PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 173308
Appellee,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,*
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
CARPIO
MORALES,*
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
AZCUNA,
VELASCO, JR.
NACHURA,*
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and
BRION, JJ.
ELMER DE LA CRUZ and
TRANQUILINO MARTINEZ,
Appellants.
Promulgated:
June 25, 2008
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CORONA,
J.:
For review is the November 2, 2005 decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. HC-CR No. 00947 affirming with modification the November 18, 2002
decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 89 in Criminal Case No. Q-99-80669 finding the accused-appellants
Elmer de la Cruz (De la Cruz) and Tranquilino Martinez (Martinez) guilty of the
crime of kidnapping for ransom and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of
death.
Charged
with the crime of kidnapping for ransom were accused-appellants De la Cruz and
Martinez, along with three others, namely, Aldrin Tano (Tano), Romeo Dano
(Dano) and Rex Tarnate (Tarnate). The information read:
That
on or about November 9, 1998 in Quezon City, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, carry away and deprive AARON DENNIS ONG Y
RODRIGUEZ, a minor of eight (8) years old, of his liberty against his will for
purposes of extorting money as in fact a demand for money was made as a
condition for his release.
CONTRARY
TO LAW.[3]
On
arraignment, only accused-appellant De la Cruz, Tarnate and Tano, assisted by
their counsel, appeared. They all entered a plea of not guilty. Accused-appellant
Martinez was arrested subsequently and he likewise pleaded not guilty upon his
arraignment. Dano, on the other hand, remains at large to the present.
During
trial, the RTC received a letter from the Quezon City Jail Warden that accused
Tarnate died of cardiac arrest during incarceration.
Thereafter,
while in the process of presenting its witnesses, the prosecution filed a
motion to discharge accused Tano as a state witness. Accused-appellants De la
Cruz and Martinez filed their separate oppositions thereto. The RTC granted the
motion and denied the motion for reconsideration.
The
prosecution presented six witnesses, namely: the victim Aaron Dennis Ong
(Aaron), his father Erwin Ong (Erwin), Delfin Quinano (Quinano), Fortunato Sauquillo (Sauquillo),
state witness Tano and Chief Inspector Rolando Anduyan (Anduyan) of the Presidential
Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF).
As
established during the trial, accused-appellant De la Cruz was employed by Erwin
as a family driver. He brought Aaron, then an eight-year-old third-grade
student, to and from Claret School.
State
witness Tano relayed that on November 4, 1998, he, accused-appellants De la
Cruz and Martinez, along with Dano, had a meeting wherein De la Cruz broached
the idea of kidnapping Aaron. According to De la Cruz, the child was a “good
catch” as his boss’ family had “plenty of money.” He knew this because he had accompanied
Erwin to the bank thrice. Martinez agreed that it was a good idea to abduct
Aaron.
The
group discussed the plan to kidnap Aaron on two other occasions. On November 5,
1998, they agreed that Martinez should act as their leader, while De la Cruz
would provide the tips. On November 8, 1998, De la Cruz informed them that he
would raise the hood of the car he was driving upon his arrival at the Claret
School as a signal to put the plan into action.
On
November 9, 1998, De la Cruz fetched Aaron from school. As the boy took the
car's front passenger seat, De la Cruz placed Aaron's bag at the back seat of
the car. De la Cruz told the child that
the car was overheating and proceeded to open the hood of the car and the rear
compartment. He took a container of water and poured it on the car's engine.
Martinez got inside the car and handcuffed Aaron's left wrist. De la Cruz then closed
the rear compartment, boarded the car and seated himself behind the driver. He
was also handcuffed by Martinez to Aaron.
Tano
then went in and seated himself at the right side of the back seat beside De la
Cruz and behind Aaron. Martinez then drove the car all the way to Batasan Hills
where Dano resided. They fetched Dano who took over control of the car from Martinez.
They proceeded to Minuyan, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, reaching the place at
around 8:00-9:00 p.m.
