FIRST DIVISION
M+W ZANDER PHILIPPINES, INC. and ROLF
WILTSCHEK,
Petitioners,
- versus -
Respondent.
G.R. No.
169173
Present:
PUNO,
C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
Promulgated:
June 5, 2009
x
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O
N
PUNO, C.J.:
At bar is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking the reversal of the decision,[1] dated
May 31, 2005, of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 87597, entitled
“Trinidad M. Enriquez v. National Labor Relations Commission, M+W Zander
Philippines, Inc. and Rolf Wiltschek.” The decision of the Court of Appeals set
aside the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and ruled the
dismissal of respondent Trinidad M. Enriquez (Enriquez) as illegal. The Court
of Appeals also ordered petitioners M+W Zander Philippines, Inc. and Rolf
Wiltschek to reinstate respondent to her former position without loss of
seniority rights and privileges and awarded her moral damages and attorney’s
fees.
The
facts are as follows.
On
June 4, 2001, respondent Enriquez was hired on probationary basis as the
Administration Manager and Executive Assistant to the General Manager of petitioner
M+W Zander Philippines, Inc. (M+W Zander), a multi-national corporation engaged
in construction and facilities management. She was confirmed as a permanent
employee on December 4, 2001. As Administration Manager, respondent’s
responsibilities include taking charge of the management of administrative
personnel assigned to the head office, as well as the security of the company
staff and premises and the implementation of company rules. As Executive
Assistant to the General Manager, respondent was in charge of scheduling,
monitoring and tracking all the General Manager’s appointments and personal
finances and serving as the liaison among the General Manager, the Division
Heads, the Administrative Staff and external contacts.
In
January 2002, M+W Zander relieved its General Manager, Mr. Eric Van Stiegeren,
and in his place appointed Mr. Rolf
Wiltschek (Wiltschek). The appointment of Wiltschek as the Acting
General Manager was announced in a meeting held on January 31, 2002. On the
same day, a Letter of Appeal[2] was
signed by 29 employees of M+W Zander, opposing the appointment of Wiltschek.
The
letter states:
TO: MR. KLAUS GAERTNER
Managing Director
CC: MR.
HELMUT KURZBOECK
CC: MISS
KITY LEE
DATE: January 31, 2002
LETTER OF APPEAL
We are writing you this Letter of Appeal in the hope
of expressing our concern and sentiments on the appointment of Rolf Wiltschek
as the new General Manager.
We are appealing for your kind attention and
consideration on this matter as part of the m+w Zander family worldwide. We
know that above anything else, the well-being of the company is the first
priority of every employee from whom he derives his livelihood and that of his
family. However, we believe that Rolf Wiltschek as the General Manager here in
the
For how can we have a person represent the company
when we cannot even respect him as a person. His human behavior and
relationship, his manners and etiquette appear less than the accepted norms in
a civilized society. His sarcasm and arrogance and seeming feeling of
superiority as expressed by his verbal abuses on his contemporaries and
subordinates is unacceptable even in a poor country like the
We wish to relay to you our extreme disappointment on
the replacement of Mr. Eric Van Stijgeren with the sudden appointment of Rolf
Wiltschek as the new General Manager. We wish to convey to you our apprehension
on the fate that awaits m+w Zander here in the
Please help
us save m+w Zander (Phils.) Inc.
Respectfully yours,
M+W Zander- Manila Head Office STAFF
All of the Undersigned:
|
1. ABEC TAYAG (sgd.) |
|
2. CARLITO GARCIA (sgd.) |
|
3. MARK JOSEPH AMADOR (sgd.) |
|
4. CHRISTINE SAN AGUSTIN (sgd.) |
|
5. EMMANUEL PIELAGO, JR. (sgd.) |
|
6. |
|
7. JOANNE A. MEDIARITO (sgd.) |
|
8. MICHAEL M. ILAGAN (sgd.) |
|
9. DIANE F. COMINTAN (sgd.) |
|
10. ERIC V. NAPOLITAN (sgd.) |
|
11. RAYMOND C. JOSE (sgd.) |
|
12. CHE BONBON (sgd.) |
|
13. POCHOLO G. RATON (sgd.) |
|
14. JON-JON IBARRA (sgd.) |
|
15. MICHELLE DE |
|
16. |
|
17. VIRGILIO G. NATIVIDAD (sgd.) |
|
18. CELSA L. BAG-AO (sgd.) |
|
19. ALLAN RIVERA (sgd.) |
|
20. RANDY TECSON (sgd.) |
|
21. JOY P. ESGUERRA (sgd.) |
|
22. LARRY N. MARASIGAN (sgd.) |
|
23. ELMER M. ARANA (sgd.) |
|
24. ALDRIN EVANGELISTA (sgd.) |
|
25. EDWARD A. BORJA (sgd.) |
|
26. ERNESTO M. ANTIQUIA (sgd.) |
|
27. JESS DELA CRUZ (sgd.) |
|
28. P.R. SIMPLICIANO (sgd.) |
|
29. R.L. CRUZ (sgd.) |
The same appeal from the employees at the site to
follow.[3]
A day after the Letter of Appeal was
released, a number of employees did not report to work.
