EN BANC

 

 

 

 

Francisco Chavez,

                            Petitioner,

 

 

 

 

 

                   -  versus  - 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

RAUL M. GONZALES,

in his capacity as the

Secretary of the

Department of Justice;

and NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC),

                           Respondents.

G.R. No. 168338

 

Present:

 

PUNO, C.J.,

QUISUMBING,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

CARPIO,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CORONA,

CARPIO MORALES,

AZCUNA,

TINGA,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA,

REYES, and

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

 

Promulgated:        

 

February 15, 2008

 

 

 

 

 

x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

 

 

D E C I S I O N

 

 

PUNO, C.J.:

 

A. Precis

 

        In this jurisdiction, it is established that freedom of the press is crucial and so inextricably woven into the right to free speech and free expression, that any attempt to restrict it must be met with an examination so critical that only a danger that is clear and present would be allowed to curtail it. 

       

Indeed, we have not wavered in the duty to uphold this cherished freedom. We have struck down laws and issuances meant to curtail this right, as in Adiong v. COMELEC,[1] Burgos v. Chief of Staff,[2] Social Weather Stations v. COMELEC,[3] and Bayan v. Executive Secretary Ermita.[4]  When on its face, it is clear that a governmental act is nothing more than a naked means to prevent the free exercise of speech, it must be nullified.

 

B. The Facts

 

1.     The case originates from events that occurred a year after the 2004 national and local elections.  On June 5, 2005, Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye told reporters that the opposition was planning to destabilize the administration by releasing an audiotape of a mobile phone conversation allegedly between the President of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).  The conversation was audiotaped allegedly through wire-tapping.[5]  Later, in a Malacañang press briefing, Secretary Bunye produced two versions of the tape, one supposedly the complete version, and the other, a spliced, “doctored” or altered version, which would suggest that the President had instructed the COMELEC official to manipulate the election results in the President’s favor. [6] It seems that Secretary Bunye admitted that the voice was that of President Arroyo, but subsequently made a retraction. [7]

 

2.     On June 7, 2005, former counsel of deposed President Joseph Estrada, Atty. Alan Paguia, subsequently released an alleged authentic tape recording of the wiretap.  Included in the tapes were purported conversations of the President, the First Gentleman Jose Miguel Arroyo, COMELEC Commissioner Garcillano, and the late Senator Barbers.[8] 

 

3.     On June 8, 2005, respondent Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Raul Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the compact disc (CD) and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. These persons included Secretary Bunye and Atty. Paguia.  He also stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody who had personal knowledge if the crime was committed or was being committed in their presence.[9]

 

4.     On June 9, 2005, in another press briefing, Secretary Gonzales ordered the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to go after media organizations “found to have caused the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a tape” of an alleged wiretapped conversation involving the President about fixing votes in the 2004 national elections.  Gonzales said that he was going to start with Inq7.net, a joint venture between the Philippine Daily Inquirer and GMA7 television network, because by the very nature of the Internet medium, it was able to disseminate the contents of the tape more widely.  He then expressed his intention of inviting the editors and managers of Inq7.net and GMA7 to a probe, and supposedly declared, “I [have] asked the NBI to conduct a tactical interrogation of all concerned.” [10]

 

5.     On June 11, 2005, the NTC issued this press release: [11]

 

NTC GIVES FAIR WARNING TO RADIO AND TELEVISION OWNERS/OPERATORS TO OBSERVE ANTI-WIRETAPPING LAW AND PERTINENT CIRCULARS ON PROGRAM STANDARDS

 

xxx          xxx    xxx

 

Taking into consideration the country’s unusual situation, and in order not to unnecessarily aggravate the same, the NTC warns all radio stations and television network owners/operators that the conditions of the authorization and permits issued to them by Government like the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority explicitly provides that said companies shall not use [their] stations for the broadcasting or telecasting of false information or willful misrepresentation.  Relative thereto, it has come to the attention of the [NTC] that certain personalities are in possession of alleged taped conversations which they claim involve the President of the Philippines and a Commissioner of the COMELEC regarding supposed violation of election laws.

 

These personalities have admitted that the taped conversations are products of illegal wiretapping operations. 

 

Considering that these taped conversations have not been duly authenticated nor could it be said at this time that the tapes contain an accurate or truthful representation of what was recorded therein, it is the position of the [NTC] that the continuous airing or broadcast of the said taped conversations by radio and television stations is a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and the conditions of the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority issued to these radio and television stations.  It has been subsequently established that the said tapes are false and/or fraudulent after a prosecution or appropriate investigation, the concerned radio and television companies are hereby warned that their broadcast/airing of such false information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to the said companies.

 

In addition to the above, the [NTC] reiterates the pertinent NTC circulars on program standards to be observed by radio and television stations.  NTC Memorandum Circular 111-12-85 explicitly states, among others, that “all radio broadcasting and television stations shall, during any broadcast or telecast, cut off from the air the speech, play, act or scene or other matters being broadcast or telecast the tendency thereof is to disseminate false information or such other willful misrepresentation, or to propose and/or incite treason, rebellion or sedition.” The foregoing directive had been reiterated by NTC Memorandum Circular No. 22-89, which, in addition thereto, prohibited radio, broadcasting and television stations from using their stations to broadcast or telecast any speech, language or scene disseminating false information or willful misrepresentation, or inciting, encouraging or assisting in subversive or treasonable acts.

 

The [NTC] will not hesitate, after observing the requirements of due process, to apply with full force the provisions of said Circulars and their accompanying sanctions on erring radio and television stations and their owners/operators.   

 

6.     On June 14, 2005, NTC held a dialogue with the Board of Directors of the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP).  NTC allegedly assured the KBP that the press release did not violate the constitutional freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, and the right to information.  Accordingly, NTC and KBP issued a Joint Press Statement which states, among others, that: [12]

 

§   NTC respects and will not hinder freedom of the press and the right to information on matters of public concern.  KBP & its members have always been committed to the exercise of press freedom with high sense of responsibility and discerning judgment of fairness and honesty.

 

§   NTC did not issue any MC [Memorandum Circular] or Order constituting a restraint of press freedom or censorship.  The NTC further denies and does not intend to limit or restrict the interview of members of the opposition or free expression of views.

 

§   What is being asked by NTC is that the exercise of press freedom [be] done responsibly.

 

§   KBP has program standards that KBP members will observe in the treatment of news and public affairs programs. These include verification of sources, non-airing of materials that would constitute inciting to sedition and/or rebellion.

 

§   The KBP Codes also require that no false statement or willful misrepresentation is made in the treatment of news or commentaries.

 

§   The supposed wiretapped tapes should be treated with sensitivity and handled responsibly giving due consideration to the process being undertaken to verify and validate the authenticity and actual content of the same.”

