THIRD DIVISION
|
MA. Petitioner, - versus - ROGELIO Respondent. x
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x ROGELIO Petitioner, - versus - OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; RONALDO V. ZAMORA, in his
capacity as Executive Secretary; ROY V. SENERES, in his capacity as Chairman
of the National Labor Relations Commission (in lieu of RAUL T. AQUINO, in his
capacity as Acting Chairman of the National labor Relations Commission); and
MA. Respondents. x
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x The Petitioners, - versus - ROGELIO Respondent. |
G.R. No. 155831
G.R. No. 155840
G.R. No. 158700
Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, NACHURA,
and REYES,
JJ. Promulgated: February 18, 2008 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Sexual harassment is an imposition of
misplaced “superiority” which is enough to dampen an employee’s spirit and her
capacity for advancement. It affects her sense of judgment; it changes her
life.[1]
Before this Court are three Petitions
for Review on Certiorari assailing
the October 18, 2002 Resolution of the CA’s Former Ninth Division[2] in
CA-G.R. SP No. 61026. The Resolution modified the December 14, 2001 Decision[3] of
the Court of Appeals’ Eleventh Division, which had affirmed the Decision of the
Office of the President (OP) dismissing from the service then National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) Chairman Rogelio I. Rayala (Rayala) for disgraceful
and immoral conduct.
All three petitions stem from the
same factual antecedents.
On November 16, 1998, Ma. Lourdes T.
Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a
Complaint for sexual harassment against Rayala before Secretary Bienvenido
Laguesma of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
To support the Complaint, Domingo
executed an Affidavit narrating the incidences of sexual harassment complained
of, thus:
x x x x
4. Sa
simula ay pabulong na sinasabihan lang ako ni Chairman Rayala ng mga salitang
“Lot, gumaganda ka yata?”
5. Sa
ibang mga pagkakataon nilalapitan na ako ni Chairman at hahawakan ang aking
balikat sabay pisil sa mga ito habang ako ay nagta-type at habang nagbibigay
siya ng diktasyon. Sa mga pagkakataong
ito, kinakabahan ako. Natatakot na baka
mangyari sa akin ang mga napapabalitang insidente na nangyari na noon tungkol
sa mga sekretarya niyang nagbitiw gawa ng mga mahahalay na panghihipo ni
Chairman.
6. Noong
ika-10 ng Setyembre, 1998, nang ako ay nasa 8th Floor, may nagsabi
sa akin na kailangan akong bumaba sa 7th Floor kung nasaan ang aming
opisina dahil sa may koreksyon daw na gagawin sa mga papel na tinayp ko. Bumaba naman ako para gawin ito. Habang ginagawa ko ito, lumabas si Chairman
Rayala sa silid ni Mr. Alex Lopez. Inutusan
ako ni Chairman na sumunod sa kaniyang silid.
Nang nasa silid na kami, sinabi niya sa akin:
Chairman: Lot, I like you a lot. Naiiba ka sa lahat.
At
pagkatapos ako ay kaniyang inusisa tungkol sa mga personal na bagay sa aking
buhay. Ang ilan dito ay tungkol sa aking
mga magulang, kapatid, pag-aaral at kung may boyfriend na raw ba ako.
Chairman:
May boyfriend ka na ba?
Lourdes: Dati
nagkaroon po.
Chairman: Nasaan
na siya?
Lourdes:
Nag-asawa na ho.
Chairman:
Bakit hindi kayo nagkatuluyan?
Lourdes:
Nainip po.
Chairman:
Pagkatapos mo ng kurso mo ay kumuha ka
ng Law at ako ang bahala sa iyo, hanggang ako pa ang Chairman dito.
Pagkatapos
ay kumuha siya ng pera sa kaniyang amerikana at inaabot sa akin.
Chairman: Kuhanin mo ito.
Lourdes: Huwag na ho hindi ko kailangan.
Chairman: Hindi sige, kuhanin mo. Ayusin mo ang dapat ayusin.
Tinanggap
ko po ang pera ng may pag-aalinlangan.
Natatakot at kinakabahan na kapag hindi ko tinanggap ang pera ay baka
siya magagalit kasabay na rito ang pagtapon sa akin kung saan-saan opisina o
kaya ay tanggalin ako sa posisyon.
Chairman: Paglabas mo itago mo ang pera. Ayaw ko ng may makaka-alam nito. Just the two
of us.
Lourdes: Bakit naman, Sir?
Chairman: Basta.
Maraming tsismosa diyan sa labas.
But I don’t give them a damn.
Hindi ako mamatay sa kanila.
Tumayo
na ako at lumabas. Pumanhik na ako ng 8th
Floor at pumunta ako sa officemate ko na si Agnes Magdaet. Ikinwento ko ang nangyari sa akin sa opisina
ni Chairman. Habang kinikwento ko ito
kay Agnes ay binilang namin ang pera na nagkakahalaga ng tatlong libong piso
(PHP 3,000). Sinabi ni Agnes na isauli
ko raw ang pera, pero ang sabi ko ay natatakot ako baka magalit si Sir. Nagsabi agad kami kay EC Perlita Velasco at
sinalaysay ko ang nangyari. Sinabi niya na isauli ko ang pera at noong araw
ding iyon ay nagpasiya akong isauli na nga ito ngunit hindi ako nagkaroon ng
pagkakataon dahil marami siyang naging bisita.
Isinauli ko nga ang pera noong Lunes, Setyembre 14, 1998.
7. Noong
huling linggo ng Setyembre, 1998, ay may tinanong din sa akin si Chairman
Rayala na hindi ko masikmura, at sa aking palagay at tahasang pambabastos sa
akin.
