THIRD DIVISION
|
LEONIS NAVIGATION CO.,
INC. and WORLD MARINE Petitioners, - versus - CATALINO U. VILLAMATER and/or
The Heirs of the Late Catalino U. Villamater, represented herein by Sonia
Mayuyu Villamater; and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 179169
Present:
Chairperson, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, PERALTA, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: March 3,
2010 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari[1]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set aside the
Decision[2]
dated May 3, 2007 and the Resolution[3]
dated July 23, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 85594,
entitled “Leonis Navigation Co., Inc., et
al. v.
The antecedents of this case are as
follows:
Private respondent Catalino U.
Villamater (Villamater) was hired as Chief Engineer for the ship MV Nord Monaco, owned by petitioner
World Marine Panama,
Prior to his deployment, Villamater
underwent the required Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME). He passed the PEME and was declared “Fit to
Work.”[5] Thereafter, Villamater was deployed on June
26, 2002.
Sometime in October 2002, around four
(4) months after his deployment, Villamater suffered intestinal bleeding and
was given a blood transfusion.
Thereafter, he again felt weak, lost considerable weight, and suffered
intermittent intestinal pain. He consulted
a physician in
Villamater was later repatriated,
under medical escort, as soon as he was deemed fit to travel. As soon as he arrived in the
In the course of his chemotherapy, when
no noticeable improvement occurred, Villamater filed a complaint[8]
before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
for payment of permanent and total disability benefits in the amount of
US$80,000.00, reimbursement of medical and hospitalization expenses in the
amount of P11,393.65, moral damages in the sum of P1,000,000.00,
exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00, as well as attorney’s
fees.
After the submission of the required
position papers, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision[9]
dated July 28, 2003 in favor of Villamater, holding that his illness was
compensable, but denying his claim for moral and exemplary damages. The Labor Arbiter disposed as follows—
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered,
judgment is hereby rendered declaring complainant’s illness to be compensable
and ordering respondents LEONIS NAVIGATION CO., INC. and WORLD MARINE PANAMA,
S.A. liable to pay, jointly and severally, complainant CATALINO U. VILLAMATER,
the amount of US$60,000.00 or its Philippine Peso equivalent at the time of
actual payment, representing the latter’s permanent total disability benefits
plus ten percent (10%) thereof as Attorney’s Fees.
All other claims are dismissed for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Petitioners appealed to the
NLRC. Villamater also filed his own
appeal, questioning the award of the Labor Arbiter and claiming that the 100%
degree of disability should be compensated in the amount of US$80,000.00,
pursuant to Section 2, Article XXI of the ITF-JSU/AMOSUP Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) between petitioners and Associated Marine Officers &
Seamen’s Union of the Philippines, which covered the employment contract of
Villamater.
On February 4, 2004, the NLRC issued
its resolution,[11]
dismissing the respective appeals of both parties and affirming in toto the decision of the Labor
Arbiter.
Petitioners filed their motion for
reconsideration of the February 4, 2004 resolution, but the NLRC denied the
same in its resolution dated June 15, 2004.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court before the CA. After the
filing of the required memoranda, the CA rendered its assailed May 3, 2007
Decision, dismissing the petition. The appellate
court, likewise, denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration in its July 23,
2007 Resolution.
Hence, this petition based on the following
grounds, to wit:
First,
the Court of Appeals erroneously held that [the] Commission’s Dismissal
Decision does not constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction but mere error of judgment, considering that the decision
lacks evidentiary support and is contrary to both evidence on record and
prevailing law and jurisprudence.
Second, the Court of Appeals seriously erred
in upholding the NLRC’s decision to award Grade 1 Permanent and Total
Disability Benefits in favor of seaman Villamater despite the lack of factual
and legal basis to support such award, and more importantly, when it
disregarded undisputed facts and substantial evidence presented by petitioners
which show that seaman Villamater’s illness was not work-related and hence, not
compensable, as provided by the Standard Terms of the POEA Contract.
Third, the Court of Appeals erred in holding
that non-joinder of indispensable parties warrant the outright dismissal of the
Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Fourth, the Court of Appeals erroneously held
that final and executory decisions or resolutions of the NLRC render appeals to
superior courts moot and academic.