 

 

C. The Petition

 

Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against respondents Secretary Gonzales and the NTC, “praying for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and prohibition, as extraordinary legal remedies, to annul void proceedings, and to prevent the unlawful, unconstitutional and oppressive exercise of authority by the respondents.”[13]

 

Alleging that the acts of respondents are violations of the freedom on expression and of the press, and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern,[14]  petitioner specifically asked this Court: 

 

[F]or [the] nullification of acts, issuances, and orders of respondents committed or made since June 6, 2005 until the present that curtail the public’s rights to freedom of expression and of the press, and to information on matters of public concern specifically in relation to information regarding the controversial taped conversion of President Arroyo and for prohibition of the further commission of such acts, and making of such issuances, and orders by respondents. [15] 

 

Respondents[16] denied that the acts transgress the Constitution, and questioned petitioner’s legal standing to file the petition.  Among the arguments they raised as to the validity of the “fair warning” issued by respondent NTC, is that broadcast media enjoy lesser constitutional guarantees compared to print media, and the warning was issued pursuant to the NTC’s mandate to regulate the telecommunications industry. [17]  It was also stressed that “most of the [television] and radio stations continue, even to this date, to air the tapes, but of late within the parameters agreed upon between the NTC and KBP.” [18]

 

D. The Procedural Threshold: Legal Standing

 

To be sure, the circumstances of this case make the constitutional challenge peculiar. Petitioner, who is not a member of the broadcast media, prays that we strike down the acts and statements made by respondents as violations of the right to free speech, free expression and a free press. For another, the recipients of the press statements have not come forward—neither intervening nor joining petitioner in this action. Indeed, as a group, they issued a joint statement with respondent NTC that does not complain about restraints on freedom of the press.

 

It would seem, then, that petitioner has not met the requisite legal standing, having failed to allege “such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the Court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” [19]

 

        But as early as half a century ago, we have already held that where serious constitutional questions are involved, “the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside if we must, technicalities of procedure.” [20] Subsequently, this Court has repeatedly and consistently refused to wield procedural barriers as impediments to its addressing and resolving serious legal questions that greatly impact on public interest,[21] in keeping with the Court's duty under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether or not other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them. 

 

Thus, in line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi when a case involves an issue of overarching significance to our society,[22] we therefore brush aside technicalities of procedure and take cognizance of this petition,[23] seeing as it involves a challenge to the most exalted of all the civil rights, the freedom of expression. The petition raises other issues like the extent of the right to information of the public. It is fundamental, however, that we need not address all issues but only the most decisive one which in the case at bar is whether the acts of the respondents abridge freedom of speech and of the press.

 

But aside from the primordial issue of determining whether free speech and freedom of the press have been infringed, the case at bar also gives this Court the opportunity: (1) to distill the essence of freedom of speech  and of the press now beclouded by the vagaries of motherhood statements; (2) to clarify the types of speeches and their differing restraints allowed by law; (3) to discuss the core concepts of prior restraint, content-neutral and content-based regulations and their constitutional standard of review; (4) to examine the historical difference in the treatment of restraints between print and broadcast media and stress the standard of review governing both; and (5) to call attention to the ongoing blurring of the lines of distinction between print and broadcast media.

 

       

E. Re-examining The law on freedom of speech,

of expression and of the press

 

No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.[24]

 

Freedom of expression has gained recognition as a fundamental principle of every democratic government, and given a preferred right that stands on a higher level than substantive economic freedom or other liberties. The cognate rights codified by Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution, copied almost verbatim from the First Amendment of the U.S. Bill of Rights,[25] were considered the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the complement of free speech.[26]  This preferred status of free speech has also been codified at the international level, its recognition now enshrined in international law as a customary norm that binds all nations.[27]     

 

In the Philippines, the primacy and high esteem accorded freedom of expression is a fundamental postulate of our constitutional system. [28] This right was elevated to constitutional status in the 1935, the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions, reflecting our own lesson of history, both political and legal, that freedom of speech is an indispensable condition for nearly every other form of freedom.[29] Moreover, our history shows that the struggle to protect the freedom of speech, expression and the press was, at bottom, the struggle for the indispensable preconditions for the exercise of other freedoms.[30] For it is only when the people have unbridled access to information and the press that they will be capable of rendering enlightened judgments.  In the oft-quoted words of Thomas Jefferson, we cannot both be free and ignorant.

 

E.1. Abstraction of Free Speech

 

Surrounding the freedom of speech clause are various concepts that we have adopted as part and parcel of our own Bill of Rights provision on this basic freedom.[31] What is embraced under this provision was discussed exhaustively by the Court in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, [32] in which it was held:

 

…At the very least, free speech and free press may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest without censorship and punishment. There is to be no previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be a clear and present danger of substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent. [33] 

 

Gonzales further explained that the vital need of a constitutional democracy for freedom of expression is undeniable, whether as a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment; of attaining the truth; of assuring participation by the people in social, including political, decision-making; and of maintaining the balance between stability and change.[34] As early as the 1920s, the trend as reflected in Philippine and American decisions was to recognize the broadest scope and assure the widest latitude for this constitutional guarantee. The trend represents a profound commitment to the principle that debate on public issue should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. [35] 

 

Freedom of speech and of the press means something more than the right to approve existing political beliefs or economic arrangements, to lend support to official measures, and to take refuge in the existing climate of opinion on any matter of public consequence.[36]  When atrophied, the right becomes meaningless.[37] The right belongs as well -- if not more – to those who question, who do not conform, who differ.[38] The ideas that may be expressed under this freedom are confined not only to those that are conventional or acceptable to the majority.  To be truly meaningful, freedom of speech and of the press  should allow and even encourage the articulation of the unorthodox view, though it be hostile to or derided by others; or though such view “induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.”[39] To paraphrase Justice Holmes, it is freedom for the thought that we hate, no less than for the thought that agrees with us. [40] 

 

        The scope of freedom of expression is so broad that it extends protection to nearly all forms of communication. It protects speech, print and assembly regarding secular as well as political causes, and is not confined to any particular field of human interest. The protection covers myriad matters of public interest or concern embracing all issues, about which information is needed or appropriate, so as to enable members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period. The constitutional protection assures the broadest possible exercise of free speech and free press for religious, political, economic, scientific, news, or informational ends, inasmuch as the Constitution's basic guarantee of freedom to advocate ideas is not confined to the expression of ideas that are conventional or shared by a majority.

 

The constitutional protection is not limited to the exposition of ideas. The protection afforded free speech extends to speech or publications that are entertaining as well as instructive or informative.  Specifically, in Eastern Broadcasting Corporation (DYRE) v. Dans,[41] this Court stated that all forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the clause on freedom of speech and of expression.

 

While all forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of freedom of expression clause, the freedom of film, television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspapers and other print media, as will be subsequently discussed.

 

E.2. Differentiation: The Limits & Restraints of Free Speech

       

       From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right to free speech and a free press is not susceptible of any limitation. But the realities of life in a complex society preclude a literal interpretation of the provision prohibiting the passage of a law that would abridge such freedom.  For freedom of expression is not an absolute, [42] nor is it an “unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom.” 