Chairman: Lot, may ka live-in ka ba?
Lourdes: Sir, wala po.
Chairman: Bakit malaki ang balakang mo?
Lourdes: Kayo, Sir ha! Masama sa amin ang may ka live-in.
Chairman: Bakit, ano ba ang relihiyon ninyo?
Lourdes: Catholic, Sir. Kailangan ikasal muna.
Chairman: Bakit ako, hindi kasal.
Lourdes: Sir, di magpakasal kayo.
Chairman: Huh.
Ibahin na nga natin ang usapan.
8. Noong
Oktubre 29, 1998, ako ay pumasok sa kwarto ni Chairman Rayala. Ito ay sa kadahilanang ang fax machine ay
nasa loob ng kaniyang kwarto. Ang
nag-aasikaso nito, si Riza Ocampo, ay naka-leave kaya ako ang nag-asikaso nito
noong araw na iyon. Nang mabigyan ko na
ng fax tone yung kausap ko, pagharap ko sa kanan ay nakaharang sa dadaanan ko
si Chairman Rayala. Tinitingnan ako sa
mata at ang titig niya ay umuusad mula ulo hanggang dibdib tapos ay ngumiti na
may mahalay na pakahulugan.
9. Noong
hapon naman ng pareho pa ring petsa, may nag-aapply na sekretarya sa opisina,
sinabi ko ito kay Chairman Rayala:
Lourdes: Sir, si Pinky po yung applicant,
mag-papainterview po yata sa inyo.
Chairman: Sabihin mo magpa-pap smear muna siya
Chairman: O sige, i-refer mo kay Alex. (Alex Lopez,
Chief of Staff).
10. Noong
Nobyembre 9, 1998, ako ay tinawag ni Chairman Rayala sa kaniyang opisina upang
kuhanin ko ang diktasyon niya para kay ELA Oscar Uy. Hindi pa kami nakakatapos ng unang talata,
may pumasok na bisita si Chairman, si Baby Pangilinan na sinamahan ni Riza
Ocampo. Pinalabas muna ako ni
Chairman. Nang maka-alis na si Ms.
Pangilinan, pinapasok na niya ako ulit.
Umupo ako. Lumapit sa likuran ko
si Chairman, hinawakan ang kaliwang balikat ko na pinipisil ng kanang kamay
niya at sinabi:
Chairman: Saan
na ba tayo natapos?
Palakad-lakad
siya sa aking likuran habang nag-didikta.
Huminto siya pagkatapos, at nilagay niya ang kanang kamay niya sa aking
kanang balikat at pinisil-pisil ito pagkatapos ay pinagapang niya ito sa kanang
bahagi ng aking leeg, at pinagapang hanggang kanang tenga at saka
kiniliti. Dito ko inalis ang kaniyang
kamay sa pamamagitan ng aking kaliwang kamay.
At saka ko sinabi:
Lourdes: Sir, yung kamay ninyo alisin niyo!
Natapos
ko rin ang liham na pinagagawa niya pero halos hindi ko na maintindihan ang
na-isulat ko dahil sa takot at inis na nararamdaman ko.[4]
After the last incident narrated,
Domingo filed for leave of absence and asked to be immediately transferred.
Thereafter, she filed the Complaint for sexual harassment on the basis of
Administrative Order No. 250, the Rules
and Regulations Implementing RA 7877 in the Department of Labor and Employment.
Upon receipt of the Complaint, the
DOLE Secretary referred the Complaint to the OP, Rayala being a presidential
appointee. The OP, through then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, ordered Secretary
Laguesma to investigate the allegations in the Complaint and create a committee
for such purpose. On December 4, 1998, Secretary Laguesma issued Administrative
Order (AO) No. 280, Series of 1998,[5]
constituting a Committee on Decorum and Investigation (Committee) in accordance
with Republic Act (RA) 7877, the Anti-Sexual
Harassment Act of 1995.[6]
The Committee heard the parties and
received their respective evidence. On March 2, 2000, the Committee submitted
its report and recommendation to Secretary Laguesma. It found Rayala guilty of
the offense charged and recommended the imposition of the minimum penalty
provided under AO 250, which it erroneously stated as suspension for six (6)
months.
The following day, Secretary Laguesma
submitted a copy of the Committee Report and Recommendation to the OP, but with
the recommendation that the penalty should be suspension for six (6) months and
one (1) day, in accordance with AO 250.
On May 8, 2000, the OP, through Executive
Secretary Zamora, issued AO 119,[7]
the pertinent portions of which read:
Upon a careful scrutiny of the evidence on
record, I concur with the findings of the Committee as to the culpability of
the respondent [Rayala], the same having been established by clear and
convincing evidence. However, I disagree with the recommendation that
respondent be meted only the penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one
(1) day considering the circumstances of the case.
What aggravates respondent’s situation is the
undeniable circumstance that he took advantage of his position as the superior
of the complainant. Respondent occupies the highest position in the NLRC, being
its Chairman. As head of said office, it was incumbent upon respondent to set
an example to the others as to how they should conduct themselves in public
office, to see to it that his subordinates work efficiently in accordance with
Civil Service Rules and Regulations, and to provide them with healthy working
atmosphere wherein co-workers treat each other with respect, courtesy and
cooperation, so that in the end the public interest will be benefited (City Mayor
of Zamboanga vs. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 785 [1990]).