Petitioners allege that after the
announcement of Wiltschek as the new General Manager, respondent actively
solicited signatures for a letter opposing the appointment of Wiltschek (Letter
of Appeal). The petitioners claim that Enriquez used her influence and moral
ascendancy to coerce several employees into signing the letter of appeal.[4]
They referred to Affidavits of Mark Joseph M. Amador (Amador),[5]
Randy R. Tecson (Tecson)[6]
and Patrocinio R. Simpliciano,[7]
M+W Zander’s Accounting Assistant, Network Administrator and Contract
Administrator, respectively, which state that respondent sought their signature
for the Letter of Appeal. Amador stated in his affidavit[8]
that on February 1, 2002 one Abelardo Tayag asked him not to go to work and
Enriquez only called him to confirm that he did not report for work. In Tecson’s
affidavit,[9]
it was stated that on February 1, 2002, he received a call from Enriquez in his
mobile phone telling him not to report to work since other employees will not
report to work and that he should just file for a sick leave since they were
doing the same. Tecson said he was already on his way to the office and refused
to follow Enriquez.
Upon discovering respondent Enriquez’s
participation in drafting and in circulating the Letter of Appeal, as well as
in the alleged work stoppage that occurred a day after the release of the
Letter, M+W Zander sent a Notice[10]
to respondent Enriquez, requiring her to explain within 48 hours from receipt
of the notice why no disciplinary action should be taken against her for
willful breach of trust and using her authority and/or influence as
Administration Manager of M+W Zander over her subordinates to stage a “no work day”
on February 1, 2002. It was indicated that willful breach of trust has a
corresponding penalty of dismissal. Meanwhile, respondent Enriquez was placed
under preventive suspension for 15 working days.
Respondent Enriquez signed a
statement,[11]
dated February 5, 2002, denying that she used her authority and/or influence as
Administration Manager and Executive Assistant to the General Manager to compel
her co-employees to stage the illegal work stoppage. She also denied that she performed
any act to disrupt the vital operations of the company. She said that when she
arrived at work on February 2, 2002, she was given a notice of suspension for
15 days and was instructed to leave the premises without being given an
explanation. Her personal belongings were inspected and she was escorted out of
the premises like a criminal. Respondent stated in her affidavit that her
colleagues were given an order that if she is seen in the premises of the
company, the administration should be informed immediately and that in no case
should respondent be allowed to enter the premises of the company except if she
is with an authorized escort of the petitioner company.[12]
On February 14, 2002, an
administrative investigation and an administrative hearing were conducted by
the petitioner. During the administrative hearing, the respondent submitted
several signed statements from her subordinates, such as Cecilia Benito,[13]
the receptionist; Michelle De Mesa,[14]
the Engineering Administrative Assistant; Joy Esguerra,[15]
an Administrative Assistant, and Christine Roma San Agustin;[16]
all saying that they were never advised
or prevailed upon by the respondent not to report to work.
Sales Engineer Allan Ordinario Rivera
(Rivera) admitted before the investigating panel that he was the one who
instigated the no work day on February 1, 2002, but he was not charged by the
petitioners. We quote Rivera’s statement:
14
FEBRUARY 2002
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
IN RELATION TO THE ALLEGATIONS MADE AGAINST MS. TRINIDAD
ENRIQUEZ, I ALLAN O. RIVERA REQUEST TO BE ACKNOWLEDGED & RECOGNIZED THROUGH
MY OWN INITIATIVE & NOT FORCED TO PRESENT THIS WRITTEN STATEMENT TO CLARIFY
WHAT REALLY TRANSPIRED ON JANUARY 31, 2002.
