G.R. No. 180363 – EDGAR Y. TEVES, petitioner, versus THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HERMINIO G. TEVES, respondents.
Promulgated: April 28, 2009
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I fully concur with the ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago. I add these views to further explore the term “moral turpitude” – a term that, while carrying far-reaching effects, embodies a concept that to date has not been given much jurisprudential focus.
I. Historical Roots
The term “moral turpitude” first took
root under the United States (U.S.) immigration laws. Its history can be traced back as far as the 17th
century when the States of Virginia and
In 1951, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
on the constitutionality of the term “moral turpitude” in Jordan v. De George. The case presented only one question: whether
conspiracy to defraud the U.S. of taxes on distilled spirits is a crime
involving moral turpitude within the meaning of Section 19 (a) of the
Immigration Act of 1919 (Immigration Act). Sam De George, an Italian immigrant was
convicted twice of conspiracy to defraud the
Whatever the phrase “involving moral turpitude” may mean in peripheral cases, the decided cases make it plain that crimes in which fraud was an ingredient have always been regarded as involving moral turpitude.xxx Fraud is the touchstone by which this case should be judged.xxx We therefore decide that Congress sufficiently forewarned respondent that the statutory consequence of twice conspiring to defraud the United States is deportation. 
Significantly, the U.S. Congress has
never exactly defined what amounts to a “crime involving moral turpitude.” The legislative history of statutes
containing the moral turpitude standard indicates that Congress left the interpretation
of the term to
[An] act of baseness, vileness, or the depravity in private and social duties which man owes to his fellow man, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man. xxx Act or behavior that gravely violates moral sentiment or accepted moral standards of community and is a morally culpable quality held to be present in some criminal offenses as distinguished from others. xxx The quality of a crime involving grave infringement of the moral sentiment of the community as distinguished from statutory mala prohibita.
In Re Basa, a 1920 case, provided the first instance for the Court to define the term moral turpitude in the context of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the disbarment of a lawyer for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Carlos S. Basa, a lawyer, was convicted of the crime of abduction with consent. The sole question presented was whether the crime of abduction with consent, as punished by Article 446 of the Penal Code of 1887, involved moral turpitude. The Court, finding no exact definition in the statutes, turned to Bouvier’s Law Dictionary for guidance and held:
"Moral turpitude," it has been said, "includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, cited by numerous courts.) Although no decision can be found which has decided the exact question, it cannot admit of doubt that crimes of this character involve moral turpitude. The inherent nature of the act is such that it is against good morals and the accepted rule of right conduct.
early on, the
II. Problems with the Definition of Moral Turpitude
Through the years, the Court has never significantly deviated from the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of moral turpitude as “an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.” This definition is more specific than that used in In re Vinzon where the term moral turpitude was considered as encompassing “everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals.”
Criticisms of moral turpitude as an inexactly defined concept are not unwarranted. First, the current definition of the term is broad. It can be stretched to include most kinds of wrongs in society -- a result that the Legislature could not have intended. This Court itself concluded in IRRI v. NLRC that moral turpitude “is somewhat a vague and indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the process of judicial inclusion or exclusion as the cases are reached” – once again confirming, as late as 1993 in IRRI, our case-by-case approach in determining the crimes involving moral turpitude.
Second, the definition also assumes the existence of a universally recognized code for socially acceptable behavior -- the “private and social duties which man owes to his fellow man, or to society in general”; moral turpitude is an act violating these duties. The problem is that the definition does not state what these duties are, or provide examples of acts which violate them. Instead, it provides terms such as “baseness,” “vileness,” and “depravity,” which better describe moral reactions to an act than the act itself. In essence, they are “conclusory but non-descriptive.” To be sure, the use of morality as a norm cannot be avoided, as the term “moral turpitude” contains the word “moral” and its direct connotation of right and wrong. “Turpitude,” on the other hand, directly means “depravity” which cannot be appreciated without considering an act’s degree of being right or wrong. Thus, the law, in adopting the term “moral turpitude,” necessarily adopted a concept involving notions of morality – standards that involve a good measure of subjective consideration and, in terms of certainty and fixity, are far from the usual measures used in law.
Third, as a legal standard, moral turpitude fails to inform anyone of
what it requires.