Last, the Court of Appeals seriously erred in
upholding the award of attorney’s fees considering that the grant has neither factual
nor legal basis.[12]
Before delving into the merits of
this petition, we deem it fit to discuss the procedural issues raised by
petitioners.
First. It is worthy to note that the CA dismissed the
petition, considering that (1) the June 15, 2004 Resolution of the NLRC had
already become final and executory on June 26, 2004, and the same was already
recorded in the NLRC Book of Entries of Judgments; and that (2) the award of
the Labor Arbiter was already executed, thus, the case was closed and
terminated.
According to Sections 14 and 15, Rule
VII of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC—
Section
14. Finality of decision of the
commission and entry of judgment. – a) Finality of the Decisions, Resolutions or Orders of the
Commission. – Except as provided in Section 9 of Rule X, the decisions,
resolutions or orders of the Commission shall become final and executory after
ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties.
b)
Entry of Judgment. – Upon the expiration of the ten (10) calendar day period
provided in paragraph (a) of this Section, the decision, resolution, or order
shall be entered in a book of entries of judgment.
The Executive Clerk or Deputy Executive Clerk
shall consider the decision, resolution or order as final and executory after
sixty (60) calendar days from date of mailing in the absence of return cards,
certifications from the post office, or other proof of service to parties.
Section
15. Motions for reconsideration. – Motion for reconsideration of any decision,
resolution or order of the Commission shall not be entertained except when
based on palpable or patent errors; provided that the motion is under oath and
filed within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of decision, resolution or
order, with proof of service that a copy of the same has been furnished, within
the reglementary period, the adverse party; and provided further, that only one
such motion from the same party shall be entertained.
Should
a motion for reconsideration be entertained pursuant to this SECTION, the
resolution shall be executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof.[13]
Petitioners
received the June 15, 2004 resolution of the NLRC, denying their motion for
reconsideration, on June 16, 2004. They
filed their petition for certiorari
before the CA only on August 9, 2004,[14]
or 54 calendar days from the date of notice of the June 15, 2004 resolution. Considering that the above-mentioned 10-day
period had lapsed without petitioners filing the appropriate appeal, the NLRC issued
an Entry of Judgment dated June 28, 2004.
Moreover,
by reason of the finality of the June 15, 2004 NLRC resolution, the Labor
Arbiter issued on July 29, 2004 a Writ of Execution.[15] Consequently, Leonis voluntarily paid Villamater’s
widow, Sonia M. Villamater (Sonia), the amount of P3,649,800.00, with Rizal
Commercial and Banking Corporation (RCBC) Manager’s Check No. 0000008550[16]
dated August 12, 2004, as evidenced by the Acknowledgment Receipt[17]
dated August 13, 2004, and the Cheque Voucher[18]
dated August 12, 2004. Following the
complete satisfaction of the judgment award, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order[19]
dated September 8, 2004 that reads—
There
being complete satisfaction of the judgment award as shown by the record upon
receipt of the complainant of the amount of P3,649,800.00, voluntarily
paid by the respondent, as full and final satisfaction of the Writ of Execution
dated July 29, 2004; and finding the same to be not contrary to law, morals,
good custom, and public policy, and pursuant to Section 14, Rule VII of the
Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), this case
is hereby ordered DISMISSED with
prejudice, and considered CLOSED and
TERMINATED.
SO
ORDERED.
Petitioners
never moved for a reconsideration of this Order regarding the voluntariness of
their payment to Sonia, as well as the dismissal with prejudice and the
concomitant termination of the case.
However,
petitioners argued that the finality of the case did not render the petition
for certiorari before the CA moot and
academic. On this point, we agree with
petitioners.
In
the landmark case of St. Martin Funeral
Home v. NLRC,[20] we
ruled that judicial review of decisions of the NLRC is sought via a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, and the petition should be filed before the CA, following the
strict observance of the hierarchy of courts.
Under Rule 65, Section 4,[21] petitioners
are allowed sixty (60) days from notice of the assailed order or resolution
within which to file the petition. Thus,
although the petition was not filed within the 10-day period, petitioners reasonably
filed their petition for certiorari
before the CA within the 60-day reglementary period under Rule 65.