IT WAS ME [sic] WHO GAVE INSTRUCTION TO THOSE PRESENT
THAT EVENING OF JANUARY 31, 2002 NOT TO REPORT FOR WORK THE FOLLOWING DAY[,]
FEBRUARY 01, 2002 (FRIDAY).
IT WAS ALSO I, WHO INVITED MS. TRINIDAD ENRIQUEZ TO
JOIN US, WHO WAS THEN LATER ACCUSED OF INSTIGATING THE SAID “NO WORK DAY SHOW,”
WHEREAS, IT WAS I WHO INSTIGATED THE INCIDENT.
FURTHER MS. TRINIDAD ENRIQUEZ, ASIDE FROM COMING LATE
EVENING, SHE ONLY STAYED FOR LESS THAN AN HOUR, THAT THE ACCUSATION BY SOME OF
THE INDIVIDUALS IS NOT TRUE, SINCE SOME HAD ALREADY LEFT & MOST OF THE
PARTICIPANTS DID NOT ARRIVED [sic] YET.
THIS IS TO ATTEST TO THE TRUTH OF THE ABOVE.
(Sgd.)
ALLAN ORDINARIO RIVERA
SALES ENGINEER[17]
Out of the
eight subordinates who gave their statements during the administrative
investigation, it was only Stanley Mosende (Mosende) who stated that he was
influenced by respondent Enriquez not to report for work.[18]
It appears, however, that Mosende was not absent from work based on the signed
attendance sheet, which showed that he reported to the office at 5:00 p.m. and
signed out at 7:00 p.m.[19] The accounts of Mosende are incongruous with
the statement of Tecson, the Network Administrator. Tecson submitted a written statement
declaring that around 8:00 a.m. of February 1, 2002, he received a text message
from Mosende and from Wally Borja asking him not to go to the office.[20]
He did not mention the respondent. Later on, he contradicted his earlier
statement when he submitted another affidavit that was attached to the Petition
for Review of petitioner M+W Zander, this time stating that it was respondent
Enriquez who called him up in his mobile phone to tell him not to report to
work.
On March 1, 2002, a Notice of
Termination[21] was
received by respondent informing her that her services as Administration
Manager and Executive Assistant to the General Manager of M+W Zander are
terminated effective the same day. The respondent was found liable for “willful
breach of trust and confidence in using [her] authority and/or influence as
Administrative Manager of M+W Zander Philippines over [her] subordinate to
stage a ‘no work day’ last February 1, 2002, which in turn disrupted vital
operations in the Company.”[22]
On the same day of her receipt of the
Notice of Termination, respondent filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal with
the Arbitration Office of the NLRC. Respondent Enriquez alleges that petitioners
based her termination on mere speculation since there were a number of
employees who reported to work despite signing the letter of appeal, and
despite the absence of some of the employees, the company still continued its
operations that day.
Labor Arbiter Edgar B. Bisana held
that respondent Enriquez was illegally dismissed.[23]
Both petitioners, M+W Zander and Wiltschek, were ordered to reinstate
respondent without loss of seniority rights and privileges, and to pay
respondent full backwages and benefits from the time compensation was withheld
from her up to her actual reinstatement. The petitioners were further ordered
to pay P100,000.00 as moral damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages, as well as attorney’s fees.
The NLRC reversed the decision of the
Labor Arbiter and found that respondent was not illegally dismissed because she
committed serious misconduct which destroyed the trust and confidence of the
management in her.[24]
The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of
the NLRC and reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter, declaring that the
dismissal
of respondent was illegal.[25]
The petitioners were ordered to reinstate respondent to her former position
without loss of seniority rights and privileges. The Court of Appeals deleted
the award of exemplary damages and reduced the award of moral damages to P25,000.00.
The award of attorney’s fees was also affirmed.
At issue in this petition[26]
is whether respondent was illegally dismissed by petitioners. Consequently, it
must also be determined whether moral damages and attorney’s fees should be
awarded, if respondent was illegally dismissed, and whether Wiltschek should be
personally liable together with M+W Zander.