It has been said that the loose terminology of moral turpitude hampers
uniformity since … [i]t is hardly to be expected that a word which baffle
judges will be more easily interpreted by laymen. This led Justice Jackson to conclude in
Crimes Categorized as Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude
Since the early 1920 case of In re Basa, the Court has maintained its case-by-case categorization of crimes on the basis of moral turpitude and has labeled specific crimes as necessarily involving moral turpitude. The following is a list, not necessarily complete, of the crimes adjudged to involve moral turpitude:
1. Abduction with consent
6. Estafa through falsification of a document
7. Attempted Bribery
10. Murder, whether consummated or attempted
13. Illicit Sexual Relations with a Fellow Worker
14. Violation of BP Bldg. 22
15. Falsification of Document
16. Intriguing against Honor
17. Violation of the Anti-Fencing Law
18. Violation of Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Drug-pushing)
21. Direct Bribery
22. Frustrated Homicide
Zari v. Flores is one case that has provided jurisprudence its own list of crimes involving moral turpitude, namely: adultery, concubinage, rape, arson, evasion of income tax, barratry, bigamy, blackmail, bribery, criminal conspiracy to smuggle opium, dueling, embezzlement, extortion, forgery, libel, making fraudulent proof of loss on insurance contract, murder, mutilation of public records, fabrication of evidence, offenses against pension laws, perjury, seduction under the promise of marriage, estafa, falsification of public document, and estafa thru falsification of public document.
Crimes Categorized as Crimes Not Involving Moral Turpitude
The Court, on the other hand, has also
had the occasion to
categorically rule that certain crimes do not involve moral turpitude, namely:
1. Minor transgressions of the law (i.e., conviction for speeding)
2. Illegal recruitment
3. Slight physical injuries and carrying of deadly weapon (Illegal possession of firearms)
4. Indirect Contempt
III. Approaches and Standards.
Even a cursory examination of the above lists readily reveals that while the concept of “moral turpitude” does not have one specific definition that lends itself to easy and ready application, the Court has been fairly consistent in its understanding and application of the term and has not significantly deviated from what it laid down in In re Basa. The key element, directly derived from the word “turpitude,” is the standard of depravity viewed from a scale of right and wrong.
The application of this depravity standard can be made from at least three perspectives or approaches, namely: from the objective perspective of the act itself, irrespective of whether or not the act is a crime; from the perspective of the crime itself, as defined through its elements; and from the subjective perspective that takes into account the perpetrator’s level of depravity when he committed the crime.
The Court best expressed the first approach in Zari v. Flores where the Court saw the involvement of moral turpitude where an act is intrinsically immoral, regardless of whether it is punishable by law or not. The Court emphasized that moral turpitude goes beyond being merely mala prohibita; the act itself must be inherently immoral. Thus, this approach requires that the committed act itself be examined, divorced from its characterization as a crime.
A ruling that exemplifies this
approach is that made in the
Gambling has been in existence since time immemorial. Card playing for small stakes is a common accompaniment of social life; small bets on horse racing and the “policy or numbers games” are diversions of the masses. That such enterprises exist surreptitiously is a matter of common knowledge. Many countries permit it under a license system. In ancient times laws were enacted to discourage people from gambling on the theory that the State had first claim upon their time and energy, and at later dates antigambling laws were aimed especially at the activity as practiced by the working classes. Present-day movements to suppress gambling are also tinged with other considerations. In urban communities in the past few decades the purely religious opposition to gambling has tended to become less violent because certain activities, highly reputable according to prevailing social standards, have come more and more to resemble it. Prohibition against gambling has had something of a police rather than a truly penal character. At all times an important fact in arousing antagonism in gambling has been the association, almost inevitable, with sharp practice. In established societies more or less serious attempts are everywhere made, however, to prohibit or to regulate gambling in its more notorious forms.
It would appear that statutes permitting gambling, such as those under discussion, rest primarily on the theory that they are in the interest of public policy: that is to regulate and restrict any possible abuse, to obviate cheating and other corrupt practices that may result if uncontrolled.
From this discussion, the Court went on to conclude that gambling is a malum prohibitum that is not intrinsically evil and, thus, is not a crime involving moral turpitude.
With the same approach, but with a
different result, is Office of the Court
Administrator v. Librado, a case involving drug possession. Librado, a Deputy Sheriff in
In People v. Yambot, the Court categorically ruled that the possession of a deadly weapon does not involve moral turpitude since the act of carrying a weapon by itself is not inherently wrong in the absence of a law punishing it. Likewise, the Court acknowledged in Court Administrator v. San Andres that illegal recruitment does not involve moral turpitude since it is not in itself an evil act – being ordinarily an act in the ordinary course of business – in the absence of the a law prohibiting it.