Further,
a petition for certiorari does not
normally include an inquiry into the correctness of its evaluation of the
evidence. Errors of judgment, as
distinguished from errors of jurisdiction, are not within the province of a
special civil action for certiorari,
which is merely confined to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion. It is, thus, incumbent upon
petitioners to satisfactorily establish that the NLRC acted capriciously and
whimsically in order that the extraordinary writ of certiorari will lie. By
grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and it must be shown that
the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically.
The
CA, therefore, could grant the petition for certiorari
if it finds that the NLRC, in its assailed decision or resolution, committed
grave abuse of discretion by capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily
disregarding evidence that is material to or decisive of the controversy; and it
cannot make this determination without looking into the evidence of the
parties. Necessarily, the appellate
court can only evaluate the materiality or significance of the evidence, which
is alleged to have been capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarded
by the NLRC, in relation to all other evidence on record.[22] Notably, if the CA grants the petition and
nullifies the
decision or resolution of the NLRC on
the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction, the decision or resolution of the NLRC is, in contemplation of
law, null and void ab initio; hence,
the decision or resolution never became final and executory.[23]
In
the recent case Bago v. National Labor
Relations Commission,[24]
we had occasion to rule that although the CA may review the decisions or
resolutions of the NLRC on jurisdictional and due process considerations,
particularly when the decisions or resolutions have already been executed, this
does not affect the statutory finality of the NLRC decisions or resolutions in
view of Rule VIII, Section 6 of the 2002 New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, viz.:
RULE
VIII
x
x x x
SECTION
6. EFFECT OF FILING OF PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI ON EXECUTION. – A petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court shall not stay the execution of the assailed
decision unless a temporary restraining order is issued by the Court of Appeals
or the Supreme Court.[25]
Simply
put, the execution of the final and executory decision or resolution of the
NLRC shall proceed despite the pendency of a petition for certiorari, unless it is restrained by the proper court. In the present case, petitioners already paid
Villamater’s widow, Sonia, the amount of P3,649,800.00, representing the
total and permanent disability award plus attorney’s fees, pursuant to the Writ
of Execution issued by the Labor Arbiter.
Thereafter, an Order was issued declaring the case as “closed and
terminated.” However, although there was
no motion for reconsideration of this last Order, Sonia was, nonetheless,
estopped from claiming that the controversy had already reached its end with the
issuance of the Order closing and terminating the case. This is because the Acknowledgment Receipt
she signed when she received petitioners’ payment was without prejudice to the
final outcome of the petition for certiorari
pending before the CA.
Second. We also agree with petitioners
in their position that the CA erred in dismissing outright their petition for certiorari on the ground of non-joinder
of indispensable parties. It should be
noted that petitioners impleaded only the then deceased Villamater[26]
as respondent to the petition, excluding his heirs.
Rule 3,
Section 7 of the Rules of Court defines indispensable parties
as those who are parties in interest without whom there can
be no final determination of an action.[27] They are those parties who
possess such an interest in the controversy that a final decree would
necessarily affect their rights, so that the courts cannot proceed without
their presence.[28] A party is indispensable if
his interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought is inextricably intertwined
with the other parties’ interest.[29]
Unquestionably,
Villamater’s widow stands as an indispensable party to this case.
Under Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court, neither misjoinder nor
non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal
of an action, thus:
Sec. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder
of parties. Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion
of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such
terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and
proceeded with separately.
The proper remedy is to implead the indispensable party
at any stage of the action. The court, either motu proprio or upon the motion of a party, may order the inclusion
of the indispensable party or give the plaintiff an opportunity
to amend his complaint in order to include indispensable parties. If the plaintiff ordered to include the indispensable party refuses to comply with the order of the
court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the
court's own motion. Only upon unjustified failure or refusal to obey the order
to include or to amend is the action dismissed.[30]
On the merits of this case, the questions to be answered
are: (1) Is Villamater entitled to total and permanent disability benefits by
reason of his colon cancer? (2) If yes,
would he also be entitled to attorney’s fees?
As to Villamater’s entitlement to total and permanent
disability benefits, petitioners argue, in essence, that colon cancer is not
among the occupational diseases listed under Section 32-A of the POEA Standard Terms and Conditions
Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean Going Vessels (POEA
Standard Contract), and that the risk of contracting the same was not increased
by Villamater’s working conditions during his deployment. Petitioners posit that Villamater had
familial history of colon cancer; and that, although dietary considerations may
be taken, his diet -- which might have been high in fat and low in fiber and could
have thus increased his predisposition to develop colon cancer -- might only be
attributed to him, because it was he who chose what he ate on board the vessels
he was assigned to. Petitioners also cited
the supposed declaration of their company-designated physicians who attended to
Villamater that his disease was not work-related.