After a thorough review of the
records, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and find that respondent
was illegally dismissed by petitioner M+W Zander.
The sole ground for respondent’s termination by petitioners
is “willful breach of trust and confidence in using [her] authority and/or influence
as Administrative Manager of ZANDER over [her] subordinate to stage a ‘no work
day’ last February 1, 2002.”[27]
Article 282 (c) of the Labor Code allows an employer to
terminate the services of an employee for loss of trust and confidence. [28] Certain guidelines must be observed
for the employer to terminate an employee for loss of trust and
confidence. We held in General Bank and Trust Company v. Court of
Appeals,[29] viz.:
[L]oss of confidence should not be simulated. It
should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or
unjustified. Loss of confidence may not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of
overwhelming evidence to the contrary. It must be genuine, not a mere
afterthought to justify earlier action taken in bad faith.[30]
The
first requisite for dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and confidence is
that the employee concerned must be one holding a position of trust and
confidence.
There
are two classes of positions of trust: managerial employees and fiduciary
rank-and-file employees.
Managerial
employees are defined as those vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay
down management policies and to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall,
discharge, assign or discipline employees or effectively recommend such
managerial actions.[31] They
refer to those whose primary duty consists of the management of the
establishment in which they are employed or of a department or a subdivision
thereof, and to other officers or members of the managerial staff.[32] Officers
and members of the managerial staff perform work directly related to management
policies of their employer and customarily and regularly exercise discretion
and independent judgment.[33]
The
second class or fiduciary rank-and-file employees consist of cashiers,
auditors, property custodians, etc., or those who, in the normal exercise of
their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money or property.[34] These
employees, though rank-and-file, are routinely charged with the care and
custody of the employer’s money or property, and are thus classified as
occupying positions of trust and confidence.
In
the case at bar, respondent was employed as the Administration Manager and the
Executive Assistant to the General Manager. The responsibilities of the
Administration Manager include:
-
To take charge of the
management of Administrative personnel assigned to the head office in so far as
administrative functions are concerned (Administrative Assistants assigned to the Division heads
and other managerial positions except HRD);
-
To take charge of the over-all security for
the company staff, premises, and sensitive areas; to guard against unauthorized
entry in sensitive areas (as determined by the management committee);
-
To take charge of the
implementation of company rules on housekeeping, cleanliness and security
for all occupants of the Head Office in coordination with the company Division
Heads and HRD;
-
To monitor attendance of all administrative personnel and enforce
applicable company rules pertaining thereto;
-
To take charge of the maintenance,
upkeep and inventory of all company property within the head office;
-
To take charge of the timely provision of supplies and equipment
covered by the proper requisition documents within the head office;
-
To take charge of traffic, tracking, and distribution of all incoming
and outgoing correspondence, packages and facsimile messages;
-
To take care of all official travel arrangements and documentation by
company personnel;
-
To ensure the proper allocation of company cars assigned to the Head
Office; and
-
To coordinate schedule and documentation of regular staff meetings and
one-on-one meetings as required by EVS and the Division Heads.[35]
(Emphasis supplied.)
The
duties of the Executive Assistant to the General Manager are as follows:
-
To take care of the scheduling, monitoring, and tracking of all the
GM’s appointments;
-
To serve as liaison between the GM, the Division Heads, the
Administrative Staff and external contacts;
-
To take care of immigration concerns and corresponding documents for
the GM and the company expatriates;
-
To effectively handle, monitor, and document calls for the GM;
-
To handle personal financials (Banking/Bills) for the GM and
-
To perform any other tasks relative to the above functions which may be
assigned from time to time by the GM.[36]
Though
respondent’s position is designated as the Administration Manager of M+W
Zander, it does not automatically mean that she occupies a position of trust
and confidence. It is not the job title but the actual work that the employee
performs that determines whether he or she occupies a position of trust and
confidence.[37] Respondent’s duties as
the Administration Manager include management of the administrative assistants
who are assigned to the division heads, in so far as their administrative
functions are concerned. She also
takes charge of the implementation of company rules on housekeeping and
cleanliness, oversees the security of the premises and the sensitive areas of
the company, monitors the inventory of company property, and ensures the timely
provision of supplies and equipment. The position of an Administration Manager
may thus be properly considered as a managerial position, being a head of
administrative assistants of other divisions, and because of the performance of
work directly related to management policies and company rules.