 

       Thus, all speech are not treated the same.  Some types of speech may be subjected to some regulation by the State under its pervasive police power, in order that it may not be injurious to the equal right of others or those of the community or society.[43] The difference in treatment is expected because the relevant interests of one type of speech, e.g., political speech, may vary from those of another, e.g., obscene speech. Distinctions have therefore been made in the treatment, analysis, and evaluation of the permissible scope of restrictions on various categories of speech. [44] We have ruled, for example, that in our jurisdiction slander or libel, lewd and obscene speech, as well as “fighting words” are not entitled to constitutional protection and may be penalized.[45]

Moreover, the techniques of reviewing alleged restrictions on speech (overbreadth, vagueness, and so on) have been applied differently to each category, either consciously or unconsciously. [46] A study of free speech jurisprudence—whether here or abroad—will reveal that courts have developed different tests as to specific types or categories of speech in concrete situations; i.e., subversive speech; obscene speech; the speech of the broadcast media and of the traditional print media; libelous speech; speech affecting associational rights; speech before hostile audiences; symbolic speech; speech that affects the right to a fair trial; and speech associated with rights of assembly and petition. [47]

 

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated; [48] (b) the balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of type of situation; [49] and  (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, “extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.” [50]

 

As articulated in our jurisprudence, we have applied either the dangerous tendency doctrine or clear and present danger test to resolve free speech challenges. More recently, we have concluded that we have generally adhered to the clear and present danger test. [51] 

 

E.3.  In Focus: Freedom of the Press

 

Much has been written on the philosophical basis of press freedom as part of the larger right of free discussion and expression. Its practical importance, though, is more easily grasped. It is the chief source of information on current affairs. It is the most pervasive and perhaps most powerful vehicle of opinion on public questions. It is the instrument by which citizens keep their government informed of their needs, their aspirations and their grievances. It is the sharpest weapon in the fight to keep government responsible and efficient. Without a vigilant press, the mistakes of every administration would go uncorrected and its abuses unexposed. As Justice Malcolm wrote in United States v. Bustos:[52]

 

The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of clear conscience.

 

        Its contribution to the public weal makes freedom of the press deserving of extra protection. Indeed, the press benefits from certain ancillary rights. The productions of writers are classified as intellectual and proprietary. Persons who interfere or defeat the freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication are liable for damages, be they private individuals or public officials.

 

E.4. Anatomy of Restrictions: Prior Restraint, Content-Neutral and Content-Based Regulations

        Philippine jurisprudence, even as early as the period under the 1935 Constitution, has recognized four aspects of freedom of the press. These are (1) freedom from prior restraint; (2) freedom from punishment subsequent to publication; [53] (3) freedom of access to information; [54] and (4) freedom of circulation.[55]

 

       Considering that petitioner has argued that respondents’ press statement constitutes a form of impermissible prior restraint, a closer scrutiny of this principle is in order, as well as its sub-specie of content-based (as distinguished from content-neutral) regulations. 

 

At this point, it should be noted that respondents in this case deny that their acts constitute prior restraints. This presents a unique tinge to the present challenge, considering that the cases in our jurisdiction involving prior restrictions on speech never had any issue of whether the governmental act or issuance actually constituted prior restraint.  Rather, the determinations were always about whether the restraint was justified by the Constitution. 

 

       Be that as it may, the determination in every case of whether there is an impermissible restraint on the freedom of speech has always been based on the circumstances of each case, including the nature of the restraint. And in its application in our jurisdiction, the parameters of this principle have been etched on a case-to-case basis, always tested by scrutinizing the governmental issuance or act against the circumstances in which they operate, and then determining the appropriate test with which to evaluate.

 

        Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination.[56]  Freedom from prior restraint is largely freedom from government censorship of publications, whatever the form of censorship, and regardless of whether it is wielded by the executive, legislative or judicial branch of the government. Thus, it precludes governmental acts that required approval of a proposal to publish; licensing or permits as prerequisites to publication including the payment of license taxes for the privilege to publish; and even injunctions against publication.  Even the closure of the business and printing offices of certain newspapers, resulting in the discontinuation of their printing and publication, are deemed as previous restraint or censorship. [57] Any law or official that requires some form of permission to be had before publication can be made, commits an infringement of the constitutional right, and remedy can be had at the courts.

 

       Given that deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is the hostility against all prior restraints on speech, and any act that restrains speech is presumed invalid,[58]  and “any act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows,” [59] it is important to stress not all prior restraints on speech are invalid.  Certain previous restraints may be permitted by the Constitution, but determined only upon a careful evaluation of the challenged act as against the appropriate test by which it should be measured against.

 

       Hence, it is not enough to determine whether the challenged act constitutes some form of restraint on freedom of speech. A distinction has to be made whether the restraint is (1) a content-neutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well defined standards;[60] or (2) a content-based  restraint or censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech. [61] The cast of the restriction determines the test by which the challenged act is assayed with.          

 

       When the speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral regulation, only a substantial governmental interest is required for its validity.[62]  Because regulations of this type are not designed to suppress any particular message, they are not subject to the strictest form of judicial scrutiny but an intermediate approach—somewhere between the mere rationality that is required of any other law and the compelling interest standard applied to content-based restrictions.[63]  The test is called intermediate because the Court will not merely rubberstamp the validity of a law but also require that the restrictions be narrowly-tailored to promote an important or significant governmental interest that is unrelated to the suppression of expression.  The intermediate approach has been formulated in this manner:

 

A governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government, if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incident restriction on alleged [freedom of speech & expression] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. [64]

 

       On the other hand, a governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny in light of its inherent and invasive impact. Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster,[65] with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality. 

 

       Unless the government can overthrow this presumption, the content-based restraint will be struck down.[66]

       With respect to content-based restrictions, the government must also show the type of harm the speech sought to be restrained would bring about— especially  the gravity and the imminence of the threatened harm – otherwise the prior restraint will be invalid.  Prior restraint on speech based on its content cannot be justified by hypothetical fears, “but only by showing a substantive and imminent evil that has taken the life of a reality already on ground.”[67] As formulated, “the question in every case is whether the words  used  are  used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to  create  a  clear   and   present  danger  that  they  will   bring   about  the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.”[68]

 

       The regulation which restricts the speech content must also serve an important or substantial government interest, which is unrelated to the suppression of free expression. [69]

 

       Also, the incidental restriction on speech must be no greater than what is essential to the furtherance of that interest. [70] A restriction that is so broad that it encompasses more than what is required to satisfy the governmental interest will be invalidated. [71] The regulation, therefore, must be reasonable and narrowly drawn to fit the regulatory purpose, with the least restrictive means undertaken. [72]  

 

       Thus, when the prior restraint partakes of a content-neutral regulation, it is subjected to an intermediate review. A content-based regulation,[73] however, bears a heavy presumption of invalidity and is measured against the clear and present danger rule.  The latter will pass constitutional muster only if justified by a compelling reason, and the restrictions imposed are neither overbroad nor vague. [74]  

 

       Applying the foregoing, it is clear that the challenged acts in the case at bar need to be subjected to the clear and present danger rule, as they are content-based restrictions. The acts of respondents focused solely on but one object—a specific content— fixed  as these were on the alleged taped conversations between the President and a COMELEC official. Undoubtedly these did not merely provide regulations as to the time, place or manner of the dissemination of speech or expression. 