Upon
arrival, they removed Aaron's handcuff and entered a vacant house. Martinez and
Tano left Aaron with De la Cruz and proceeded to Tarnate's house. Martinez
instructed Tarnate to feed the boy. He told the child not to make any noise as
somebody was guarding them outside. He left Aaron and De la Cruz who later told
the child that he was able to untie himself. Despite the chance to escape,
however, he took a nap.
At
around 10:00 p.m. that same evening, Martinez, Tano, Dano and Tarnate drove the
Ongs' car and went back to Batasan Hills in Quezon City. When the vehicle
overheated, they abandoned it and boarded a tricycle to get to their
destination.
Erwin,
who was by then frantically searching for his son in several hospitals and
police stations, received a phone call at around 10:45 p.m. from a man who told
him not to look for his son anymore as Aaron was with him. When Erwin asked to
speak to his son, the man ignored him and told him to wait for another
call.
The
following morning, November 10, 1998, Martinez gave Tano a piece of paper with
a telephone number. Written there were the words “Maghanda ng tatlong milyon
para sa kaligtasan ng anak mo.” (Prepare P3 million for your son’s safety.)
He ordered Tano to call Erwin and
relay the written message to him.
Back
at the vacant house where Aaron and De la Cruz were being kept, Quinano peeped inside,
saw the two and asked them why they were there. De la Cruz responded by asking
him to open the door. Quinano, who was with two women (one of them Editha
Arizobal, Tarnate's common-law wife), opened the door. When they asked De la
Cruz what they were doing inside the vacant house, the latter replied that
their car was borrowed for a medical emergency. Aaron, on the other hand, told
Quinano that some men took their car and left them there. One of the women
suggested that they report the incident to the police. De la Cruz said no and
replied that he just wanted to go home.
Quinano
then brought the two to the barangay hall and presented them to barangay
kagawad Sauquillo who took their statements and entered them in the barangay
logbook. This was signed and verified by both Aaron and De la Cruz. Erwin was
then informed by phone that his son was already in the custody of the barangay
officials in Barangay Minuyan, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.
When
Erwin arrived, the barangay chairman recommended that the incident be
reported to the San Jose del Monte, Bulacan Police. They went to the police
station to file a complaint and give their statements. They were fetched by PAOCTF personnel and met up with Col. Cesar
Mancao at McDonald's Commonwealth Avenue. The latter assigned Chief Inspector
Anduyan to investigate the case.
After
discussing the events surrounding the incident, Aaron, Erwin, De la Cruz,
Anduyan and his team proceeded to San Jose del Monte, Bulacan and interviewed
Sauquillo. After learning that Tarnate and Editha Arizobal were in charge of
the vacant house where the two had been kept, Anduyan went to Tarnate's house
to investigate. Tarnate immediately
admitted his participation and revealed information on the identities and
whereabouts of the other accused. He named Dano, Tano, and Martinez and led
Anduyan's group to Martinez's house in Batasan HiIls.
Anduyan
and his men proceeded to Batasan Hills and there waited for the other accused. An
hour later, a taxicab arrived and the three other accused alighted. As the
police team moved to arrest them, Dano and Martinez were able to escape in the
confusion and only Tano was arrested. The house was searched and the
authorities found Aaron's bag inside. Anduyan spoke with the cab driver who
identified the escapees as Dano and Martinez. The police recovered Dano’s and
Martinez's identification (ID) cards and two guns which were brought to Camp
Crame.
When
the identification cards were shown to Aaron, he was able to identify Dano and
Martinez. Anduyan and his men were able to arrest Martinez later on in
connection with another kidnapping case.
The
defense presented the testimonies of both accused-appellants. Martinez's
defense hinged on denial and alibi. De la Cruz, on the other hand, invoked his
innocence.
After
trial on the merits, the RTC convicted both accused-appellants of the crime
charged. The dispositive portion of the decision[4] read:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, judgment is rendered finding accused Elmer dela Cruz and
Tranquilino Martinez guilty of the crime of Kidnapping with Ransom as defined
and penalized under paragraph of Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accordingly, accused Elmer dela Cruz and Tranquilino Martinez are hereby each
sentenced to death.