What is more, public service requires the
utmost integrity and strictest discipline (Gano vs. Leonen, 232 SCRA 99
[1994]). Thus, a public servant must exhibit at all times the highest sense of
honesty and integrity, and “utmost devotion and dedication to duty” (Sec. 4 (g),
RA 6713), respect the rights of others and shall refrain from doing acts
contrary to law, and good morals (Sec. 4(c)). No less than the Constitution
sanctifies the principle that a public office is a public trust, and enjoins
all public officers and employees to serve with the highest degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency (Section 1, Article XI, 1987
Constitution).
Given these established standards, I see
respondent’s acts not just [as] a failure to give due courtesy and respect to his
co-employees (subordinates) or to maintain good conduct and behavior but
defiance of the basic norms or virtues which a government official must at all
times uphold, one that is contrary to law and “public sense of morality.”
Otherwise stated, respondent – to whom stricter standards must apply being the
highest official [of] the NLRC – had shown an attitude, a frame of mind, a
disgraceful conduct, which renders him unfit to remain in the service.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent
Rogelio I. Rayala, Chairman, National Labor Relations Commission, is found
guilty of the grave offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct and is hereby DISMISSED from the service effective
upon receipt of this Order.
SO ORDER[ED].
Rayala
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the OP denied in a Resolution[8]
dated May 24, 2000. He then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure before this Court
on June 14, 2000.[9]
However, the same was dismissed in a Resolution dated June 26, 2000 for
disregarding the hierarchy of courts.[10] Rayala filed a Motion
for
Reconsideration[11]
on August 15, 2000. In its Resolution[12]
dated September 4, 2000, the Court recalled its June 26 Resolution and referred
the petition to the Court of Appeals (CA) for appropriate action.
The CA rendered its Decision[13]
on December 14, 2001. It held that there was sufficient evidence on record to
create moral certainty that Rayala committed the acts he was charged with. It
said:
The complainant narrated her story complete
with details. Her straightforward and uninhibited testimony was not emasculated
by the declarations of Commissioner Rayala or his witnesses. x x x
Moreover, Commissioner Rayala has not proven
any vicious motive for Domingo and her witnesses to invent their stories. It is
very unlikely that they would perjure themselves only to accommodate the
alleged conspiracy to oust petitioner from office. Save for his empty conjectures
and speculations, Rayala failed to substantiate his contrived conspiracy. It is
a hornbook doctrine that conspiracy must be proved by positive and convincing
evidence (People v. Noroña, 329 SCRA 502
[2000]). Besides, it is improbable that the complainant would concoct a
story of sexual harassment against the highest official of the NLRC and thereby
expose herself to the possibility of losing her job, or be the subject of
reprisal from her superiors and perhaps public ridicule if she was not telling the
truth.
It also held that Rayala’s dismissal
was proper. The CA pointed out that Rayala was dismissed for disgraceful and
immoral conduct in violation of RA 6713, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees. It held that the OP was correct in concluding that Rayala’s acts
violated RA 6713:
Indeed, [Rayala] was a public official,
holding the Chairmanship of the National Labor Relations Commission, entrusted
with the sacred duty of administering justice. Occupying as he does such an
exalted position, Commissioner Rayala must pay a high price for the honor
bestowed upon him. He must comport himself at all times in such a manner that
the conduct of his everyday life should be beyond reproach and free from any
impropriety. That the acts complained of were committed within the sanctuary of
[his] office compounded the objectionable nature of his wrongdoing. By daring
to violate the complainant within the solitude of his chambers, Commissioner
Rayala placed the integrity of his office in disrepute. His disgraceful and
immoral conduct warrants his removal from office.[14]
Thus, it dismissed the petition, to
wit:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant
petition is hereby DISMISSED and Administrative Order No. 119 as well [as] the
Resolution of the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 00-E-9118 dated May
24, 2000 are AFFIRMED IN TOTO. No cost.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Rayala timely filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. Justices Vasquez and Tolentino voted to affirm the December 14
Decision. However, Justice Reyes dissented mainly because AO 250 states that
the penalty imposable is suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day.[16]
Pursuant to the internal rules of the CA, a Special Division of Five was
constituted.[17] In its
October 18, 2002 Resolution, the CA modified its earlier Decision:
ACCORDINGLY, the Decision dated December
[14], 2001 is MODIFIED to the effect that the penalty of dismissal is DELETED
and instead the penalty of suspension from service for the maximum period of
one (1) year is HEREBY IMPOSED upon the petitioner. The rest of the challenged
decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
Domingo filed a Petition for Review[18]
before this Court, which we denied in our February 19, 2003 Resolution for
having a defective verification. She filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which
the Court granted; hence, the petition was reinstated.
Rayala likewise filed a Petition for
Review[19]
with this Court essentially arguing that he is not guilty of any act of sexual
harassment.
Meanwhile, the Republic filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the CA’s October 18, 2002 Resolution. The CA
denied the same in its June 3, 2003 Resolution, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, by a majority vote, public respondents’
Motion for Reconsideration, (sic) is DENIED.
SO
ORDERED.
The Republic then filed its own
Petition for Review.[20]
On June 28, 2004, the Court directed
the consolidation of the three (3) petitions.
G.R. No. 155831
Domingo assails the CA’s resolution
modifying the penalty imposed by the Office of the President. She raises this
issue:
The Court of Appeals erred in modifying the
penalty for the respondent from dismissal to suspension from service for the
maximum period of one year. The President has the prerogative to determine the
proper penalty to be imposed on an erring Presidential appointee. The President
was well within his power when he fittingly used that prerogative in deciding
to dismiss the respondent from the service.[21]
She argues that the power to remove
Rayala, a presidential appointee, is lodged with the President who has control
of the entire Executive Department, its bureaus and offices. The OP’s decision
was arrived at after affording Rayala due process. Hence, his dismissal from
the service is a prerogative that is entirely with the President.[22]
As to the applicability of AO No.