 

E.5. Dichotomy of Free Press: Print v. Broadcast Media

 

Finally, comes respondents’ argument that the challenged act is valid on the ground that broadcast media enjoys free speech rights that are lesser in scope to that of print media.  We next explore and test the validity of this argument, insofar as it has been invoked to validate a content-based restriction on broadcast media. 

 

The regimes presently in place for each type of media differ from one other. Contrasted with the regime in respect of books, newspapers, magazines and traditional printed matter, broadcasting, film and video have been subjected to regulatory schemes.

 

The dichotomy between print and broadcast media traces its origins in the United States. There, broadcast radio and television have been held to have limited First Amendment protection,[75] and U.S. Courts have excluded broadcast media from the application of the “strict scrutiny” standard that they would otherwise apply to content-based restrictions.[76]  According to U.S. Courts, the three major reasons why broadcast media stands apart from print media are: (a) the scarcity of the frequencies by which the medium operates [i.e., airwaves are physically limited while print medium may be limitless]; [77] (b) its “pervasiveness” as a medium; and (c) its unique accessibility to children.[78]  Because cases involving broadcast media need not follow “precisely the same approach that [U.S. courts] have applied to other media,” nor go “so far as to demand that such regulations serve ‘compelling’ government interests,”[79] they are decided on whether the “governmental restriction” is narrowly tailored to further a substantial governmental interest,”[80] or the intermediate test.

 

As pointed out by respondents, Philippine jurisprudence has also echoed a differentiation in treatment between broadcast and print media.  Nevertheless, a review of Philippine case law on broadcast media will show that—as we have deviated with the American conception of the Bill of Rights[81]— we likewise did not adopt en masse the U.S. conception of free speech as it relates to broadcast media, particularly as to which test would govern content-based prior restraints. 

 

Our cases show two distinct features of this dichotomy. First, the difference in treatment, in the main, is in the regulatory scheme applied to broadcast media that is not imposed on traditional print media, and narrowly confined to unprotected speech (e.g., obscenity, pornography, seditious and inciting speech), or is based on a compelling government interest that also has constitutional protection, such as national security or the electoral process.

 

Second, regardless of the regulatory schemes that broadcast media is subjected to, the Court has consistently held that the clear and present danger test applies to content-based restrictions on media, without making a distinction as to traditional print or broadcast media.

 

        The distinction between broadcast and traditional print media was first enunciated in Eastern Broadcasting Corporation (DYRE) v. Dans,[82] wherein it was held that “[a]ll forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of speech and expression clause. The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and present danger rule…”[83]   

 

Dans  was a case filed to compel the reopening of a radio station which had been summarily closed on grounds of national security. Although the issue had become moot and academic because the owners were no longer interested to reopen, the Court still proceeded to do an analysis of the case and made formulations to serve as guidelines for all inferior courts and bodies exercising quasi-judicial functions. Particularly, the Court made a detailed exposition as to what needs be considered in cases involving broadcast media.  Thus:[84]   

 

                                    xxx             xxx             xxx

 

 (3)      All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of speech and expression clause. The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and present danger rule,  that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent, In his Constitution of the Philippines (2nd Edition, pp. 569-570) Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando cites at least nine of our decisions which apply the test. More recently, the clear and present danger test was applied in J.B.L. Reyes in behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition v. Bagatsing. (4)  The clear and present danger test, however, does not lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums.

Broadcasting has to be licensed. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated among qualified users. A broadcast corporation cannot simply appropriate a certain frequency without regard for government regulation or for the rights of others.

All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of expression clause. Necessarily, however, the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media.

The American Court in Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation (438 U.S. 726), confronted with a patently offensive and indecent regular radio program, explained why radio broadcasting, more than other forms of communications, receives the most limited protection from the free expression clause. First, broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all citizens, Material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but in the privacy of his home. Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children. Bookstores and motion picture theaters may be prohibited from making certain material available to children, but the same selectivity cannot be done in radio or television, where the listener or viewer is constantly tuning in and out.

Similar considerations apply in the area of national security.

The broadcast media have also established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Filipinos. Newspapers and current books are found only in metropolitan areas and in the poblaciones of municipalities accessible to fast and regular transportation. Even here, there are low income masses who find the cost of books, newspapers, and magazines beyond their humble means. Basic needs like food and shelter perforce enjoy high priorities.

On the other hand, the transistor radio is found everywhere. The television set is also becoming universal. Their message may be simultaneously received by a national or regional audience of listeners including the indifferent or unwilling who happen to be within reach of a blaring radio or television set. The materials broadcast over the airwaves reach every person of every age, persons of varying susceptibilities to persuasion, persons of different I.Q.s and mental capabilities, persons whose reactions to inflammatory or offensive speech would be difficult to monitor or predict. The impact of the vibrant speech is forceful and immediate. Unlike readers of the printed work, the radio audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate analyze, and reject the utterance.

(5)       The clear and present danger test, therefore, must take the particular circumstances of broadcast media into account. The supervision of radio stations-whether by government or through self-regulation by the industry itself calls for thoughtful, intelligent and sophisticated handling.

The government has a right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. Radio and television may not be used to organize a rebellion or to signal the start of widespread uprising. At the same time, the people have a right to be informed. Radio and television would have little reason for existence if broadcasts are limited to bland, obsequious, or pleasantly entertaining utterances. Since they are the most convenient and popular means of disseminating varying views on public issues, they also deserve special protection.

(6)       The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. In the 1918 case of United States v. Bustos (37 Phil. 731) this Court was already stressing that.

The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted.

(7)       Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution. [Citations omitted]

 

       It is interesting to note that the Court in Dans adopted the arguments found in U.S. jurisprudence to justify differentiation of treatment (i.e., the scarcity, pervasiveness and accessibility to children), but only after categorically declaring that “the test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and present danger rule,” for all forms of media, whether print or broadcast.  Indeed, a close reading of the above-quoted provisions would show that the differentiation that the Court in Dans referred to was narrowly restricted to what is otherwise deemed as “unprotected speech” (e.g., obscenity, national security, seditious and inciting speech), or to validate a licensing or regulatory scheme necessary to allocate the limited broadcast frequencies, which is absent in print media.  Thus, when this Court declared in Dans that the freedom given to broadcast media was “somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media,” it was not as to what test should be applied, but the context by which requirements of licensing, allocation of airwaves, and application of norms to unprotected speech. [85]

      

        In the same year that the Dans case was decided, it was reiterated in Gonzales v. Katigbak,[86]  that the test to determine free expression challenges was the clear and present danger, again without distinguishing the media.[87] Katigbak, strictly speaking, does not treat of broadcast media but motion pictures. Although the issue involved obscenity standards as applied to movies,[88] the Court concluded its decision with the following obiter dictum that a less liberal approach would be used to resolve obscenity issues in television as opposed to motion pictures:

 

All that remains to be said is that the ruling is to be limited to the concept of obscenity applicable to motion pictures.  It is the consensus of this Court that where television is concerned, a less liberal approach calls for observance.  This is so because unlike motion pictures where the patrons have to pay their way, television reaches every home where there is a set.  Children then will likely be among the avid viewers of the programs therein shown…..It cannot be denied though that the State as parens patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of the young.  