With respect to Rex Tarnate, his
conviction cannot be pronounced as the same has been extinguished by his death.
With
cost against convicted accused.
The case
was forwarded to this Court on automatic review but we referred it to the CA in
accordance with People v. Mateo.[5]
The CA affirmed the RTC decision:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 89 in Criminal Case No. Q-99-80669 sentencing
accused-appellants Elmer dela Cruz and Tranquilino Martinez to DEATH for kidnapping
for ransom is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that they shall pay in
solidum the amount of twenty five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary
damages to the victim, Aaron Dennis Ong.
Finding
that the penalty of death should be imposed, We thereby CERTIFY the case
and elevate the entire record to the Supreme Court for review[6] and
final disposition, pursuant to Section 13 (a & b), Rule 124 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
SO
ORDERED.
We affirm accused-appellants' guilt.
In
his brief, Martinez averred that there was no valid warrant for his arrest when
he was shot in the back by police officers at the time of his arrest. He
recounted that he was merely walking along Roxas Boulevard and was not committing
any illegal act at the time, nor did the arresting officers have any knowledge
of facts indicating that he had just committed a crime. As such, his arrest
without a warrant could not be justified.
We
agree with the CA that, even if his arrest was unlawful because of the absence
of a valid warrant of arrest, he was deemed to have waived his right to assail
the same, as he never bothered to question the legality thereof and, in fact,
even voluntarily entered his plea. In People v. Asis,[7] we held that the accused-appellants
therein were deemed to have waived their right to assail the legality of their
arrest when they voluntarily submitted themselves to the court by entering a
plea, instead of filing a motion to quash the information for lack of
jurisdiction over their person.
Martinez
further argued that the court a quo erred in ruling that he was a
co-conspirator in the crime charged as the identification by the minor victim
that he was one of the perpetrators of the crime was unreliable and that the
testimony of the state witness regarding his complicity in the crime was
doubtful. He harped on the fact that Aaron could not have possibly taken a good
look at the person he later on identified in open court as Martinez because, by
the child's own testimony, the man who handcuffed him was wearing a hat or a
sunvisor which he did not remove during the entire duration of the kidnapping
incident.
It
must be pointed out that this averment goes into the issue of the witness’
credibility. Time and again, we have held that the trial court's evaluation of
the credibility of a witness is entitled to the highest respect as it had the
opportunity to observe the witness’ demeanor on the stand and his manner of
testifying. Trial court judges are in a unique position to ascertain whether or
not a witness is telling the truth. Consequently, unless it is shown that a
trial judge overlooked certain facts of substance and value which, if
considered, might affect the result of the case, his assessment of credibility
must be upheld.[8]
In this case, we find no reason to
overturn the conclusion arrived at by the trial court. It held that Aaron's
testimony was credible as he delivered his testimony in a clear, direct and
positive manner. He positively identified accused-appellant Martinez twice,
from the ID of the accused-appellant shown to him by the police and in open
court, as the man who handcuffed him and drove the family car from his school.
He also categorically stated that he saw him again in the vacant house where he
and De la Cruz were brought.
Moreover,
it cannot be said that Aaron could not have possibly taken a good look at the
man he identified as Martinez by mere reason of the hat or sunvisor which
supposedly effectively concealed the latter’s face throughout the whole ordeal.
It is natural for persons who find themselves thrust into extraordinary
circumstances to remember many of the important details then taking place. The
most natural reaction of victims of crimes is to strive to see the features and
faces of the perpetrators and observe the manner they commit the crime.[9] In this case, it must be noted that
Aaron had several face-to-face encounters with Martinez: he was the one who
first boarded the car; he was the one who handcuffed the child; and he was the
one who drove the car and was thus seated beside him until they fetched Dano in
Batasan Hills.