250, she argues that the same was not intended to cover cases against
presidential appointees. AO No. 250 refers only to the instances wherein the
DOLE Secretary is the disciplining authority, and thus, the AO does not
circumscribe the power of the President to dismiss an erring presidential
appointee.
G.R. No. 155840
In his petition, Rayala raises the
following issues:
I.
CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS, THE ACTS OF HEREIN PETITIONER DO NOT CONSTITUTE SEXUAL HARASSMENT AS
LAID DOWN BY THE En Banc RULING IN
THE CASE OF AQUINO vs. ACOSTA, ibid., AS WELL AS IN THE APPLICATION OF
EXISTING LAWS.
II.
CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT IN A CASE FOR SEXUAL
HARASSMENT. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING THAT IT IS AN OFFENSE THAT
IS MALUM PROHIBITUM.
III.
THE INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE, THE OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, AND NOW, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HAS MISAPPLIED AND EXPANDED
THE DEFINITION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE UNDER R.A. No. 7877, BY
APPLYING DOLE A.O. 250, WHICH RUNS COUNTER TO THE RECENT PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THIS
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.[23]
Invoking Aquino v. Acosta,[24]
Rayala argues that the case is the definitive ruling on what constitutes sexual
harassment. Thus, he posits that for sexual harassment to exist under RA 7877,
there must be: (a) demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor; (b) the
same is made a pre-condition to hiring, re-employment, or continued employment;
or (c) the denial thereof results in discrimination against the employee.
Rayala asserts that Domingo has
failed to allege and establish any sexual favor, demand, or request from
petitioner in exchange for her continued employment or for her promotion.
According to Rayala, the acts imputed to him are without malice or ulterior
motive. It was merely Domingo’s perception of malice in his alleged acts – a “product
of her own imagination”[25] –
that led her to file the sexual harassment complaint.
Likewise, Rayala assails the OP’s
interpretation, as upheld by the CA, that RA 7877 is malum prohibitum such that the defense of absence of malice is
unavailing. He argues that sexual harassment is considered an offense against a
particular person, not against society as a whole. Thus, he claims that intent
is an essential element of the offense because the law requires as a conditio sine qua non that a sexual favor be first sought by the offender in
order to achieve certain specific results. Sexual harassment is committed with
the perpetrator’s deliberate intent to commit the offense.[26]
Rayala next argues that AO 250
expands the acts proscribed in RA 7877. In particular, he assails the
definition of the forms of sexual harassment:
Rule IV
FORMS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Section 1. Forms of Sexual Harassment.
– Sexual harassment may be committed in any of the following forms:
a) Overt sexual advances;
b) Unwelcome or improper gestures of affection;
c) Request or demand for sexual favors including
but not limited to going out on dates, outings or the like for the same
purpose;
d) Any other act or conduct of a sexual nature or
for purposes of sexual gratification which is generally annoying, disgusting or
offensive to the victim.[27]
He posits that these acts alone
without corresponding demand, request, or requirement do not constitute sexual
harassment as contemplated by the law.[28]
He alleges that the rule-making power granted to the employer in Section 4(a) of
RA 7877 is limited only to procedural matters. The law did not delegate to the
employer the power to promulgate rules which would provide other or additional forms
of sexual harassment, or to come up with its own definition of sexual
harassment.[29]
G.R. No. 158700
The Republic raises this issue:
Whether or not the President of
the Philippines may validly dismiss respondent Rayala as Chairman of the NLRC
for committing acts of sexual harassment.[30]
The Republic argues that Rayala’s
acts constitute sexual harassment under AO 250. His acts constitute unwelcome
or improper gestures of affection and are acts or conduct of a sexual nature,
which are generally annoying or offensive to the victim.[31]
It also contends that there is no
legal basis for the CA’s reduction of the penalty imposed by the OP. Rayala’s
dismissal is valid and warranted under the circumstances. The power to remove
the NLRC Chairman solely rests upon the President, limited only by the
requirements under the law and the due process clause.
The Republic further claims that,
although AO 250 provides only a one (1) year suspension, it will not prevent
the OP from validly imposing the penalty of dismissal on Rayala. It argues that
even though Rayala is a presidential appointee, he is still subject to the
Civil Service Law. Under the Civil Service Law, disgraceful and immoral
conduct, the acts imputed to Rayala, constitute grave misconduct punishable by
dismissal from the service.[32] The
Republic adds that Rayala’s position is invested with public trust and his acts
violated that trust; thus, he should be dismissed from the service.
This argument, according to the
Republic, is also supported by Article 215 of the Labor Code, which states that
the Chairman of the NLRC holds office until he reaches the age of 65 only
during good behavior.[33]
Since Rayala’s security of tenure is conditioned upon his good behavior, he may
be removed from office if it is proven that he has failed to live up to this
standard.
All the issues raised in these three
cases can be summed up in two ultimate questions, namely:
(1)
Did Rayala commit sexual harassment?
(2)
If he did, what is the applicable penalty?
Initially, however, we must resolve a
procedural issue raised by Rayala. He accuses the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), as counsel for the Republic, of forum shopping because it filed
a motion for reconsideration of the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 61026 and then filed a comment in G.R. No. 155840
before this Court.
We do not agree.