The second approach is to look at the act committed through its elements as a crime. In Paras v. Vailoces, the Court recognized that as a “general rule, all crimes of which fraud is an element are looked on as involving moral turpitude.” This is the same conclusion that the U.S. Supreme Court made in Jordan, i.e., that crimes requiring fraud or intent to defraud always involve moral turpitude.
Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections is a case in point that uses the second approach and is one case where the Court even dispensed with the review of facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime since Dela Torre did not assail his conviction. Dela Torre was disqualified by the Comelec from running as Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna on the basis of his conviction for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law. Dela Torre appealed to this Court to overturn his disqualification on the ground that the crime of fencing is not a crime involving moral turpitude. The Court ruled that moral turpitude is deducible from the third element. Actual knowledge by the fence of the fact that property received is stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of one’s rightful property as that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude.
To be sure, the elements of the crime can be a critical factor in determining moral turpitude if the second approach is used in the crimes listed above as involving moral turpitude. In Villaber v. Commission on Elections, the Court, by analyzing the elements alone of the offense under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, held that the “presence of the second element manifest moral turpitude” in that “a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals.” The same conclusion was reached by the Court in Magno v. Commission on Elections, when it ruled that direct bribery involves moral turpitude, thus:
Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the offender agrees to accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from performing an official duty in exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious intent on the part of the offender to renege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen and society in general. Also, the fact that the offender takes advantage of his office and position is a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the public. It is a conduct clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty and good morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. [Emphasis supplied]
The third approach, the subjective approach, essentially takes the offender and his acts into account in light of the attendant circumstances of the crime: was he motivated by ill will indicating depravity? The Court apparently used this approach in Ao Lin v. Republic, a 1964 case, when it held “that the use of a meter stick without the corresponding seal of the Internal Revenue Office by one who has been engaged in business for a long time, involves moral turpitude because it involves a fraudulent use of a meter stick, not necessarily because the Government is cheated of the revenue involved in the sealing of the meter stick, but because it manifests an evil intent on the part of the petitioner to defraud customers purchasing from him in respect to the measurement of the goods purchased.”
In IRRI v. NLRC, the International Rice Research Institute terminated the employment contract of Nestor Micosa on the ground that he has been convicted of the crime of homicide – a a crime involving moral turpitude. The Court refused to characterize the crime of homicide as one of moral turpitude in light of the circumstances of its commission. The Court ruled:
These facts show that Micosa’s intention was not to slay the victim but only to defend his person. The appreciation in his favor of the mitigating circumstances of self-defense and voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any aggravating circumstances demonstrate that Micosa’s character and intentions were not inherently vile, immoral or unjust. [italics supllied].
The Court stressed, too, not only the subjective element, but the need for the appreciation of facts in considering whether moral turpitude exists – an unavoidable step under the third approach. Thus, the Court explained:
This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral turpitude. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. [Emphasis supplied]
In contrast, while IRRI refused to characterize the crime of homicide as one of moral turpitude, the recent case of Soriano v. Dizon held that based on the circumstances, the crime of frustrated homicide committed by the respondent involved moral turpitude. In Soriano, complainant Soriano filed a disbarment case against respondent Atty. Manuel Dizon alleging that the crime of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude under the circumstances surrounding its commission, and was a sufficient ground for his disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. The Court after noting the factual antecedents of IRRI held that –
The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the circumstances clearly evince the moral turpitude of respondent and his unworthiness to practice law. Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot complainant when the latter least expected it. The act of aggression shown by respondent will not be mitigated by the fact that he was hit once and his arm twisted by complainant. Under the circumstances, those were reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off the lawyer’s assault.
We also consider the trial court’s finding of treachery as a further indication of the skewed morals of respondent. He shot the victim when the latter was not in a position to defend himself. In fact, under the impression that the assault was already over, the unarmed complainant was merely returning the eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the latter unexpectedly shot him. To make matters worse, respondent wrapped the handle of his gun with a handkerchief so as not to leave fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed his sly intention to escape punishment for his crime.
