EN BANC
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CHAIRMAN PERCIVAL C. CHAVEZ, Chair and Chief
Executive Officer, Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor (PCUP), Petitioner, - versus - Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 180941 Present: PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES,* CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, and BERSAMIN, JJ. Promulgated: June 11, 2009 |
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NACHURA, J.:
Before
this Court is a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision[1]
dated August 8, 2007 and its Resolution[2]
dated December 17, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 89024.
The
factual and procedural antecedents follow:
Respondent
Lourdes R. Ronidel was an employee of the Presidential Commission for the Urban
Poor (PCUP), occupying the position of Development Management Officer (DMO)
III. On May 25, 2000, she applied for
promotion to one of the two vacant positions of DMO V.
The
minimum qualification standards for DMO V are:
Education: Masteral Degree
Experience: 4 years in position/s involving management and
supervision
Training: 24 hours of training in management and
supervision
Eligibility: Career Service (Professional)
Second level eligibility[3]
and at the time of her application,
respondent possessed the following qualifications:
Education: Master[s] in Management
Experience: OIC-Administrative and Finance Service
(January 14 to June 4, 2000; Acting Director-
National Capital Region (August 1998 to March
1999; Assistant NCR Director (January 1997-
1998)
Training: First Congress of Human Resource Management
Practitioners and Area Coordinator Congress[4]
After
a thorough evaluation, the PCUP National Selection Board (NSB) found respondent
to have met the minimum qualifications for the position of DMO V. Accordingly, she, together with another
applicant, Alicia S. Diaz (Diaz), were declared fit for promotion.[5]
Thus,
on June 1, 2000 and February 23, 2001, then PCUP Chairperson Atty. Donna Z.
Gasgonia (Gasgonia) issued promotional appointments in favor of Diaz and
respondent, respectively, to the two DMO V positions. Respondent took her oath and assumed her new
position on the date of her appointment.[6]
Meanwhile,
on
1. That respondent did not meet the “experience” requirement for the contested position;
2. That the authority of Gasgonia as PCUP Chairman ceased when the president appointed petitioner to the post on February 19, 2001;
3.
That respondent’s appointment as DMO V was a
4. That respondent’s appointment was not effective since it was not in accordance with pertinent laws and rules; and
5. Notwithstanding the initial approval of respondent’s appointment, the same can be recalled for non-compliance with the criteria provided by PCUP’s promotion plan.[9]
Aggrieved by petitioner’s inaction on
her appointment, respondent appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC),
National Capital Region (NCR). On
January 17, 2003, the CSC-NCR issued an Order[10]
in favor of respondent, the pertinent portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, we find the Appeal meritorious. Ronidel’s appointment as Development Management Officer V of PCUP is deemed valid and she is, therefore, allowed to assume the duties of said position.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Considering
that Gasgonia received her salary until February 25, 2001 and petitioner took
his oath and assumed office only the following day, the CSC-NCR concluded that
at the time of respondent’s appointment on February 23, 2001, Gasgonia was
still the appointing authority. It
further held that although the appointment was issued a few days prior to the
expiration of Gasgonia’s tenure, the same was deliberated upon for almost a
year; thus, it cannot be considered a midnight appointment. Finally, the CSC-NCR upheld respondent’s
appointment since it had been passed upon by the PCUP-NSB.
On
On
On February 25, 2005, the CSC denied respondent’s
motion for reconsideration.[15]
On
a petition for review, the CA reversed and set aside the CSC Resolutions and
consequently affirmed the CSC-NCR’s January 17, 2003 Order. The appellate court
did not agree with the CSC’s action
invalidating respondent’s appointment solely on technical grounds. It emphasized that the submission of the
monthly ROPA was the responsibility of PCUP and not the respondent’s. Hence, she should not be prejudiced by PCUP’s
inaction.
Aggrieved,
petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, now assails the CA
decision in this petition for review on certiorari
on the lone issue of the validity of respondent’s appointment as PCUP DMO
V.
The
petition must fail.
In
resolving the issue posed by petitioner, we must decide the following
sub-issues: 1) whether Gasgonia had the authority to appoint respondent to the
position of DMO V notwithstanding the appointment of petitioner as the new
chairperson of the PCUP; 2) whether respondent’s appointment may be invalidated
for failure to meet the qualification standards for said position; and 3)
whether the failure of PCUP to submit two copies of the ROPA made respondent’s
appointment inefficacious.
The
Court notes that on February 19, 2001, petitioner was appointed as the new chairperson
and chief executive officer of PCUP. On February 23, 2001, Gasgonia issued a
promotional appointment in
favor of respondent. On the same day, respondent took her oath and
assumed office. On
Petitioner
insists that since he was appointed as the new PCUP Chairperson on the 19th
of February, Gasgonia no longer had the authority to extend a promotional
appointment in favor of respondent on the 23rd of February. Respondent, on the other hand, claims that
Gasgonia was still the appointing authority prior to petitioner’s assumption of
office on the 26th.
