. The question involved here
is whether an employer-employee relationship can exist between the cooperative
and an owner-member. In fact, a closer
look at Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao
City, Inc. will show that it actually recognized that an owner-member of a
cooperative can be its own employee.
It bears stressing, too, that a
cooperative acquires juridical personality upon its registration with the
Cooperative Development Authority.[38] It has its Board of Directors, which directs
and supervises its business; meaning, its Board of Directors is the one in
charge in the conduct and management of its affairs.[39] With that, a cooperative can be likened to a
corporation with a personality separate and distinct from its
owners-members. Consequently, an
owner-member of a cooperative can be an employee of the latter and an
employer-employee relationship can exist between them.
In the present case, it is not
disputed that the respondent cooperative had registered itself with the
Cooperative Development Authority, as evidenced by its Certificate of
Registration No. 0-623-2460.[40] In its by-laws,[41]
its Board of Directors directs, controls, and supervises the business and
manages the property of the respondent cooperative. Clearly then, the management of the affairs
of the respondent cooperative is vested in its Board of Directors and not in its
owners-members as a whole. Therefore, it
is completely logical that the respondent cooperative, as a juridical person
represented by its Board of Directors, can enter into an employment with its
owners-members.
In sum, having declared that there is
an employer-employee relationship between the respondent cooperative and its
owners-member, we conclude that the petitioner SSC has jurisdiction over the
petition-complaint filed before it by the petitioner SSS. This being our conclusion, it is no longer
necessary to discuss the issue of whether the respondent cooperative was
estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the petitioner SSC when it filed
its Answer with Motion to Dismiss.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision and
the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87236, dated
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. with Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Vicente Q. Roxas, concurring; rollo, pp. 63-74.
[2]
[3] Penned by Commissioner Sergio R. Ortiz-Luis, Jr.; id. at 116-119.
[4]
[5] Otherwise known as “Social
Security Act of 1997,” which was approved on
[6] Otherwise known as “Cooperative
Code of the
[7] CA rollo, p. 63.
[8] Section 2, Asiapro Cooperative Amended By-Laws, CA rollo, p. 68.
[9]
[10] It represents the amount given to respondent cooperative’s owners-members for rendering services to the client of respondent cooperative, like Stanfilco. Such amount shall not be lower than the prevailing rates of wages.
[11] Rollo, pp. 75-76.
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15] Rollo, pp. 66-68.
[16]
[17] Social Security System v. Court of Appeals, 401 Phil. 132, 141 (2000).
[18] Abacus
Securities Corporation v. Ampil, G.R. No. 160016,
[19] Philrock, Inc. v. Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, 412 Phil. 236, 246 (2001).
[20] Article 217(a)(6) of the Labor Code
of the
[21] Rollo, p. 117.
[22] SEC. 5. Settlement of Disputes. – (a) x x x.
(b) x x x. The Commission shall be deemed to be a party to any judicial action involving any such decision, and may be represented by an attorney employed by the Commission, by the Solicitor General or any public prosecutor.
[23] Almendrala
v. Ngo, G.R. No. 142408,
[24] Recognized exceptions to this rule are: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellee and the appellant; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion (Langkaan Realty Development, Inc. v. United Coconut Planters Bank, 400 Phil. 1349, 1356 (2000); Nokom v. National Labor Relations Commissions, 390 Phil. 1228, 1243 (2000); Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Embroidery and Garments Industries (Phils.), Inc., 364 Phil. 541, 546-547 (1999); Sta. Maria v. Court of Appeals, 349 Phil. 275, 282-283 (1998); Almendrala v. Ngo, G.R. No. 142408, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 311, 322.)
[25] Jo v. National Labor Relations Commission, 381 Phil. 428, 435 (2000).
[26] Chavez
v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 146530,
[27] Jo v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 25.
[28] 7. SELECTION, ENGAGEMENT, DISCHARGE. The Cooperative shall have the exclusive discretion in the acceptance, engagement, investigation and discipline and removal of its owner-members and team leaders. (Service Contract, CA rollo, p. 458).
[29] ART. 97(f) of the Labor Code.
[30] 4. COOPERATIVE’S RESPONSIBILITIES. The Cooperative shall have the following responsibilities:
x x x x.
4.3. The Cooperative shall pay the share of the service surplus due to its owner-members assigned to the Client x x x. However, the amount of the share of the service surplus of the owner-members x x x shall be in an amount not lower than existing labor laws, rules and regulations, including the wage order applicable to the area and industry. x x x. (CA rollo, pp. 457-458).
[31]
[32] 1. SCOPE OF SERVICE. x x x.
x x
x. The Cooperative shall have sole
control over the manner and means of performing the subject services under this
Contract and shall complete the services in accordance with its own means and
methods of work, in keeping with the Client’s standards. (
[33] 3.
RELATIONSHIP OF THE PARTIES. x x x.
The Cooperative shall be solely and entirely responsible for its
owner-members, team leaders and other representatives. (
[34] 3. RELATIONSHIP OF THE PARTIES. It is hereby agreed that there shall be no employer-employee relationship between the Cooperative and its owners-members x x x. (Id).
[35] Chavez
v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 26 at 493; Lopez v. Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System, G.R. No. 154472,
[36] Art. 1306, Civil Code of the
Philippines; Philippine National Bank v.
Cabansag, G.R. No. 157010,
[37] G.R. No. L-77951,
[38] ART. 16. Registration. - A cooperative formed or organized under this Code acquires juridical personality from the date the Cooperative Development Authority issues a certificate of registration under its official seal. x x x. (Republic Act No. 6938).
[39] ART. 38. Composition of the Board of Directors. - The conduct and management of the affairs of a cooperative shall be vested in a board of directors x x x.
ART. 39. Powers
of the Board of Directors. - The board of directors shall direct and
supervise the business, manage the property of the cooperative and may, by
resolution, exercise all such powers of the cooperative as are not reserved for
the general assembly under this Code and the by-laws. (
[40] CA rollo, p. 63.
[41]