Forum shopping is an act of a party,
against whom an adverse judgment or order has been rendered in one forum, of
seeking and possibly securing a favorable opinion in another forum, other than
by appeal or special civil action for certiorari.[34]
It consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same
cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of
obtaining a favorable judgment.[35]
There is forum shopping when the
following elements concur: (1) identity of the parties or, at least, of the
parties who represent the same interest in both actions; (2) identity of the
rights asserted and relief prayed for, as the latter is founded on the same set
of facts; and (3) identity of the two preceding particulars such that any
judgment rendered in the other action will amount to res judicata in the action under consideration or will constitute litis pendentia.[36]
Reviewing the antecedents of these
consolidated cases, we note that the CA rendered the assailed Resolution on
October 18, 2002. The Republic filed its Motion for Reconsideration on November
22, 2002. On the other hand, Rayala filed his petition before this Court on
November 21, 2002. While the Republic’s Motion for Reconsideration was pending
resolution before the CA, on December 2, 2002, it was directed by this Court to
file its Comment on Rayala’s petition, which it submitted on June 16, 2003.
When the CA denied the Motion for
Reconsideration, the Republic filed its own Petition for Review with this Court
on July 3, 2003. It cited in its “Certification and Verification of a Non-Forum
Shopping” (sic), that there was a case involving the same facts pending before
this Court denominated as G.R. No. 155840. With respect to Domingo’s petition,
the same had already been dismissed on February 19, 2003. Domingo’s petition
was reinstated on June 16, 2003 but the resolution was received by the OSG only
on July 25, 2003, or after it had filed its own petition.[37]
Based on the foregoing, it cannot be
said that the OSG is guilty of forum shopping. We must point out that it was
Rayala who filed the petition in the CA, with the Republic as the adverse
party. Rayala himself filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA’s December
21, 2001 Decision, which led to a more favorable ruling, i.e., the lowering of the penalty from dismissal to one-year
suspension. The parties adversely affected by this ruling (Domingo and the
Republic) had the right to question the same on motion for reconsideration. But
Domingo directly filed a Petition for Review with this Court, as did Rayala. When
the Republic opted to file a motion for reconsideration, it was merely
exercising a right. That Rayala and
Domingo had by then already filed cases before the SC did not take away this
right. Thus, when this Court directed the Republic to file its Comment on
Rayala’s petition, it had to comply, even if it had an unresolved motion for
reconsideration with the CA, lest it be cited for contempt.
Accordingly, it cannot be said that the
OSG “file[d] multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a
favorable judgment.”
We now proceed to discuss the
substantive issues.
It is noteworthy that the five CA
Justices who deliberated on the case were unanimous in upholding the findings
of the Committee and the OP. They found
the assessment made by the Committee and the OP to be a “meticulous and
dispassionate analysis of the testimonies of the complainant (Domingo), the
respondent (Rayala), and their respective witnesses.” [38] They differed only on the appropriate
imposable penalty.
That Rayala committed the acts
complained of – and was guilty of sexual harassment – is, therefore, the common
factual finding of not just one, but three independent bodies: the Committee,
the OP and the CA. It should be
remembered that when supported by substantial evidence, factual findings made
by quasi-judicial and administrative bodies are accorded great respect and even
finality by the courts.[39] The
principle, therefore, dictates that such findings should bind us.[40]
Indeed, we find no reason to deviate
from this rule. There appears no valid ground for this Court to review the
factual findings of the CA, the OP, and the Investigating Committee. These
findings are now conclusive on the Court. And quite significantly, Rayala himself
admits to having committed some of the acts imputed to him.
He insists, however, that these acts
do not constitute sexual harassment, because Domingo did not allege in her
complaint that there was a demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor as
a condition for her continued employment or for her promotion to a higher
position.[41] Rayala urges us to apply to his case our
ruling in Aquino v. Acosta.[42]
We find respondent’s insistence
unconvincing.
Basic in the law of public officers
is the three-fold liability rule,
which states that the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give
rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability. An action for each can proceed independently
of the others.[43] This rule applies with full force to sexual
harassment.
The law penalizing sexual harassment
in our jurisdiction is RA 7877. Section
3 thereof defines work-related sexual harassment in this wise:
Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. – Work, education or training-related sexual harassment is committed by an employer, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or education environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said Act.
(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when:
(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which in a way would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee;
(2) The above acts would impair the employee’s rights or privileges under existing labor laws; or
(3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employee.
This section, in relation to Section
7 on penalties, defines the criminal aspect of the unlawful act of sexual
harassment. The same section, in
relation to Section 6, authorizes the institution of an independent civil
action for damages and other affirmative relief.
Section
4, also in relation to Section 3, governs the procedure for administrative cases,
viz.:
Sec. 4. Duty of the Employer or Head of Office in a Work-related, Education or Training Environment. – It shall be the duty of the employer or the head of the work-related, educational or training environment or institution, to prevent or deter the commission of acts of sexual harassment and to provide the procedures for the resolution, settlement or prosecution of acts of sexual harassment. Towards this end, the employer or head of office shall:
(a) Promulgate appropriate rules and regulations in consultation with and jointly approved by the employees or students or trainees, through their duly designated representatives, prescribing the procedure for the investigation or sexual harassment cases and the administrative sanctions therefor.
Administrative sanctions shall not be a bar to prosecution in the proper courts for unlawful acts of sexual harassment.
The said rules and regulations issued pursuant to this section (a) shall include, among others, guidelines on proper decorum in the workplace and educational or training institutions.