The
CSC-NCR, CSC and the CA are one in saying that Gasgonia still had appointing
authority at the time she issued respondent’s promotional appointment.
We
find no reason to depart from such conclusion.
Well-settled is the rule that an oath
of office is a qualifying requirement for a public office, a prerequisite to
the full investiture of the office. [16]
Since petitioner took his oath and assumed office only on February 26, it was
only then that his right to enter into the position became plenary and
complete. [17] Prior
to such oath, Gasgonia still had the right to exercise the functions of her
office. It is also well to note that per
certification issued by Raymond C. Santiago, Accountant of PCUP, Gasgonia
received her last salary for the period covering February 1-25, 2001; and
petitioner received his first salary for the period covering February 26 to
March 7, 200[1].[18]
Clearly, at the time of respondent’s
appointment on February 23, Gasgonia still was the rightful occupant of the
position and was, therefore, authorized to extend a valid promotional
appointment.
Petitioner further contends that
respondent’s appointment should be invalidated for respondent’s failure to meet
the “experience” requirement for the contested position.
This contention is also without
merit.
The question of respondent’s
qualifications is a factual issue which calls for the examination of the
evidence presented by the contending parties.
Certainly, it is beyond the power of this Court to review. This is especially true in the instant case,
as the CSC-NCR, CSC and the CA have all found that, indeed, respondent
possesses the required qualifications. As repeatedly held, we accord great respect to the findings of administrative agencies because they have
acquired expertise in their jurisdiction; and we refrain from questioning their
findings, particularly when these are affirmed by the appellate tribunal.
We are not inclined to re-examine and re-evaluate the probative value of the
evidence proffered in the concerned forum, which had formed the basis of the
latter’s impugned decision, resolution or order, absent a clear showing of
arbitrariness and want of any rational basis therefor.[19]
An appointment to a public office is
the unequivocal act of designating or selecting, by one having the authority,
an individual to discharge and perform
the duties and functions of an office or trust.[20] In
the appointment or promotion of employees, the appointing authority considers not only their civil service eligibilities but also their
performance, education, work
experience, trainings and seminars attended, agency examinations and
seniority. Consequently, the appointing
authority has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his
best judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have
the necessary qualifications and eligibilities.
The final choice of the appointing authority should be respected and
left undisturbed. Judges should not
substitute their judgment for that of the appointing authority.[21] Sufficient,
if not plenary, discretion should be granted to those entrusted with the
responsibility of administering the offices concerned. They are in a position to determine who can
best perform the functions of the office vacated. Not only is the appointing authority the
officer primarily responsible for the administration of the office, he is also
in the best position to determine who among the prospective appointees can
effectively discharge the functions of the position.[22]
Moreover, promotions in the Civil
Service should always be made on the basis of qualifications, including occupational
competence, moral character, devotion to duty, and loyalty to the service. The last trait should be given appropriate
weight, to reward the civil servant who has chosen to make his employment in
the government a lifetime career in which he can expect advancement through the
years for work well done. Political patronage should not be necessary. His record alone should be sufficient
assurance that when a higher position becomes vacant, he shall
be seriously considered for the
promotion and, if warranted, preferred to less devoted aspirants.[23]
We
would like to stress that once an appointment is issued and the moment the appointee
assumes a position in the
civil service under a
completed appointment, he acquires a
legal, not merely equitable, right to the position which is protected not only
by statute, but also by the Constitution; and it cannot be taken away from him
either by revocation of the appointment or by removal, except for cause, and
with previous notice and hearing.[24]
Lastly,
we agree with the appellate court that respondent’s appointment could not be
invalidated solely because of PCUP’s failure to submit two copies of the ROPA
as required by CSC Resolution No. 97368.
In the said resolution, the CSC delegated to PCUP the authority to take
final action on its employees’ appointments.
It further required the submission within the first fifteen calendar
days of each month two copies of the monthly ROPA, together with certified true
copies of appointments acted upon.
Finally, it provided that failure to submit the ROPAs within the
prescribed period shall render all appointments listed therein lapsed and
ineffective.
Pursuant
to the above resolution, while upholding Gasgonia’s appointing power, the CSC
still invalidated respondent’s appointment.
The CA, however, reached a different conclusion by upholding the
validity of the questioned appointment.