The
second requisite of terminating an employee for loss of trust and confidence is
that there must be an act that would justify the loss of trust and confidence.[38] To be
a valid cause for dismissal, the loss of confidence must be based on a willful
breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts.[39]
We find that it was not established
that respondent used her authority to influence her subordinates to stage a “no
work day”; and assuming that she performed this act as alleged by petitioners,
it does not satisfy the jurisprudential requirements for valid termination due to
loss of trust and confidence.
Loss of trust and confidence stems
from a breach of trust founded on a dishonest, deceitful or fraudulent
act. In the case at bar, respondent did
not commit any act which was dishonest or deceitful. She did not use her authority
as the Administration Manager to misappropriate company property nor did she
abuse the trust reposed in her by petitioners with respect to her
responsibility to implement company rules. The most that can be attributed to respondent is that she
influenced a single subordinate, without exerting any force or making any
threats, not to report to work. This does not constitute dishonest or deceitful
conduct which would justify the conclusion of loss of trust and confidence.
We
are convinced that respondent's dismissal cannot justifiably be sustained since
the findings in this case and whatever investigations may have been made by
petitioners miserably fail to establish culpability on respondent’s part. While
dishonesty or disloyalty of an employee is not to be condoned, neither should a
condemnation on that ground be tolerated on the basis of suspicions spawned by
speculative inferences.[40]
Petitioners anchored the termination
of respondent on the statement made by a single subordinate, Mosende, which was
made during the administrative investigation conducted by petitioners. Mosende
stated that respondent, as his superior, told him not to report to work on
February 1, 2002.[41]
It was only Mosende who said that respondent forced him not to report to work on
February 1, 2002. During the administrative investigation, the rest of respondent’s
subordinates did not identify respondent as the one who influenced them not to
go to work on February 1, 2002.
The act of influencing a single
subordinate not to report to work is insufficient to merit the harsh and grave
penalty of dismissal. The records are bereft of any evidence to prove that respondent
in fact coerced a considerable number of employees to stage the “no work day.” Petitioners
may not arbitrarily assert loss of trust and confidence in respondent based on the
lone affidavit of Mosende, in the face of overwhelming evidence to the
contrary, including affidavits from several subordinates of respondent and the
categorical statement of Rivera that he was the one who influenced other
employees to stage the “no work day.”
We note that while 29 other employees
signed the Letter of Appeal, and several employees joined the alleged work
stoppage, it was only respondent who was singled out and dismissed. These protest
activities bear out the general sentiment of discontent within the company and
petitioners cannot pin the blame on respondent alone. Petitioners may not terminate respondent’s
employment on mere speculation and base her dismissal on unclear and nebulous
reasons, especially where a less punitive penalty would suffice. The penalty must be commensurate with the
act, conduct or omission imputed to the employee and must be imposed in
connection with the disciplinary authority of the employer.[42]
We thus find the dismissal to be illegal. Consequently,
respondent is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and
other privileges, and to full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and other
benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed from the time of the
withholding of the employee's compensation up to the time of actual
reinstatement. If reinstatement is not possible due to the strained relations
between the employer and the employee, separation pay should instead be paid
the employee equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, computed
from the time of engagement up to the finality of this decision.
Petitioners
also raised as an issue the propriety of the award of moral damages and
attorney’s fees, arguing that there is no factual or legal basis to award such.
Petitioners also pointed out that there
was also no discussion in the body of the decision of the Court of Appeals
which states the reasons for the award of damages.
We
find that based on the facts of the case, there is sufficient basis to award
moral damages and attorney’s fees to respondent. We have consistently ruled
that in illegal dismissal cases, moral damages are recoverable only where the
dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted an
act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy.[43] Such
an award cannot be justified solely upon the premise that the employer fired
his employee without just cause or due process. Additional facts must be
pleaded and proven to warrant the grant of moral damages under the Civil Code, i.e., that the act of dismissal was
attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or
was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; and, of
course, that social humiliation, wounded feelings, grave anxiety, and similar
injury resulted therefrom.[44]
In
previous cases where moral damages and attorney’s fees were awarded, the manner
of termination was done in a humiliating and insulting manner, such as in the
case of Balayan Colleges v. National
Labor Relations Commission[45] where the employer posted copies of
its letters of termination to the teachers inside the school campus and it also
furnished copies to the town mayor and Parish Priest of their community for the
purpose of maligning the teachers’ reputation. So also in the case of Chiang Kai Shek School v. Court of Appeals,[46] this
Court awarded moral damages to a teacher who was flatly, and without warning or
a formal notice, told that she was dismissed.