(b) Create a committee on decorum and investigation of cases on sexual harassment. The committee shall conduct meetings, as the case may be, with other officers and employees, teachers, instructors, professors, coaches, trainors and students or trainees to increase understanding and prevent incidents of sexual harassment. It shall also conduct the investigation of the alleged cases constituting sexual harassment.
In the case of a work-related environment, the committee shall be composed of at least one (1) representative each from the management, the union, if any, the employees from the supervisory rank, and from the rank and file employees.
In the case of the educational or training institution, the committee shall be composed of at least one (1) representative from the administration, the trainors, teachers, instructors, professors or coaches and students or trainees, as the case maybe.
The employer or head of office, educational or training institution shall disseminate or post a copy of this Act for the information of all concerned.
The CA, thus, correctly ruled that
Rayala’s culpability is not to be determined solely on the basis of Section 3,
RA 7877, because he is charged with the administrative offense, not the
criminal infraction, of sexual harassment.[44] It should be enough that the CA, along with
the Investigating Committee and the Office of the President, found substantial
evidence to support the administrative charge.
Yet, even if we were to test Rayala’s
acts strictly by the standards set in Section 3, RA 7877, he would still be
administratively liable. It is true that
this provision calls for a “demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor.” But it is not necessary that the demand,
request or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a categorical oral
or written statement. It may be
discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the offender. Holding and squeezing Domingo’s shoulders,
running his fingers across her neck and tickling her ear, having inappropriate
conversations with her, giving her money allegedly for school expenses with a
promise of future privileges, and making statements with unmistakable sexual
overtones – all these acts of Rayala resound with deafening clarity the
unspoken request for a sexual favor.
Likewise, contrary to Rayala’s claim,
it is not essential that the demand, request or requirement be made as a
condition for continued employment or for promotion to a higher position. It is enough that the respondent’s acts
result in creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the
employee.[45] That the acts of Rayala generated an
intimidating and hostile environment for Domingo is clearly shown by the common
factual finding of the Investigating Committee, the OP and the CA that Domingo
reported the matter to an officemate and, after the last incident, filed for a leave
of absence and requested transfer to another unit.
Rayala’s invocation of Aquino v. Acosta[46] is misplaced, because the factual
setting in that case is different from that in the case at bench. In Aquino,
Atty. Susan Aquino, Chief of the Legal and Technical Staff of the Court of Tax Appeals
(CTA), charged then CTA Presiding Judge (now Presiding Justice) Ernesto Acosta
of sexual harassment. She complained of
several incidents when Judge Acosta allegedly kissed her, embraced her, and put
his arm around her shoulder. The case
was referred to CA Justice Josefina G. Salonga for investigation. In her report, Justice Salonga found that
“the complainant failed to show by convincing evidence that the acts of Judge
Acosta in greeting her with a kiss on the cheek, in a `beso-beso’ fashion, were
carried out with lustful and lascivious desires or were motivated by malice or
ill motive. It is clear from the
circumstances that most of the kissing incidents were done on festive and
special occasions,” and they “took place in the presence of other people and
the same was by reason of the exaltation or happiness of the moment.” Thus, Justice Salonga concluded:
In all the incidents complained of, the
respondent's pecks on the cheeks of the complainant should be understood in the
context of having been done on the occasion of some festivities, and not the
assertion of the latter that she was singled out by Judge Acosta in his kissing
escapades. The busses on her cheeks were simply friendly and innocent, bereft
of malice and lewd design. The fact that respondent judge kisses other people
on the cheeks in the 'beso-beso' fashion, without malice, was corroborated by
Atty. Florecita P. Flores, Ms. Josephine Adalem and Ms. Ma. Fides Balili, who
stated that they usually practice 'beso-beso' or kissing on the cheeks, as a
form of greeting on occasions when they meet each other, like birthdays,
Christmas, New Year's Day and even Valentine's Day, and it does not matter
whether it is Judge Acosta's birthday or their birthdays. Theresa Cinco Bactat,
a lawyer who belongs to complainant's department, further attested that on occasions
like birthdays, respondent judge would likewise greet her with a peck on the
cheek in a 'beso-beso' manner. Interestingly, in one of several festive
occasions, female employees of the CTA pecked respondent judge on the cheek
where Atty. Aquino was one of Judge Acosta's well wishers.
In sum, no sexual harassment had indeed
transpired on those six occasions. Judge Acosta's acts of bussing Atty. Aquino
on her cheek were merely forms of greetings, casual and customary in nature. No
evidence of intent to sexually harass complainant was apparent, only that the
innocent acts of 'beso-beso' were given malicious connotations by the
complainant. In fact, she did not even relate to anyone what happened to her.
Undeniably, there is no manifest sexual undertone in all those incidents.[47]
This Court agreed with Justice
Salonga, and Judge Acosta was exonerated.
To
repeat, this factual milieu in Aquino
does not obtain in the case at bench. While
in Aquino, the Court interpreted the
acts (of Judge Acosta) as casual gestures of friendship and camaraderie, done
during festive or special occasions and with other people present, in the
instant case, Rayala’s acts of holding and squeezing Domingo’s shoulders,
running his fingers across her neck and tickling her ear, and the inappropriate
comments, were all made in the confines of Rayala’s office when no other
members of his staff were around. More
importantly, and a circumstance absent in Aquino,
Rayala’s acts, as already adverted to above, produced a hostile work environment
for Domingo, as shown by her having reported the matter to an officemate and,
after the last incident, filing for a leave of absence and requesting transfer
to another unit.