The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. By his conduct, respondent revealed his extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. As it were, he acted like a god on the road, who deserved to be venerated and never to be slighted. Clearly, his inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His overreaction also evinced vindictiveness, which was definitely an undesirable trait in any individual, more so in a lawyer. In the tenacity with which he pursued complainant, we see not the persistence of a person who has been grievously wronged, but the obstinacy of one trying to assert a false sense of superiority and to exact revenge.  [Emphasis supplied]
Laguitan v. Tinio, expressed in terms of the protection of the sanctity of marriage, also necessarily looked at the subjective element because the offender’s concubinage involved an assault on the basic social institution of marriage. Another subjective element case, in terms of looking at the damage wrought by the offender’s act, is People v. Jamero where the Court disregarded the appellants’ argument that the trial court erred in ordering the discharge of Inocencio Retirado from the Information in order to make him a state witness, since he has been previously convicted of the crime of malicious mischief – a crime involving moral turpitude. The Court said:
In the absence of any evidence to show the gravity and the nature of the malicious mischief committed, We are not in a position to say whether or not the previous conviction of malicious mischief proves that accused had displayed the baseness, the vileness and the depravity which constitute moral turpitude. And considering that under paragraph 3 of Article 329 of the Revised Penal Code, any deliberate act (not constituting arson or other crimes involving destruction) causing damage in the property of another, may constitute the crime of malicious mischief, We should not make haste in declaring that such crime involves moral turpitude without determining, at least, the value of the property destroyed and/or the circumstances under which the act of destroying was committed. [Emphasis supplied]
Thus, again, the need for a factual determination was considered necessary.
In sum, a survey of jurisprudence from the earliest case of In Re Basa to the recent case of Soriano v. Dizon  shows that the Court has used varying approaches, but used the same standard or measure – the degree of attendant depravity. The safest approach to avoid being misled in one’s conclusion is to apply all three approaches, if possible, and to evaluate the results from each of the approaches. A useful caveat in the evaluation is to resolve any doubt in favor of the perpetrator, as a conclusion of moral turpitude invariably signifies a worse consequence for him or her.
IV. The Approaches Applied to TEVES
The Objective Approach
The crime for which petitioner Teves was convicted (possession of pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit) is, at its core, related to gambling – an act that by contemporary community standards is not per se immoral. Other than the ruling heretofore cited on this point, judicial notice can be taken of state-sponsored gambling activities in the country that, although not without controversy, is generally regarded to be within acceptable moral limits. The ponencia correctly noted that prior to the enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991, mere possession by a public officer of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not expressly prohibited. This bit of history alone is an indicator that, objectively, no essential depravity is involved even from the standards of a holder of a public office. This reasoning led the ponencia to conclude that “its illegality does not mean that violation thereof . . . makes such possession of interest inherently immoral.”
From the Perspective of the Elements of the Crime
Under this approach, we determine whether a crime involves moral turpitude based solely on our analysis of the elements of the crime alone.
The essential elements of the offense of possession of prohibited interest (Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law) for which the petitioner was convicted are:
1. The accused is a public officer;
2. He has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction; and
3. He is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or any law.
From the perspective of moral turpitude, the third element is the critical element. This element shows that the holding of interest that the law covers is not a conduct clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty and good morals; it is illegal solely because of the prohibition that exists in law or in the Constitution. Thus, no depravity immediately leaps up or suggests itself based on the elements of the crime committed.
The Subjective Approach
This approach is largely the ponencia’s approach, as it expressly stated that “a determination of all surrounding circumstances of the violation of the statute must be considered.” In doing this, the ponencia firstly considered that the petitioner did not use his official capacity in connection with the interest in the cockpit, not that he hid this interest by transferring it to his wife, as the transfer took effect before the effectivity of the law prohibiting the possession of interest. The ponencia significantly noted, too, that the violation was not intentionally committed in a manner contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals, but due simply to Teves’ lack of awareness or ignorance of the prohibition. This, in my view, is the clinching argument that no moral turpitude can be involved as no depravity can be gleaned where intent is clearly absent.
To recapitulate, all three approaches point to the conclusion that no moral turpitude was involved in the crime Teves committed, with the predominant reasons being the first (or objective) and the third (or subjective) approaches. Analysis in this manner, with one approach reinforcing another, results in clear and easily appreciated conclusions.
ARTURO D. BRION
 Jordan v. De George, 341
 Brian C. Harms, Redefining “Crimes of Moral Turpitude”: A Proposal to Congress, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 259, 261 (2001).
 Supra note 1, p. 227.
 Derrick Moore, “Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude”: Why the Void-For-Vagueness Argument is Still Available and Meritorious, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 813, 816 (2008).
 Effective September 1, 1901.
 Now RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, Section 27.