In
the case at bar, we see it fit to award moral damages to respondent because the
manner in which respondent was treated upon petitioners’ suspicion of her
involvement in drafting and in circulating the letter of appeal and the alleged
staging of the “no work day” is contrary to good morals because it caused
unnecessary humiliation to respondent.
When
respondent reported to work a day after the alleged “no work day,” she was
given a notice of preventive suspension, her personal belongings were
inspected, and she was escorted outside of the premises, without any
explanation. Furthermore, an order was given by the administration to her
subordinates that in no case shall she be allowed inside the company premises
without an authorized escort. Such measures were unwarranted because the
charges against respondent have no connection to the breach of trust involving
loss of money or company property, which could have called for securing company
property from respondent. The crux is precisely that the charges against
respondent are divorced from the essence of loss of trust and confidence—which
is the commission of an act that is dishonest, deceitful or
fraudulent. And despite this, based
merely on mere suspicion, respondent was treated unfairly when she was not
given an explanation why her personal belongings were inspected, why she was
asked to leave the company building, why she had to be escorted by guards, why
she was banned from the premises, and, most importantly, why it was necessary
at all to issue an order to her subordinates that she is not allowed in the
company premises unless she is escorted by authorized personnel. These measures
are uncalled for, unfair and oppressive.
On the matter of attorney's fees, we have ruled that
attorney's fees may be awarded only when the employee is illegally dismissed in
bad faith and is compelled to litigate or incur expenses to protect his rights
by reason of the unjustified acts of his employer.[47] In
the case at bar, respondent’s unjustified and unwarranted dismissal prompted her
to engage the professional services of a counsel and she is thus entitled to an
award of attorney’s fees.
Lastly, we come to the issue
of whether Wiltschek, as the General Manager, should be personally liable together
with M+W Zander. We agree with
petitioners that he should not be made personally liable. The general manager of a
corporation should not be made personally answerable for the payment of an
illegally dismissed employee's monetary claims arising from the dismissal unless he had acted maliciously or in bad
faith in terminating the services of the employee.[48] The employer corporation has a separate and
distinct personality from its officers who merely act as its agents.
It is well settled that:
[A] corporation is invested by law with a
personality separate and distinct from those of the persons composing it as
well as from that of any other entity to which it may be related. Mere
ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly
all of the capital stock of a corporation is not of itself sufficient ground
for disregarding the separate corporate personality. [49]
The
exception noted is where the official "had acted maliciously or in bad
faith," in which event he may be made personally liable for his own act.
That exception is not applicable in the case at bar, because it has not been
proven that Wiltschek was impleaded in his
capacity as General Manager of petitioner corporation and there appears to be
no evidence on record that he acted maliciously or in bad faith in terminating
the services of respondent. His act, therefore, was within the scope of his
authority and was a corporate act for which he should not be held personally liable
for.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
portion of the assailed decision ordering Rolf Wiltschek liable with M+W Zander
is DELETED. All other aspects of the decision of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
WE
CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions
in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
[1] Rollo, pp. 196-198.
[2] CA rollo, pp. 69-70.
[3]
[4] Rollo, p.
268.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8] Supra, note 5.
[9] Supra, note 6.
[10] Dated and received on February 4, 2002; rollo, p.
48.
[11] CA rollo, p. 80.
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18] Rollo, p. 328.
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23] The
dispositive portion of the decision provides:
WHEREFORE, premises all considered, judgment is hereby rendered, as
follows:
1. Declaring the dismissal of
complainant as illegal;
2. Ordering respondent to reinstate
complainant to her former position without loss of seniority rights and
privileges, either physically or in the payroll, at the option of respondents;
3. Ordering respondent to pay
complainant her full backwages and other benefits from the time her
compensation was withheld from her up to actual reinstatement, partially
computed in the amount of P485,875.00; and
4. Ordering respondents to pay
complainant P100,000.00 as moral damages and another P100,000.00
as exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees
in an amount equivalent to 10% of complainant’s monetary award. [Rollo, p. 65]
[24] The
dispositive portion of the NLRC decision provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
assailed decision is hereby reversed and set aside. Respondents are adjudged
not guilty of illegal dismissal. The Order to reinstate complainant as well as
the monetary awards are deleted from the decision. [Rollo, p. 97.]