Rayala also argues that AO 250 does
not apply to him. First, he argues that AO 250 does not cover the NLRC, which,
at the time of the incident, was under the DOLE only for purposes of program
and policy coordination. Second, he posits that even assuming AO 250 is
applicable to the NLRC, he is not within its coverage because he is a
presidential appointee.
We find, however, that the question
of whether or not AO 250 covers Rayala is of no real consequence. The events of
this case unmistakably show that the administrative charges against Rayala were
for violation of RA 7877; that the OP properly assumed jurisdiction over the
administrative case; that the participation of the DOLE, through the Committee
created by the Secretary, was limited to initiating the investigation process,
reception of evidence of the parties, preparation of the investigation report,
and recommending the appropriate action to be taken by the OP. AO 250 had never really been applied to Rayala. If it was used at all, it was to serve merely
as an auxiliary procedural guide to aid the Committee in the orderly conduct of
the investigation.
Next, Rayala alleges that the CA
erred in holding that sexual harassment is an offense malum prohibitum. He argues that intent is an essential element in
sexual harassment, and since the acts imputed to him were done allegedly without
malice, he should be absolved of the charges against him.
We reiterate that what is before us
is an administrative case for sexual
harassment. Thus, whether the crime
of sexual harassment is malum in se
or malum prohibitum is immaterial.
We also reject Rayala’s allegations
that the charges were filed because of a conspiracy to get him out of office
and thus constitute merely political harassment. A conspiracy must be proved by
clear and convincing evidence. His bare assertions cannot stand against the
evidence presented by Domingo. As we have already ruled, the acts imputed to Rayala
have been proven as fact. Moreover, he has not proven any ill motive on the
part of Domingo and her witnesses which would be ample reason for her to
conjure stories about him. On the contrary, ill motive is belied by the fact
that Domingo and her witnesses – all employees of the NLRC at that time – stood
to lose their jobs or suffer unpleasant consequences for coming forward and
charging their boss with sexual harassment.
Furthermore, Rayala decries the
alleged violation of his right to due process. He accuses the Committee on
Decorum of railroading his trial for violation of RA 7877. He also scored the
OP’s decision finding him guilty of “disgraceful and immoral conduct” under the
Revised Administrative Code and not for violation of RA 7877. Considering that
he was not tried for “disgraceful and immoral conduct,” he argues that the
verdict is a “sham and total nullity.”
We hold that Rayala was properly
accorded due process. In previous cases, this Court held that:
[i]n administrative proceedings, due
process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of
the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent’s legal
rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or
with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one’s
favor, and to defend one’s rights;
(3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to
afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as
well as impartiality; and (4) a
finding by said tribunal
which is supported by substantial
evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records
or made known to the parties affected.[48]
The records of the case indicate that
Rayala was afforded all these procedural due process safeguards. Although in
the beginning he questioned the authority of the Committee to try him,[49]
he appeared, personally and with counsel, and participated in the proceedings.
On the other point raised, this Court
has held that, even in criminal cases, the designation of the offense is not
controlling, thus:
What is controlling is not the title of the
complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or
part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by
the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular
facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in
such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know
what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce
proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not
accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element
of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances
are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the
definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging
the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the
nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare
his defense.[50]
It is noteworthy that under AO 250,
sexual harassment amounts to disgraceful and immoral conduct.[51]
Thus, any finding of liability for sexual harassment may also be the basis of
culpability for disgraceful and immoral conduct.
With the foregoing disquisitions
affirming the finding that Rayala committed sexual harassment, we now determine
the proper penalty to be imposed.
Rayala attacks the penalty imposed by
the OP. He alleges that under the pertinent Civil Service Rules, disgraceful
and immoral conduct is punishable by suspension for a period of six (6) months
and one (1) day to one (1) year. He also argues that since he is charged
administratively, aggravating or mitigating circumstances cannot be appreciated
for purposes of imposing the penalty.
Under AO 250, the penalty for the
first offense is suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year,
while the penalty for the second offense is dismissal.[52]
On the other hand, Section 22(o), Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987[53]
and Section 52 A(15) of the Revised Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service[54]
both provide that the first offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct is
punishable by suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year. A
second offense is punishable by dismissal.
Under the Labor Code, the Chairman of
the NLRC shall hold office during good
behavior until he or she reaches the age of sixty-five, unless sooner removed for cause as provided by law or becomes
incapacitated to discharge the duties of the office.[55]
In this case, it is the President of
the
Even if the OP properly considered
the fact that Rayala took advantage of his high government position, it still
could not validly dismiss him from the service. Under the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,[56]
taking undue advantage of a subordinate may be considered as an aggravating circumstance[57] and
where only aggravating and no mitigating circumstances are present, the maximum
penalty shall be imposed.[58] Hence,
the maximum penalty that can be imposed on Rayala is suspension for one (1) year.
Rayala holds the exalted position of
NLRC Chairman, with the rank equivalent to a CA Justice. Thus, it is not
unavailing that rigid standards of conduct may be demanded of him. In Talens-Dabon v. Judge Arceo,[59] this
Court, in upholding the liability of therein respondent Judge, said:
The actuations of respondent are aggravated
by the fact that complainant is one of his subordinates over whom he exercises
control and supervision, he being the executive judge. He took advantage of his
position and power in order to carry out his lustful and lascivious desires.
Instead of he being in loco parentis
over his subordinate employees, respondent was the one who preyed on them,
taking advantage of his superior position.