Consequently,
Martinez's defense of denial and alibi (that he was supposedly with his brother
in Barangay Paltik, Dingalan, Aurora Province on November 4, 5, 8 and 9, 1998,
managing his fishing boat) must crumble
in the face of Aaron's positive and clear identification of him as one of the perpetrators
of the crime. Denial and alibi cannot be given greater evidentiary value than
the testimonies of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. Positive
identification destroys the defense of alibi and renders it impotent,
especially where such identification is credible and categorical.[10]
Besides, for alibi to prevail, the
defense must establish by positive, clear and satisfactory proof that it was
physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at
the time of its commission, and not merely that the accused was then somewhere
else.[11] In the
instant case, Martinez failed to show that it was physically impossible for him
to have been at the scene of the crime. He could have easily traveled from
Aurora Province (located in Central Luzon) to Manila by land. It would have taken
him only a few hours to reach Manila. Thus, there was no physical impossibility
for him to have been present at the scene of the crime when it was committed.
Furthermore,
Martinez’s contention (that his right to produce evidence and witnesses on his
behalf was violated when the trial court refused to grant his request to
present corroborative witnesses to support his alibi) is untenable. The denial
of said request did not result in manifest injustice to Martinez for no amount of
corroborative evidence could alter and reverse the categorical and positive
testimony of the minor pointing to him as one of his kidnappers. Due process of
law is not denied by the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent
evidence, or the testimony of an incompetent witness. Due process is satisfied
when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
their respective sides of the controversy.[12] In this case, there is no showing of
violation of due process which justifies the reversal of the trial court's
findings.
For his part, De la Cruz questioned the trial court's act of
discharging accused Tano as a state witness on two points: Tano did not appear to be the least guilty
among the accused and his testimony was not necessary.
For an accused to be discharged as a state witness, the
following conditions must be present:
When
two or more persons are jointly charged with the commission of any offense,
upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct
one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may
be witnesses for the state when, after requiring the prosecution to present
evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in
support of the discharge, the court is satisfied that:
a. There is absolute necessity for the testimony
of the accused whose discharge is requested;
b. There is no other direct evidence available
for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of
said accused;
c. The testimony of said accused can be
substantially corroborated in its material points;
d. Said accused does not appear to be the most
guilty; and,
e. Said accused has not at any time been
convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.[13]
x x
x
The
provision does not require that a state witness should appear to be the “least
guilty” among the accused. Rather, it provides that he “does not appear to be
the most guilty.” The findings of the
lower court revealed that Tano merely facilitated the commission of the
crime. He merely boarded the car and sat
beside accused-appellant De la Cruz throughout the whole ride and accompanied
accused-appellant Martinez in going back to Batasan Hills after leaving Aaron
and accused-appellant De la Cruz in Bulacan. True, he was the one who placed
the call to Erwin to demand ransom. However, he was neither the mastermind nor
the one who hatched the plan to kidnap Aaron in exchange for money. Clearly, he
did not appear to be the most guilty among the accused. Thus, we uphold the
propriety of the trial court's designation of Tano as state witness.
Moreover,
his testimony was absolutely necessary as it was the only direct evidence
establishing the presence of conspiracy,[14] from the planning stage up to the
commission of the crime.
On
the issue of conspiracy, we hold that the prosecution sufficiently established
it. There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and
decide to commit it. It need not be proven by direct evidence, for it may be
inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime, showing that they acted with common purpose and
design.[15]
The
prosecution was able to present direct evidence of the conspiracy (by state
witness Tano) and to show that the conduct of all the accused overwhelmingly
pointed to the unanimity in design, intent and execution of the crime against
the victim. Each of them performed specific acts according to place and in
close coordination with one another, unmistakably indicating a common purpose
to bring about Aaron’s abduction in exchange for money.
As
to whether or not De la Cruz was a co-conspirator of the other accused, the
records show that he was undoubtedly part of the planned abduction. When the
abduction commenced, De la Cruz even had the presence of mind to close the rear
compartment of the car even after seeing his ward being handcuffed. There was an
opportunity for him to escape since it was not shown that he was forced to board
the car against his will. It was therefore beyond comprehension, to say the
least, why he did not even try to run away from the scene. He clearly boarded
the car on his own free will and allowed his co-accused Martinez to handcuff
him.