We quote with approval the appellate court’s ratiocination in this wise:
To our minds, however, the invalidation of the [respondent’s] appointment based on this sole technical ground is unwarranted, if not harsh and arbitrary, considering the factual milieu of this case. For one, it is not the [respondent’s] duty to comply with the requirement of the submission of the ROPA and the certified true copies of her appointment to [the Civil Service Commission Field Office or] CSCFO within the period stated in the aforequoted CSC Resolution. The said resolution categorically provides that it is the PCUP, and not the appointee as in the case of the [respondent] here, which is required to comply with the said reportorial requirements.
Moreover, it bears pointing out that only a few days after the [petitioner] assumed his new post as PCUP Chairman, he directed the
PCUP to hold the processing of [respondent’s] appointment papers in abeyance, until such time that an assessment thereto is officially released from his office. Unfortunately, up to this very day, the [respondent] is still defending her right to enjoy her promotional appointment as DMO V. Naturally, her appointment failed to comply with the PCUP’s reportorial requirements under CSC Resolution No. 97-3685 precisely because of the [petitioner’s] inaction to the same.
We believe that the factual circumstances of this case calls for the application of equity. To our minds, the invalidation of the [respondent’s] appointment due to a procedural lapse which is undoubtedly beyond her control, and certainly not of her own making but that of the [petitioner], justifies the relaxation of the provisions of CSC Board Resolution No. 97-3685, pars. 6,7 and 8. Hence, her appointment must be upheld based on equitable considerations, and that the non-submission of the ROPA and the certified true copies of her appointment to the CSCFO within the period stated in the aforequoted CSC Resolution should not work to her damage and prejudice. Besides, the [respondent] could not at all be faulted for negligence as she exerted all the necessary vigilance and efforts to reap the blessings of a work promotion. Thus, We cannot simply ignore her plight. She has fought hard enough to claim what is rightfully hers and, as a matter of simple justice, good conscience, and equity, We should not allow Ourselves to prolong her agony.
All told, We hold that the [respondent’s] appointment is valid, notwithstanding the aforecited procedural lapse on the part of PCUP which obviously was the own making of herein [petitioner].[25]
In
Civil Service Commission v. Joson, Jr.,[26]
we had the occasion to relax the rules on the reportorial requirement and put a
stamp of validity on an appointment that was not included in the agency’s ROPA
within the time prescribed by the rules.
In Joson, the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) failed to include Priscilla Ong’s
appointment in its ROPA for July 1995.
The records, however, showed that the agency failed to include her
appointment because its request for exemption from the educational requisite
for confidential staff members was yet to be resolved by the CSC. In view thereof, we found the non-compliance
with the rules justified, and insufficient to invalidate an appointment.
In
the instant case, it is obvious that respondent’s appointment was not included
in the ROPA because the new PCUP Chairperson
and CEO had directed the Human Resources Department to stop the processing of
respondent’s appointment until after the assessment thereon was released from
petitioner’s office. In both this and
the Joson case, the appointee could not be faulted for the non-compliance with the
CSC reportorial requirement.
We,
therefore, apply the same conclusion to both cases.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. The CA decision and resolution
dated
SO
ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
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LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
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ANTONIO
T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
RENATO
C. CORONA Associate Justice |
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(on official leave) |
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CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
MINITA
V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
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PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
TERESITA
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice (no part) |
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ARTURO
D. BRION Associate Justice |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice |
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LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section
13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I hereby certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* On official leave.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro, with Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Fernanda Lampas Peralta, concurring; rollo, pp. 32-49.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8] CA rollo, p. 52.
[9] Rollo, pp. 35-36.
[10] Penned by Director Agnes D. Padilla, CA rollo, pp. 14-24.
[11]
[12]
[13] Embodied in CSC Resolution No.
041051,
[14] Granting the PCUP the authority to take final action on its appointments.
[15] Embodied in CSC Resolution No. 050285, CA rollo, pp. 47-51.
[16] Mendoza v. Laxina, Sr., 453 Phil. 10131026-1027 (2003); Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, 364 Phil. 890, 904 (1999).
[17]
[18] CA rollo, p. 22.
[19] Cabalitan
v. Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 162805,
[20] Bermudez v. Executive Secretary Torres, 370 Phil. 769, 776 (1999).
[21] Tapispisan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157950, June 8, 2005, 459 SCRA 695, 709; Civil Service Commission v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 158737, August 31, 2004, 437 SCRA 403, 412-413.
[22] Civil Service Commission v. De la Cruz, supra; Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 152574, November 17, 2004, 442 SCRA 507, 515.
[23] Civil Service Commission v. De la Cruz, supra at 412.
[24] The Genral Manager, Phil. Ports Authority (PPA) v. Monserate, 430 Phil. 832, 845.
[25] Rollo, pp. 47-48.
[26] G.R. No. 154674,