 

       More recently, in resolving a case involving the conduct of exit polls and dissemination of the results by a broadcast company, we reiterated that the clear and present danger rule is the test we unquestionably adhere to issues that involve freedoms of speech and of the press.[89]

 

       This is not to suggest, however, that the clear and present danger rule has been applied to all cases that involve the broadcast media.  The rule applies to all media, including broadcast, but only when the challenged act is a content-based regulation that infringes on free speech, expression and the press.  Indeed, in  Osmena v. COMELEC,[90] which also involved broadcast media, the Court refused to apply the clear and present danger rule to a COMELEC regulation of time and manner of advertising of political advertisements because the challenged restriction was content-neutral.[91]  And in a case involving due process and equal protection issues, the Court in Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines v. COMELEC[92]  treated a restriction imposed on a broadcast media as a reasonable condition for the grant of the media’s franchise, without going into which test would apply.   

   

       That broadcast media is subject to a regulatory regime absent in print media is observed also in other jurisdictions, where the statutory regimes in place over broadcast media include elements of licensing, regulation by administrative bodies, and censorship.  As explained by a British author:

 

 

The reasons behind treating broadcast and films differently from the print media differ in a number of  respects, but have a common historical basis.  The stricter system of controls seems to have been adopted in answer to the view that owing to their particular impact on audiences, films, videos and broadcasting require a system of prior restraints, whereas it is now accepted that books and other printed media do not.  These media are viewed as beneficial to the public in a number of respects, but are also seen as possible sources of harm.[93]

 

       Parenthetically, these justifications are now the subject of debate. Historically, the scarcity of frequencies was thought to provide a rationale. However, cable and satellite television have enormously increased the number of actual and potential channels. Digital technology will further increase the number of channels available. But still, the argument persists that broadcasting is the most influential means of communication, since it comes into the home, and so much time is spent watching television. Since it has a unique impact on people and affects children in a way that the print media normally does not, that regulation is said to be necessary in order to preserve pluralism. It has been argued further that a significant main threat to free expression—in terms of diversity—comes not from government, but from private corporate bodies.  These  developments show a need for a reexamination of the traditional notions of the scope and extent of broadcast media regulation. [94]   

 

       The emergence of digital technology -- which has led to the convergence of broadcasting, telecommunications and the computer industry -- has likewise led to the question of whether the regulatory model for broadcasting will continue to be appropriate in the converged environment.[95]  Internet, for example, remains largely unregulated, yet the Internet and the broadcast media share similarities, [96] and the rationales used to support broadcast regulation apply equally to the Internet.[97] Thus, it has been argued that courts, legislative bodies and the government agencies regulating media must agree to regulate both, regulate neither or develop a new regulatory framework and rationale to justify the differential treatment. [98]

 

F. The Case At Bar

 

        Having settled the applicable standard to content-based restrictions on broadcast media, let us go to its application to the case at bar.  To recapitulate,  a  governmental  action  that  restricts  freedom  of speech or  of  the  press  based  on  content  is  given the strictest scrutiny, with  the  government  having  the  burden of overcoming the presumed  unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of media, including broadcast media.

 

       This outlines the procedural map to follow in cases like the one at bar as it spells out the following: (a) the test; (b) the presumption; (c) the burden of proof; (d) the party to discharge the burden; and (e) the quantum of evidence necessary.  On the basis of the records of the case at bar, respondents who have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge freedom of speech and of the press failed to hurdle the clear and present danger test.  It appears that the great evil which government wants to prevent is the airing of a tape recording in alleged violation of the anti-wiretapping law. The records of the case at bar, however, are confused and confusing, and respondents’ evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and present danger test.  Firstly, the various statements of the Press Secretary obfuscate the identity of the voices in the tape recording. Secondly, the integrity of the taped conversation is also suspect. The Press Secretary showed to the public two versions, one supposed to be a “complete” version and the other, an “altered” version.  Thirdly, the evidence of the respondents on the who’s and the how’s of the wiretapping act is ambivalent, especially considering the tape’s different versions. The identity of the wire-tappers, the manner of its commission and other related and relevant proofs are some of the invisibles of this case.  Fourthly, given all these unsettled facets of the tape, it is even arguable whether its airing would violate the anti-wiretapping law.

 

       We rule that not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing  the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. Our laws are of different kinds and doubtless, some of them provide norms of conduct which even if violated have only an adverse effect on a person’s private comfort but does not endanger national security. There are laws of great significance but their violation, by itself and without more, cannot support suppression of free speech and free press. In fine, violation of law is just a factor, a vital one to be sure, which should be weighed  in  adjudging  whether  to  restrain  freedom of speech and of the press. The totality of the injurious effects of the violation to private and public interest must be calibrated in light of the preferred status accorded by the Constitution and by related international covenants protecting freedom of speech and of the press. In calling for a careful and calibrated measurement of the circumference of all these factors to determine compliance with the clear and present danger test, the Court should not be misinterpreted as devaluing  violations  of law.  By all means,  violations  of  law  should  be  vigorously  prosecuted  by  the State  for  they  breed their own evil consequence.  But to repeat, the need to prevent their violation cannot per se trump the exercise of free  speech  and  free  press,  a preferred right whose breach can lead  to  greater evils.  For this failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of the State.

 

        This is not all the faultline in the stance of the respondents. We slide to the issue of whether the mere press statements of the Secretary of Justice and of the NTC in question constitute a form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution.  In resolving  this  issue,  we hold that it  is  not  decisive that the press statements made by respondents were not reduced in or followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements were made by respondents while in the exercise of their official functions. Undoubtedly, respondent Gonzales made his statements as Secretary of Justice, while the NTC issued its statement as the regulatory body of media.  Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the government in an official  capacity  is covered by the rule on prior restraint.  The concept of an “act” does not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order or official circular.  Otherwise, the non formalization of an act into an official order or circular  will result in the easy circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint.  The press statements at bar are acts that should be struck down as they constitute impermissible forms of prior restraints on the right to free speech and press.

 

There is enough evidence of  chilling effect of the complained acts on record.  The warnings given to media came from no less the NTC, a regulatory agency that can cancel the Certificate of Authority of the radio and broadcast media. They also came from the Secretary of Justice, the alter ego of the Executive, who wields the awesome power to prosecute those perceived to be violating the laws of the land.  After the warnings,  the KBP inexplicably joined the NTC in issuing an ambivalent Joint Press Statement. After the warnings, petitioner Chavez was left alone to fight this battle for freedom of speech and of the press.  This silence on the sidelines on the part of some media practitioners is too deafening to be the subject of misinterpretation.