[25] The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered the
decision of public respondent NLRC is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision
of the Labor Arbiter is hereby REINSTATED, declaring the dismissal
of complainant as illegal, and ordering respondents to REINSTATE petitioner to
her former position without loss of seniority rights and privileges, with the MODIFICATION
that the exemplary damages are deleted, and the award of moral damages
is reduced to TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000.00). The award of attorney’s
fees is likewise affirmed. [Rollo, p.
197.]
[26] Petitioners raised the following errors in the
questioned decision in their Petition for Review:
I.
THE
COURT OF APPEALS GAVE DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DESPITE THE
FACT THAT THERE WAS NO SHOWING THAT THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY
FOUND THAT A MANAGER’S ACT OF INFLUENCING A SUBORDINATE NOT TO REPORT FOR WORK
IS INSUFFICIENT TO WARRANT THE PENALTY OF DISMISSAL.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY
FOUND THAT RESPONDENT’S DISMISSAL WAS ANCHORED ON THE AFFIDAVIT OF ONE
SUBORDINATE.
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ADOPTED
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS WITHOUT CONSIDERING OR DISCUSSING THE POINTS RAISED BY
PETITIONERS IN RESPONSE THERETO.
V. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY
DIRECTED RESPONDENT’S REINSTATEMENT DESPITE THE FACT THAT SHE HELD THE
SUPREMELY SENSITIVE POSITION OF EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO THE GENERAL MANAGER EVEN
WHILE SHE HAS PUBLICLY MANIFESTED HER CONTEMPT FOR THE INCUMBENT GENERAL
MANAGER.
VI. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY
AWARDED MORAL DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES TO RESPONDENT DESPITE THE UTTER LACK
OF BASIS FOR SUCH AWARD.
VII. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY
MADE INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENT ROLF WILTSCHEK SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH THE COMPANY
FOR RESPONDENT’S MONETARY AWARD. [Rollo,
pp. 13-14.]
[27]
[28] Labor Code,
Art. 282.
Termination by employer. — An
employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
xxx xxx xxx
c) Fraud or willful breach by the
employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative[.]
[29] G.R. No. L-42724, April 9, 1985, 135 SCRA 569.
[30]
[31]
[32] Labor Code, Art. 82.
[33] Rules Implementing the Labor Code,
Book III, Sec. 2 (c) (1) and (2).
[34] Mabeza v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 118506, April 18, 1997, 271 SCRA 670; Bristol Myers Squibb (Phils.), Inc. v. Richard Nixon A. Baban, G.R. No. 167449, December 17, 2008.
[35] CA rollo, pp. 99-100.
[36]
[37] Estiva v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No. 95145, August 5,
1993, 225 SCRA 169.
[38] Equitable Banking Corporation
v. National Labor Relations Commission, 339 Phil
541 (1997);
[39] Garcia v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 351 Phil. 960 (1998).
[40] San Miguel Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 72572, December 19, 1989, 180 SCRA 281.
[41] Rollo, p. 328.
[42] Radio Communications of the Philippines,
Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 102958, June 25,
1993, 223 SCRA 656.
[43] Ford Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeal, 335 Phil. 1 (1997).
[44] Primero
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, L-72644, December 14, 1987, 156 SCRA 435,
444.
[45] 325 Phil. 245 (1996).
[46] G.R. No. 58028, April 18, 1989, 172 SCRA 389.
[47] Pascua v. NLRC (Third Division), G.R. No. 123518, March 13, 1998, 287 SCRA 554, 580; see Lopez v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 124548, October 8, 1998, 297 SCRA 508, 519.
[48] EPG
Construction Company, Inc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R.
No. 103372, June 22, 1992, 210 SCRA
235-236.
[49] Lim v.
National Labor Relations Commission,
G.R. No. 79907, March 16, 1989, 171
SCRA 328, 335, citing Sunio v. NLRC, 127 SCRA 390.