We
disagree.
It is
true that under Section 32-A of the POEA Standard Contract, only two types of
cancers are listed as occupational diseases – (1) Cancer of the epithelial
lining of the bladder (papilloma of the bladder); and (2) cancer,
epithellematous or ulceration of the skin or of the corneal surface of the eye
due to tar, pitch, bitumen, mineral oil or paraffin, or compound products or
residues of these substances. Section 20
of the same Contract also states that those illnesses not listed under Section
32 are disputably presumed as work-related.
Section 20 should, however, be read together with Section 32-A on the
conditions to be satisfied for an illness to be compensable,[31]
to wit:
For an occupational
disease and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, all the
following conditions must be established:
1. The seafarer’s work must involve the risk
described herein;
2. The disease was contracted as a result of the
seafarer’s exposure to the described risks;
3. The disease was contracted within a period of
exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it;
4. There was no notorious negligence on the part
of the seafarer.
Tumors of the colon and rectum are
growths arising from the inner wall of the large intestine. Benign tumors of the large intestine are
called polyps. Malignant tumors of the
large intestine are called cancers.
Benign polyps can be easily removed during colonoscopy and are not
life-threatening. If benign polyps are
not removed from the large intestine, they can become malignant (cancerous)
over time. Most of the cancers of the
large intestine are believed to have developed as polyps. Colorectal cancer can invade and damage
adjacent tissues and organs. Cancer
cells can also break away and spread to other parts of the body (such as liver
and lung) where new tumors form. The
spread of colon cancer to distant organs is called metastasis of the colon
cancer. Once metastasis has occurred in
colorectal cancer, a complete cure of the cancer is unlikely.[33]
Globally, colorectal cancer is the
third leading cause of cancer in males and the fourth leading cause of cancer
in females. The frequency of colorectal
cancer varies around the world. It is
common in the Western world and is rare in Asia and in
Factors that increase a person’s risk
of colorectal cancer include high fat intake, a family history of colorectal
cancer and polyps, the presence of polyps in the large intestine, and chronic
ulcerative colitis.[35]
Diets high in fat are believed to
predispose humans to colorectal cancer.
In countries with high colorectal cancer rates, the fat intake by the
population is much higher than in countries with low cancer rates. It is believed that the breakdown products of
fat metabolism lead to the formation of cancer-causing chemicals (carcinogens). Diets high in vegetables and high-fiber foods
may rid the bowel of these carcinogens and help reduce the risk of cancer.[36]
A person’s genetic background is an
important factor in colon cancer risk.
Among first-degree relatives of colon-cancer patients, the lifetime risk
of developing colon cancer is 18%. Even
though family history of colon cancer is an important risk factor, majority
(80%) of colon cancers occur sporadically in patients with no family history of
it. Approximately 20% of cancers are
associated with a family history of colon cancer. And 5% of colon cancers are due to hereditary
colon cancer syndromes. Hereditary colon
cancer syndromes are disorders where affected family members have inherited
cancer-causing genetic defects from one or both of the parents.[37]
In the case of Villamater, it is
manifest that the interplay of age, hereditary, and dietary factors contributed
to the development of colon cancer. By
the time he signed his employment contract on June 4, 2002, he was already 58
years old, having been born on October 5, 1943,[38]
an age at which the incidence of colon cancer is more likely.[39] He had a familial history of colon cancer,
with a brother who succumbed to death and an uncle who underwent surgery for
the same illness.[40] Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found his
illness to be compensable for permanent and total disability, because they
found that his dietary provisions while at sea increased his risk of
contracting colon cancer because he had no choice of what to eat on board
except those provided on the vessels and these consisted mainly of high-fat,
high-cholesterol, and low-fiber foods.