 ACT NO. 2711, Section 234,
 ACT NO. 3613, Section 45,
 COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 1, Section
 COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 473,
 COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 613, Section
 REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Rule 119, Section 17.
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, Section 2.
 BATAS PAMBANSA
BLG. 337, Section 60,
 BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881,
 41 Phil. 275, 276 (1920).
 Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 121592, July 5, 1996, 258 SCRA 483, 487, citing Zari v. Flores, 94 SCRA 317, 323 (1979).
 G.R. No. 561, April 27, 1967, 19 SCRA 815.
 Cited in Rafael Christopher Yap, Bouncing Doctrine: Re-Examining the Supreme Court’s Pronouncements of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 as a Crime of Moral Turpitude (2006), p. 13 (unpublished J.D. thesis, Ateneo de Manila University, on file with the Professional Schools Library, Ateneo de Manila University).
 Supra note 8, p. 816.
 Supra note 1, p. 235.
 Supra note 8, p. 814.
 G.R. No. 97239, May 12, 1993, 221 SCRA 760.
 Nate Carter, Shocking The Conscience of Mankind: Using International Law To Define “Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude” In Immigration Law, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 955, 959 (2006).
 A similar concept is “obscenity,” whose standards have been in continuous development in U.S. Supreme Court rulings. See Roth v. United States; Albert v. California, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) and Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973). Only a decade after Roth, Justice Harlan observed that “[t]he subject of obscenity has produced a variety of views among the members of the Court unmatched in any other course of constitutional adjudication.” As evidence, Justice Harlan noted that in the thirteen obscenity cases decided in the decade after Roth, there were “a total of 55 separate opinions among the Justices;” Geoffrey R. Stone et al., Constitutional Law, 1255, (1996 ed.) citing Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704-705, 705 n.1 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
 Supra note 30, p. 959.
 Supra note 8, p. 813, citing Note, Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude, 43 HARV. L. REV. 117, 121 (1930).
 Supra note 1, p. 242.
 Supra note 25, pp. 20-21.
 Supra note 22.
 In Re Marcelino Lontok, 43 Phil. 293 (1922).
 In Re Juan C. Isada, 60 Phil 915 (1934); Macarrubo v. Macarrubo, A.C. No. 6148, February 27, 2004, 424 SCRA 42 citing Laguitan v. Tinio, A.C. No. 3049, December 4, 1989, 179 SCRA 837.
 In Re Atty. Tranquilino Rovero, 92 Phil. 128 (1952).
 Mondano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143 (1955).
 In the Matter of Eduardo A. Abesamis, 102 Phil.1182 (1958).
 In Re Dalmacio De
 Tak Ng v. Republic of the
 Paras v. Vailoces, Adm. Case No. 439,
 Can v. Galing, G.R. No. L-54258,
 In Re: Atty. Isidro P. Vinzon, Admin. Case No. 561,
 Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. L-63652
 People v. Tuanda, A.M. No. 3360, January 30, 1990, 181 SCRA 692; Paolo C. Villaber v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.148326, November 15, 2001, 369 SCRA 126; Selwyn F. Lao v. Atty. Robert W. Medel, A.C. No. 5916, July 1, 2003, 405 SCRA 227.
 University of the
 Betguen v. Masangcay, A.M. No. P-93-822,
 Supra note 23 at 483.
 Office of the Court Administrator
v. Librado, A.M. No. P-94-1089,
 People v. Sorrel, G.R. No. 119332,
 Campilan v. Campilan Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-96-1100,
 Magno v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 147904,
 Soriano v. Dizon, A.C. No. 6792,
 Adm. No. (2170-MC) P-1356,
 Supra note 25 at 21.
 Ng Teng Lin v. Republic, 103 Phil. 484 (1959).
 Court Administrator v. San Andres, A.M. No. P-89-345,
 People v. Yambot, G.R. No. 120350,
 Garcia v. De Vera, A.C. No. 6052,
 Supra note 59.
 Supra note 54.
 Supra note 25, p. 23.
 Supra note 59, p. 323.
 Supra note 64.
 Supra note 63.
 Supra note 45.
 Supra note 1, p. 228.
 Supra note 23.
 Supra note 50, p. 134.
 Supra note 57.
 G.R. No. L-18506,
 Supra note 29.
 Supra note 58.
 Supra note 58, pp. 10-11.
 Supra note 39.
 Supra note 25, p. 24.
 G.R. No. L-19852,
 Supra note 22.
 Supra note 58.
 Supra note 67.
 Ponencia, p. 9.