 

        The constitutional imperative for us to strike down unconstitutional acts should always be exercised with care and in light of the distinct facts of each case.  For there are no hard and fast rules when it comes to slippery constitutional questions, and the limits and construct of relative freedoms are never set in stone.   Issues revolving on their construct must be decided on a case to case basis, always based on the peculiar shapes and shadows of each case.  But in cases where the challenged acts are patent invasions of a constitutionally protected right, we should be swift in striking them down as nullities per se. A blow too soon struck for freedom is preferred than a blow too late.

 

        In VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The writs of certiorari and prohibition are hereby issued, nullifying the official statements made by respondents on June 8, and 11, 2005 warning the  media on airing the alleged wiretapped conversation between the President and other personalities, for constituting unconstitutional prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press

        SO ORDERED.

 

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

 

 

 

 

 

WE  CONCUR:

 

 

 

 

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ

Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

 

 

 

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

 

 

 

RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice

 

 

 

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

 

 

 

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice

 

 

 

DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice

 

 

 

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

 

 

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

 

                           RUBEN T. REYES                         TERESITA LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

         Associate Justice                                                  Associate Justice

 

 

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

 

 

        Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

 

 

 

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

 


[1]        G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 712.

[2]        218 Phil. 754 (1984).

[3]        G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001, 357 SCRA 496.

[4]        G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006, 488 SCRA 226.

[5]        Rollo, pp. 6-7 (citing the Philippine Daily Inquirer (PDI), June 7, 2005, pp. A1, A18; PDI, June 14, 2005, p. A1); and p. 58.

[6]        Id. at 7-8 (citing the Manila Standard, June 10, 2005, p. A2); and 58.

[7]        Id. at 7-8 and 59.

[8]        Id.

[9]        Id. at 8-9 and 59.

[10]       Id. at 9.

[11]       Id. at 10-12, 43-44, 60-62.

[12]       Id. at 62-63, 86-87.

[13]       Id. at 6.

[14]       Respondents have “committed blatant violations of the freedom of expression and of the press and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern enshrined in Article III, Sections 4 and 7 of the 1987 Constitution. Id. at 18. Petitioner also argued that respondent NTC acted beyond its powers when it issued the press release of June 11, 2005. Id.

[15]       Id. at 6.

[16]       Through the Comment filed by the Solicitor-General. Id. at 56-83.

[17]       Id. at 71-73.

[18]       Id. at 74-75.

[19]       The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. “Legal standing” means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the government act that is being challenged. The term “interest” is material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Pimentel v. Executive Secretary,  G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005, 462 SCRA 622, citing Joya vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 96541, August 24, 1993, 225 SCRA 568. See Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, G.R. No. 118910, July 17, 1995, 246 SCRA 540, 562–563; and Agan v. PIATCO (Decision), 450 Phil. 744 (2003).

[20]       Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368, 373 (1949), cited in Osmeña v. COMELEC,  G.R. No. 100318,  July 30, 1991, 199 SCRA 750.

[21]       See Agan v. PIATCO (Decision), 450 Phil. 744 (2003).

[22]       Philconsa v. Jimenez, 122 Phil. 894 (1965); Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991, 194 SCRA 317; Guingona v. Carague, G.R. No. 94571, April 22, 1991, 196 SCRA 221; Osmeña v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 100318,  July 30, 1991, 199 SCRA 750; Basco v. PAGCOR, 274 Phil. 323 (1991); Carpio v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 96409, February 14, 1992, 206 SCRA 290; Del Mar v. PAGCOR,  400 Phil. 307 (2000).

[23]       Basco v. PAGCOR, 274 Phil. 323 (1991), citing Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas Inc. v. Tan, G.R. No. L-81311, June 30, 1988, 163 SCRA 371.

[24]       1987 Phil. Const. Art. III, §4.

[25]       U.S. Bill of Rights, First Amendment. (“Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”)

[26]       The First Amendment was so crafted because the founders of the American government believed -- as a matter of history and experience -- that the freedom to express personal opinions was essential to a free government. See Larry Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitution and Judicial Review (2004).

[27]       Article  19  of  the  1948 Universal  Declaration  on  Human  Rights  (UDHR) states: “Everyone  has  the  right  to  freedom  of  opinion  and  expression; this right includes the right to hold opinions  without  interference  and  to  seek,  receive  and  impart  information and ideas through any media and regardless of  frontiers.” Although the UDHR is not binding as a treaty, many of its provisions have acquired binding status on States and are now part of customary international law. Article 19 forms part of the UDHR principles that have been transformed into binding norms. Moreover, many of the rights in the UDHR were included in and elaborated on in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), a treaty ratified by over 150 States, including the Philippines. The recognition of freedom of expression is also found in regional human rights instruments, namely, the European Convention on Human Rights (Article 10), the American Convention on Human Rights (Article 10), and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Article 9).

[28]       Gonzales v. COMELEC, 137 Phil. 471, 492 (1969).

[29]       Salonga v. Cruz-Pano, G.R. 59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 458-459; Gonzales v. COMELEC, 137 Phil. 489, 492-3 (1969); Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., 151-A Phil. 676-677 (1973); National Press Club v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 102653, March 5, 1992, 207 SCRA 1, 9; Adiong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 712, 715.

[30]       Indeed, the struggle that attended the recognition of the value of free expression was discussed by Justice Malcolm in the early case United States v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731, 739 (1918). Justice Malcolm generalized that the freedom of speech as cherished in democratic countries was unknown in the Philippine Islands before 1900. Despite the presence of pamphlets and books early in the history of the Philippine Islands, the freedom of speech was alien to those who were used to obeying the words of barangay lords and, ultimately, the colonial monarchy. But ours was a history of struggle for that specific right: to be able to express ourselves especially in the governance of this country. Id.

[31]       Id.

[32]       137 Phil. 471, 492 (1969).

[33]       Id.

[34]       Id. at 493, citing Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 Yale Law Journal 877  (1963).

[35]       Id. citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US 254, 270 (1964).

[36]       Id.

[37]       Id.

[38]       Id.

[39]       Id. citing Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 US 1, 4 (1949).

[40]       Id. citing U.S. v. Schwimmer, 279 US 644, 655 (1929).

[41]       G.R. No. L-59329, July 19, 1985, 137 SCRA 628.

[42]       Gonzales v. COMELEC, 137 Phil. 471, 494(1969).

[43]       Hector S. De Leon, I Philippine Constitutional Law: Principles and Cases 485 (2003) [Hereinafter De Leon, Constitutional Law].

[44]       See John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law §16.1, 1131 (7th ed.2000 [Hereinafter Nowak & Rotunda, Constitutional Law].