In yet another case, this Court
declared:
As a managerial employee, petitioner is bound
by more exacting work ethics. He failed to live up to his higher standard of
responsibility when he succumbed to his moral perversity. And when such moral
perversity is perpetrated against his subordinate, he provides a justifiable
ground for his dismissal for lack of trust and confidence. It is the right,
nay, the duty of every employer to protect its employees from oversexed
superiors.[60]
It is incumbent upon the head of
office to set an example on how his employees should conduct themselves in
public office, so that they may work efficiently in a healthy working
atmosphere. Courtesy demands that he should set a good example.[61]
Rayala has thrown every argument in
the book in a vain effort to effect his exoneration. He even puts Domingo’s
character in question and casts doubt on the morality of the former President
who ordered, albeit erroneously, his dismissal from the service. Unfortunately
for him, these are not significant factors in the disposition of the case. It
is his character that is in question here and sadly, the inquiry showed that he
has been found wanting.
WHEREFORE, the
foregoing premises considered, the October 18, 2002 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61026 is AFFIRMED.
Consequently, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 155831, 155840, and 158700 are DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate
Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate
Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
* In lieu of Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario, per Special Order No. 484, dated January 11, 2008.
[1] Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 387 Phil. 256, 265 (2000).
[2] Special Division of Five. Resolution penned by Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes Jr., Edgardo P. Cruz, and Mario L. Guariña III voted for the modification of the December 14, 2001 Decision, while Associate Justices Vasquez and Amelita G. Tolentino, voted to affirm the same.
[3] Penned by Associate Justice Vasquez Jr., with Associate Justices Reyes Jr. and Tolentino, concurring.
[4] Rollo (G.R. No. 155840), pp. 142-144.
[5]
[6] The case was docketed as DOLE O.S. Adm. Case No. 02-0122298.
[7] Denominated as OP Case No. 00-E-9118; rollo (G.R. No. 155840), pp. 238-243.
[8] Rollo (G.R. No. 155840), pp. 265-266.
[9] Docketed as G.R. No. 143358, id. at 75-140.
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] Rollo (G.R. No. 155831), pp. 32-40.
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] Composed of Associate Justices Vasquez Jr., Reyes Jr., and Tolentino, with additional members Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Mario L. Guariña III.
[18] G.R. No. 155831.
[19] G.R. No. 155840.
[20] G.R. No. 158700.
[21] Rollo (G.R. No. 155831), p. 16.
[22]
[23] Rollo (G.R. No. 155840), pp. 24-25.
[24] 429 Phil. 498, 508-509 (2002).
[25] Rollo (G.R. No. 155840), p. 33.
[26]
[27] Rule IV, Section 1, AO 250.
[28] Rollo (G.R. No. 155840), pp. 59-60.
[29]
[30] Rollo (G.R. No. 158700), p. 11.
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34] Santos v. Comelec, G.R. No. 164439,
January 23, 2006, 479 SCRA 487, 493, citing Repol
v. Commission on Elections, 428 SCRA 321 (2004).
[35] Young v. Spouses Sy, G.R. No. 157745 and
G.R. No. 157955, September 26, 2006, 503 SCRA 151, 166, citing Guaranteed Hotels, Inc. v. Baltao, 448
SCRA 738, 743 (2005).
[36] PAL Employees Savings and Loan Association
v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R. No. 161110, March 30, 2006, 485 SCRA
632, 646-647, citing Philippine Nails and
Wires Corporation v. Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., 445 Phil. 465 (2003); Prubankers Association v. Prudential Bank
and Trust Company, 361 Phil. 744, 755 (1999); First Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals, 322 Phil.
280, 307 (1996).
[37] Rollo (G.R. No. 158700), p. 158.
[38] Court of Appeals Decision dated December 14, 2001, rollo (G.R. No. 155831), p. 36.
[39] R & E Transport, Inc. v. Latag, 467 Phil. 355, 364 (2004), citing Pabu-aya v. Court of Appeals, 356 SCRA 651, 657 (2001); Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 351 Phil. 827, 835 (1998); Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 344 Phil. 860, 873 (1997).
[40] See Insurance Services and Commercial Traders, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 395 Phil. 791, 801 (2000).
[41] Rollo (G.R. No. 155840), p. 1138.
[42] Supra note 24.
[43] Office of the Court Administrator v. Enriquez, Adm. Matter No. P-89-290, January 29, 1993, 218 SCRA 1.
[44] Rollo (G.R. No. 155831), p. 39.
[45] REPUBLIC ACT 7877, Sec. 3 (a) (3); AO 250, Rule III, Sec. 3 (d).
[46] Supra note 24.
[47]
[48] Fabella v. Court of Appeals, 346 Phil. 940, 952-953 (1997).
[49] He filed a petition for the creation of a new Committee on Decorum and Investigation composed of his peers (rollo [G.R. No. 155840], pp. 171-177]). This was denied by Secretary Laguesma saying that the Committee was created pursuant to the directive of the OP and its composition was in accord with Section 4 of RA 7877 (pp. 210-203).
[50] People v. Dimaano, G.R. No. 168168, September 14, 2005, 469 SCRA 647, 666-668.
[51] AO 250, Rule VI, Sec. 8.
[52]
[53] Executive Order No. 292.
[54] Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 19-99.
[55] Section 215, Presidential Decree No.
442 (The Labor Code of the
[56] Supra
note 54.
[57] Section 53, id.
[58] Section 54 (c), id.
[59] 328 Phil. 692, 708 (1996).
[60] Villarama v. Golden Donuts, G.R. No. 106341, September 2, 1994.
[61] Guidelines on Proper Decorum, Annex A, Administrative Order No. 250, Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995) in the Department of Labor and Employment.