Moreover,
De la Cruz again showed no intention of escaping despite another chance to do
so after untying himself. Considering the critical situation they were in, he
even decided to catch some sleep as if it was the most natural thing to do
under such circumstances.
Equally
confounding was the fact that all the other accused left them in the vacant
house and went back to Batasan Hills without leaving anyone to stand guard over
them.
Furthermore,
De la Cruz even tried to cover up for the abductors by telling the witness
Quinano and his companions that their car was used for an “emergency” when the
latter asked what they were doing inside the vacant house. And when one of the
women suggested that the crime be reported to the police, De la Cruz suspiciously
brushed off the suggestion and replied, “Huwag na,” because he would
rather “go home.” All told, these were not actuations of an innocent person
victimized by a kidnap-for-ransom gang. The circumstances indubitably pointed
to the fact that he was one of the authors of the crime.
While this
Court affirms the finding of guilt of accused-appellants, it can no longer
impose the penalty of death in view of RA 9346.[16] Section
2 of RA 9346 mandates that, in lieu of the death penalty, reclusion perpetua
without eligibility for parole should instead be imposed.
In line with prevailing
jurisprudence, the award of P50,000 civil indemnity[17] was
proper. Pursuant to People v. Garalde,[18] P200,000
for moral damages is awarded to Aaron considering his minority.[19]
Moreover, since the crime was attended by a demand for ransom, and by way of
example or correction, Aaron is entitled to P100,000 exemplary damages.[20]
WHEREFORE, the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. HC-CR No. 00947 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATIONS. Elmer De la Cruz and Tranquilino Martinez are found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping for ransom. They are sentenced to reclusion
perpetua with no possibility of parole and ordered to pay, jointly and severally, P50,000
civil indemnity, P200,000 moral damages and P100,000 exemplary
damages to the minor victim, Aaron Dennis Ong.
Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice |
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate
Justice |
|
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO Associate
Justice |
(On Official Leave) MA. ALICIA M. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice
|
|
(On Official Leave) CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate
Justice
|
ADOLFO S.
AZCUNA Associate
Justice |
|
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
MINITA V.
CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice
|
|
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR. Associate
Justice |
(On Official Leave) ANTONIO EDUARDO
B. NACHURA
Associate Justice |
|
RUBEN
T. REYES Associate Justice |
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
* On Official Leave.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo and concurred in by Associate Justices Elvi John S. Asuncion (dismissed from the service) and Noel G. Tijam of the Fifteenth Division of the Court of Appeals. Rollo, pp. 3-26.
[2] Penned by Judge Elsa I. de Guzman. CA rollo, pp. 95-111.
[3] Id., p. 7.
[4] CA rollo, p. 111.
[6] Section 13 (a), Rule 124 as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC.
[7] 439 Phil 707, 720 (2002), citing People v. Bongalon, 425 Phil 96, 119-120 (2002); People v. Whisenhunt, 420 Phil 677, 698 (2001); People v. Castillon III, 439 Phil 92, 103 (2001); and People v. Del Mundo, 418 Phil 740, 756 (2001).
[8] People v. Castillon III, supra.
[9] People v. Martinez, 469 Phil 558, 570 (2004).
[10] People v. Delim, et al., G.R. No. 175942, 13 September 2007.
[11] People v. Tumulak, G.R. No. 177299, 28 November 2007.
[12] People v. Larranaga, 466 Phil 324, 373-374 (2004).
[13] RULES OF COURT, Rule 119, Sec. 17.
[14] People v. Martinez, supra note 9, at 574.
[15] People v. Barcenal, G.R. No. 175925, 17 August 2007, 530 SCRA 706, 726.
[16] Entitled “An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines.”
[17] See People v. Solangon, G.R. No. 172693, 21 November 2007; People v. Yambot, 397 Phil. 23, (2000).
[18] G.R. No. 173055, 13 April 2007.
[19] See also People v. Solangon, supra; People v. Baldogo, 444 Phil. 35, 66 (2003); People v. Garcia, 424 Phil. 158, 194 (2002).
[20] Id.