[45]       De Leon, Constitutional Law at 485.  Laws have also limited the freedom of speech and of the press, or otherwise affected the media and freedom of expression. The Constitution itself imposes certain limits (such as Article IX on the Commission on Elections, and Article XVI prohibiting foreign media ownership); as do the  Revised  Penal  Code  (with  provisions  on  national  security,  libel  and  obscenity), the  Civil  Code  (which  contains two articles on privacy), the Rules of Court (on the fair administration  of justice and contempt) and certain presidential decrees. There is also a “shield law,” or Republic Act No. 53, as amended by Republic Act No. 1477.  Section  1  of this law provides protection  for  non-disclosure  of  sources  of  information,  without prejudice to one’s liability under civil and criminal  laws. The publisher,  editor,  columnist or  duly  accredited  reporter of a newspaper, magazine or periodical of general  circulation cannot be compelled to reveal the source of any  information or news report appearing in said publication, if the information was released in confidence to such publisher, editor  or reporter unless the court or a Committee of Congress finds that such revelation is demanded by the security of  the state.

[46]       See Nowak & Rotunda, Constitutional Law §16.1, 1131 (7th ed.2000).

[47]       Id.

[48]       Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 151 (1957); Gonzales v. COMELEC, 137 Phil. 471 (1969). See People v. Perez, 4 Phil. 599 (1905); People v. Nabong, 57 Phil. 455 (1933); People v. Feleo, 57 Phil. 451 (1933).  

[49]       This test was used by J. Ruiz-Castro in his Separate Opinion in Gonzales v. COMELEC, 137 Phil. 471, 532-537 (1969).

[50]       Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 151 (1957).

[51]       ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. COMELEC, 380 Phil. 780, 794 (2000).

[52]       See U.S. v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731 (1918).

[53]       The aspect of freedom from liability subsequent to publication precludes liability for completed publications of views traditionally held innocent. Otherwise, the prohibition on prior restraint would be meaningless, as the unrestrained threat of subsequent punishment, by itself, would be an effective prior restraint. Thus, opinions on public issues cannot be punished when published, merely because the opinions are novel or controversial, or because they clash with current doctrines. This fact does not imply that publishers and editors are never liable for what they print. Such freedom gives no immunity from laws punishing scandalous or obscene matter, seditious or disloyal writings, and libelous or insulting words. As classically expressed, the freedom of the press embraces at the very least the freedom to discuss truthfully and publicly matters of public concern, without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment. For discussion to be innocent, it must be truthful, must concern something in which people in general take a healthy interest, and must not endanger some important social end that the government by law protects. See Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 225 (2003 ed.).

[54]       Freedom of access to information regarding matters of public interest is kept real in several ways. Official papers, reports and documents, unless held confidential and secret by competent authority in the public interest, are public records. As such, they are open and subject to reasonable regulation, to the scrutiny of the inquiring reporter or editor. Information obtained confidentially may be printed without specification of the source; and that source is closed to official inquiry, unless the revelation is deemed by the courts, or by a House or committee of Congress, to be vital to the security of the State. Id.

[55]       Freedom of circulation refers to the unhampered distribution of newspapers and other media among customers and among the general public. It may be interfered with in several ways. The most important of these is censorship. Other ways include requiring a permit or license for the distribution of media and penalizing dissemination of copies made without it;[55] and requiring the payment of a fee or tax, imposed either on the publisher or on the distributor, with the intent to limit or restrict circulation.  These modes of interfering with the freedom to circulate have been constantly stricken down as unreasonable limitations on press freedom. Thus, imposing a license tax measured by gross receipts for the privilege of engaging in the business of advertising in any newspaper, or charging license fees for the privilege of selling religious books are impermissible restraints on the freedom of expression. Id.  citing Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), and American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101 Phil. 386 (1957). It has been held, however, even in the Philippines, that publishers and distributors of newspapers and allied media cannot complain when required to pay ordinary taxes such as the sales tax. The exaction is valid only when the obvious and immediate effect is to restrict oppressively the distribution of printed matter.

[56]       Id at 225.

[57]       Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 218 Phil. 754 (1984).

[58]       Gonzales v. COMELEC, 137 Phil. 471 (1969); ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. COMELEC, 380 Phil. 780, 795 (2000) (“Doctrinally, the Court has always ruled in favor of the freedom of expression, and any restriction is treated an exemption.”); Social Weather Stations v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001, 357 SCRA 496 (“[A]ny system of prior restraint comes to court bearing a heavy burden against its constitutionality. It is the government which must show justification for enforcement of the restraint.”). See also Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, 328 Phil. 893 (1996) (religious speech falls within the protection of free speech).

[59]       Iglesia ni Cristo v. CA, 328 Phil. 893, 928 (1996), citing Near v. Minnesota, 283 US 697 (1931); Bantam Books Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 US 58 (1963); New York Times v. United States, 403 US 713 (1971).

[60]       See J.B.L. Reyes v. Bagatsing, 210 Phil. 457 (1983), Navarro v. Villegas, G.R. No. L-31687, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 730; Ignacio v. Ela, 99 Phil. 346 (1956); Primicias v. Fugosa, 80 Phil. 71 (1948).

[61]       Determining if a restriction is content-based is not always obvious.  A regulation may be content-neutral on its face but partakes of a content-based restriction in its application, as when it can be shown that the government only enforces the restraint as to prohibit one type of content or viewpoint. In this case, the restriction will be treated as a content-based regulation.  The most important part of the time, place, or manner standard is the requirement that the regulation be content-neutral both as written and applied. See Nowak & Rotunda, Constitutional Law §16.1, 1133 (7th ed.2000).

[62]       See Osmeña v. COMELEC, 351 Phil. 692, 718 (1998). The Court looked to Adiong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 103456, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 712, which had cited a U.S. doctrine, viz. “A governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government, if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incident restriction on alleged [freedom of speech & expression] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”

[63]       Nowak & Rotunda, Constitutional Law §16.1, 1133 (7th ed.2000). This was also called a “deferential standard of review” in Osmeña v. COMELEC, 351 Phil. 692, 718 (1998). It was explained that the clear and present danger rule is not a sovereign remedy for all free speech problems, and its application to content-neutral regulations would be tantamount to “using a sledgehammer to drive a nail when a regular hammer is all that is needed.” Id. at 478.

[64]       Osmeña v. COMELEC, 351 Phil. 692, 717, citing Adiong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 712.  It was noted that the test was actually formulated in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), which was deemed appropriate for restrictions on speech which are content-neutral.

[65]       Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, 328 Phil. 893 (1996). In this case, it was found that the act of respondent Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television of rating a TV program with “X”— on  the ground that it “offend[s] and constitute[s] an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law”— was a form of prior restraint and required the application of the clear and present danger rule.

[66]       Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, 328 Phil. 893 (1996);  Gonzales v. COMELEC, 137 Phil. 471 (1969); ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. COMELEC, 380 Phil. 780 (2000); Social Weather Stations v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001, 357 SCRA 496.

[67]       Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, 328 Phil. 893 (1996).