While findings of the Labor Arbiter,
which were affirmed by the NLRC, are entitled to great weight and are binding
upon the courts, nonetheless, we find it also worthy to note that even during
the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, Villamater cited that the foods
provided on board the vessels were mostly meat, high in fat and high in
cholesterol. On this matter, noticeably,
petitioners were silent when they argued that Villamater’s affliction was
brought about by diet and genetics. It
was only after the Labor Arbiter issued his Decision, finding colon cancer to
be compensable because the risk was increased by the victuals provided on board,
that petitioners started claiming that the foods available on the vessels also
consisted of fresh fruits and vegetables, not to mention fish and poultry. It is also worth mentioning that while Dr.
Salvador declared that Villamater’s cancer “appears to be not work-related,”
she nevertheless suggested to petitioners Disability Grade 1, which, under the
POEA Standard Contract, “shall be considered or shall constitute total and
permanent disability.”[41] During his confinement in
On these points, we sustain the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC in granting total and permanent disability benefits in
favor of Villamater, as it was sufficiently shown that his having contracted colon
cancer was, at the very least, aggravated by his working conditions,[43]
taking into consideration his dietary provisions on board, his age, and his job
as Chief Engineer, who was primarily in charge of the technical and mechanical
operations of the vessels to ensure voyage safety. Jurisprudence provides that to establish
compensability of a non-occupational disease, reasonable proof of
work-connection and not direct causal relation is required. Probability, not the ultimate degree of
certainty, is the test of proof in compensation proceedings.[44]
The Labor Arbiter correctly awarded
Villamater total and permanent disability benefits, computed on the basis of
the schedule provided under the POEA Standard Contract, considering that the
schedule of payment of benefits under the ITF-JSU/AMOSUP CBA refers only to
permanent disability as a result of an accident or injury.[45]
By reason of Villamater’s entitlement
to total and permanent disability benefits, he (or in this case his widow
Sonia) is also entitled to the award of attorney’s fees, not under Article
2208(2) of the Civil Code, “[w]hen the defendant’s act or omission has
compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to
protect his interest,” but under Article 2208(8) of the same Code, involving
actions for indemnity under workmen’s compensation and employer’s liability
laws.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed May 3, 2007 Decision and the July 23, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate
Justice |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate
Justice |
JOSE CATRAL
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 9-41.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, with Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Regalado E. Maambong, concurring; id. at 47-61.
[3]
[4] Rollo, p. 84.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] Emphasis supplied.
[14] Rollo, p. 15.
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20] G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998, 295 SCRA 494.
[21] SEC. 4. When and where position filed. – The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
[22] Dole
[23] Tomas Claudio Memorial College, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152568, February 16, 2004, 423 SCRA 122, 130.
[24] G.R. No. 170001, April 4, 2007, 520 SCRA 644.
[25] This rule has been substantially incorporated in the NLRC 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure, which became effective on January 6, 2006, thus:
RULE XI
x x x x
Section 10. Effect of Petition for Certiorari on Execution.—A petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court shall not stay the execution of the assailed decision unless a restraining order is issued by said courts.
[26] He died on January 4, 2004.
[27] Uy v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 157065,
[28] Seno
v. Mangubat, G.R. No. L-44339,
[29] Uy v. Court of Appeals, supra note 27.
[30] Nieves Plasabas and Marcos Malazarte v. Court of Appeals (Special Former Ninth Division), Dominador Lumen and Aurora Aunzo, G.R. No. 166519, March 31, 2009; PepsiCo, Inc. v. Emerald Pizza, Inc., G.R. No. 153059, August 14, 2007, 530 SCRA 58, 67.
[31] Estate of Posedio Ortega v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 175005, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 649.
[32] Colorectal cancer <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colorectal_cancer (visited February 15, 2010).
[33] Colon Cancer (Colorectal Cancer) <http://www.medicinenet.com/colon_cancer/article.htm (visited February 15, 2010).
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38] Rollo, p. 128.
[39] Risk factors by Mayo Clinic staff <http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/colon-cancer/DS00035/DSection=risk%2Dfactors (visited February 15, 2010).
[40] Supra note 38.
[41] POEA Standard Contract, Sec. 32.
[42] Cadornigara v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 158073, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 363.
[43] Masangcay v. Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc., G.R. No. 172800, October 17, 2008, 569 SCRA 592.
[44] Debaudin v. Social Security System, G.R.
No. 148308, September 21, 2007, 533 SCRA 601.
[45] Rollo, p. 102.