[68]       Schenke v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (19191), cited in Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 151 (1957); and ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. COMELEC, 380 Phil. 780, 794 (2000). 

[69]       Adiong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 712, cited in ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. COMELEC, 380 Phil. 780, 795 (2000). 

[70]       See Adiong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 712, and Gonzales v. COMELEC, 137 Phil. 471 (1969), cited in ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. COMELEC, 380 Phil. 780, 795 (2000). 

[71]       See Adiong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 712. 

[72]       See Osmeña v. COMELEC, 351 Phil. 692 (1998). 

[73]       Parenthetically, there are two types of content-based restrictions.  First, the government may be totally banning some type of speech for content (total ban).  Second, the government may be requiring individuals who wish to put forth certain types of speech to certain times or places so that the type of speech does not adversely affect its environment. See Nowak & Rotunda, Constitutional Law §16.1, 1131 (7th ed.2000).  Both types of conten-based regulations are subject to strict scrutiny and the clear and present danger rule. 

[74]       Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, 328 Phil. 893 (1996);  Gonzales v. COMELEC, 137 Phil. 471 (1969); ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. COMELEC, 380 Phil. 780 (2000); Social Weather Stations v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001, 357 SCRA 496.

[75]       This is based on a finding that “broadcast regulation involves unique considerations,” and that “differences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to them.” Red Lion Broad. Co. v. Federal Communications Commission [FCC], 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969). See generally National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943) (noting that the public interest standard denoted to the FCC is an expansive power). 

[76]       See Federal Communications Commission [FCC] v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989); and Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union [ACLU], 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997). In these cases, U.S. courts disregarded the argument that the offended listener or viewer could simply turn the dial and avoid the unwanted broadcast [thereby putting print and broadcast media in the same footing], reasoning that because the broadcast audience is constantly tuning in and out, prior warnings cannot protect the listener from unexpected program content.

[77]       Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969). Red Lion involved the application of the fairness doctrine and whether someone personally attacked had the right to respond on the broadcast medium within the purview of FCC regulation. The court sustained the regulation.  The Court in Red Lion reasoned that because there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies available, this “scarcity of the spectrum” necessitates a stricter standard for broadcast media, as opposed to newspapers and magazines. See generally National Broadcasting  v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943) (noting that the public interest standard denoted to the FCC is an expansive power). 

[78]       See Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Sable Communications  v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989); and Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union [ACLU], 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997). In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, involving an FCC decision to require broadcasters to channel indecent programming away from times of the day when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience, the U.S. Court found that the broadcast medium was an intrusive and pervasive one. In reaffirming that this medium should receive the most limited of First Amendment protections, the U.S. Court held that the rights of the public to avoid indecent speech trump those of the broadcaster to disseminate such speech. The justifications for this ruling were two-fold. First, the regulations were necessary because of the pervasive presence of broadcast media in American life, capable of injecting offensive material into the privacy of the home, where the right "to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder." Second, the U.S. Court found that broadcasting "is uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read." The Court dismissed the argument that the offended listener or viewer could simply turn the dial and avoid the unwanted broadcast, reasoning that because the broadcast audience is constantly tuning in and out, prior warnings cannot protect the listener from unexpected program content.

[79]       FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376 (1984).

[80]       Id.  at 380.

[81]       See Estrada v. Escritor (Resolution), A.M. No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006 (free exercise of religion); and Osmeña v. COMELEC, 351 Phil. 692, 718 (1998) (speech restrictions to promote voting rights). The Court in Osmeña v. COMELEC, for example, noted that it is a foreign notion to the American Constitution that the government may restrict the speech of some in order to enhance the relative voice of others [the idea being that voting is a form of speech].  But this Court then declared that the same does not hold true of the Philippine Constitution, the notion “being in fact an animating principle of that document.” 351 Phil. 692, 718 (1998).

[82]       G.R. No. L-59329, July 19, 1985, 137 SCRA 628.

[83]       Id.

[84]       Id. at 634-637.

[85]       There is another case wherein the Court had occasion to refer to the differentiation between traditional print media and broadcast media, but of limited application to the case at bar inasmuch as the issues did not invoke a free-speech challenge, but due process and equal protection. See  Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. COMELEC, 352 Phil. 153 (1998) (challenge to legislation requiring broadcast stations to provide COMELEC Time free of charge).

[86]       G.R. No. L-69500, July 22, 1985, 137 SCRA 717. In this case, the classification of a movie as “For Adults Only” was challenged, with the issue focused on obscenity as basis for the alleged invasion of the right to freedom on artistic and literary expression embraced in the free speech guarantees of the Constitution. The Court held that the test to determine free expression was the clear and present danger rule. The Court found there was an abuse of discretion, but did not get enough votes to rule it was grave. The decision specifically stated that the ruling in the case was limited to concept of obscenity applicable to motion pictures. Id. at 723-729.

[87]       Id. at 725.

[88]       Id.

[89]       ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. COMELEC, 380 Phil. 780, 794 (COMELEC Resolution restraining ABS-CBN, a corporation engaged in broadcast media of television and radio, from conducting exit surveys after the 1998 elections).  Although the decision was rendered after the 1998 elections, the Court proceeded to rule on the case to rule on the issue of the constitutionality of holding exit polls and the dissemination of data derived therefrom. The Court ruled that restriction on exit polls must be tested against the clear and present danger rule, the rule we “unquestionably” adhere to. The framing of the guidelines issued by the Court clearly showed that the issue involved not only the conduct of the exit polls but also its dissemination by broadcast media. And yet, the Court did not distinguish, and still applied the clear and present danger rule.        

[90]       351 Phil. 692 (1998) (challenge to legislation which sought to equalize media access through regulation).

[91]       Id. at 718.

[92]       Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. COMELEC, 352 Phil. 153 (1998) (challenge to legislation requiring broadcast stations to provide COMELEC Time free of charge).

[93]       Helen Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights 296 (3rd ed. 2002).

[94]       Id.

[95]       Stephen J. Shapiro, How Internet Non-Regulation Undermines The Rationales Used To Support Broadcast Regulation, 8-FALL Media L. & Pol'y 1, 2 (1999).

[96]       Technological advances, such as software that facilitates the delivery of live, or real-time, audio and video over the Internet, have enabled Internet content providers to offer the same services as broadcasters. Indeed, these advancements blur the distinction between a computer and a television. Id. at 13.

[97]       Id.

[98]       The current rationales used to support regulation of the broadcast media become unpersuasive in light of the fact that the unregulated Internet and the regulated broadcast media share many of the same features. Id. In other words, as the Internet and broadcast media become identical, for all intents and purposes, it makes little sense to regulate one but not the other in an effort to further First Amendment principles. Indeed, as Internet technologies advance, broadcasters will have little incentive to continue developing broadcast programming under the threat of regulation when they can disseminate the same content in the same format through the unregulated Internet. In conclusion, "the theory of partial regulation, whatever its merits for the circumstances of the last fifty years, will be unworkable in the media landscape of the future." Id. at 23.