ROQUE C. FACURA and EDUARDO F. TUASON,
G.R. No. 166495
COURT OF APPEALS,
RODOLFO S. DE JESUS and EDELWINA DG. PARUNGAO,
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RODOLFO S. DE JESUS,
G.R. No. 184129
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, EDUARDO F. TUASON, LOCAL WATER UTILITIES ADMINISTRATION (LWUA), represented by its new Administrator Orlando C. Hondrade,
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OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
- versus -
EDELWINA DG. PARUNGAO, and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Former 7th Division),
G.R. No. 184263
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
February 16, 2011
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D E C I S I O N
For resolution before this Court are the following:
G.R. No. 166495 is a petition for certiorari filed by Roque Facura (Facura) and Eduardo Tuason (Tuason) assailing the Resolutions dated September 22, 2004 and January 4, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 84902, which granted the applications for preliminary mandatory injunction filed by Atty. Rodolfo De Jesus (De Jesus) and Atty. Edelwina Parungao (Parungao) by ordering their reinstatement to their former positions despite the standing order of dismissal issued by the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) against them.
G.R. No. 184129 is an appeal, by way of Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed by De Jesus, from the Decision dated May 26, 2005 and Resolution dated August 6, 2008 of the CA, in CA-G.R. SP No. 84902, which affirmed the Review and Recommendation dated January 26, 2004 and Order dated April 20, 2004 issued by the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-02-0496-J, which dismissed De Jesus from the government service with prejudice to re-entry thereto.
G.R. 184263 is another appeal, by way of Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed by the Ombudsman, from the Decision dated May 26, 2005 and Resolution dated August 6, 2008 of the CA, in CA-G.R. SP No. 84902, for ordering the reinstatement of Parungao as Manager of the Human Resources Management Department (HRMD) of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), thereby modifying the Review and Recommendation dated January 26, 2004 and Order dated April 20, 2004, issued by the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-02-0496-J, which dismissed Parungao from the government service with prejudice to re-entry thereto.
These consolidated cases arose from a Joint Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Ombudsman by Facura and Tuason against De Jesus and Parungao for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), dishonesty, gross neglect of duty, grave misconduct, falsification of official documents, being notoriously undesirable, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
The LWUA is a government-owned and controlled corporation chartered under Presidential Decree (P.D) No. 198, as amended. De Jesus was the Deputy Administrator for Administrative Services of LWUA, while Parungao was its HRMD Manager for Administrative Services.
Jesus was dismissed from the service per LWUA Board Resolution No. 061
the CSC Accreditation Program, particularly under CSC Resolution No. 967701
to the grant of authority to De Jesus to sign appointment papers, in a letter
awaiting the reply of DBM on his request, Jamora, in an inter-office
As HRMD head, Parungao forwarded the said documents to the Personnel Division to have them transformed into formal appointment papers, otherwise known as CSC Standard Form No. 33. The encoded standard forms indicated the names and positions of the confidential staff and the dates of signing and issuance of the appointments, which were the retroactive effectivity dates appearing in the inter-office memoranda and letter issued by the Board member. The concerned HRMD staff and Parungao affixed their initials below the printed name of De Jesus who, in turn, signed the formal appointment papers as respresentative of the appointing authority. The nine (9) appointment papers bore Serial Nos. 168207, 168210, 168213, 168214, 168215, 168216, 168217, 168287, and 168288.
Office Order No. 286.01 dated
Geraldine Rose D. Buenaflor -
M. Raval -
G. Valenciano, Jr. -
Stephanie R. Badoy -
Joy T. Badoy -
R. Toren -
Susan G. Facto -
Anthony S. Versoza -
December 20, 2001, Administrator Jamora issued an inter-office memorandum
to the accounting department on the matter of payment of back salaries of the
said confidential staff, stating therein that as approved by the DBM in its
letter, the hiring of such personnel was authorized retroactive to their employment
date, thus, ordering the immediate payment of their back salaries and other
remunerations. On the same day, a LWUA disbursement voucher
was prepared and processed by the Accounting Department, and Administrator Jamora
thereafter approved the release of a Land Bank check amounting to
as part of the cash advance amounting to P692,657.31, for the payment of
the back salaries.
appointments of the subject confidential staff were reflected in the
Supplemental Quarterly Report on Accession for June and August 2001 and Quarterly
Report on Accession and Separation for October to December 2001 which were
submitted to the CSC on
for the purpose of meeting the monitoring and reportorial requirements of the
CSC in relation to the accreditation given to LWUA to take final action on its
appointments, De Jesus and Parungao, with the prior approval of Administrator
Jamora, re-issued the appointments of the Boards nine (9) confidential staff.
The appointment papers
were now all dated
the LWUA Accounting Department, in a Brief to the Legal Department dated
the Internal Control Office (ICO) of LWUA issued a memorandum dated
Geraldine Rose D. Buenaflor -
Michael M. Raval -
G. Valenciano, Jr. -
Noelle Stephanie R. Badoy -
Kristina Joy T. Badoy -
It was further recommended that the Legal Department conduct an investigation to identify the person liable to refund to LWUA the overpayments made to the subject personnel and that the Accounting Department take appropriate actions to recover the overpayment.
In a Brief to Administrator Jamora dated July 26, 2002, signed by De Jesus and initialed by Parungao, the issues raised by ICO in its Memorandum on the retroactive appointments of the concerned confidential staff and overpayments were deemed clarified with the reply letter of the DBM on the retroactive implementation of the authority granted to LWUA in the previous letter of approval.
Meanwhile, on November 20, 2001, in relation to the earlier appeal of De Jesus (which he withdrew upon his reinstatement by the newly reconstituted LWUA Board), the CSC issued Resolution No. 011811, which remanded the case to LWUA for the conduct of an investigation regarding De Jesus dismissal, to be finished within three (3) calendar months, failure of which would result in the dismissal of the case against De Jesus.
Complaint of Facura and Tuason
On October 18, 2002, Facura and Tuason filed a Joint Affidavit-Complaint before the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau of the Ombudsman against De Jesus and Parungao charging them with: 1) violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019; and 2) dishonesty, gross neglect of duty, grave misconduct, falsification of official documents, being notoriously undesirable, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, for the fabrication of fraudulent appointments of nine (9) coterminous employees of LWUA.
and Tuason alleged that the retroactive appointment papers were fabricated and fraudulent
as they were made to appear to have been signed/approved on the dates stated,
and not on the date of their actual issuance. They further alleged that with
malice and bad faith, De Jesus and Parungao willfully and feloniously conspired
not to submit the fraudulent appointment papers to the CSC, and to submit
instead the valid set of appointment papers bearing the
questioned the issuance of the fraudulent appointments in favor of the nine (9)
confidential staff, to the prejudice of the government in the amount of
as these were used as basis for the payment of their back salaries. They also
alleged that De Jesus reinstatement was illegal and that he had lost authority
to sign any LWUA documents effective upon the issuance of LWUA Board Resolution
Nos. 061 and 069. Thus, the actions
undertaken by him in signing the fraudulent appointments were all
misrepresented and, therefore, unlawful. They further alleged that contrary to
law, De Jesus continued to receive his salary and benefits as Deputy
Administrator of LWUA despite having already been dismissed. They cited the string
of criminal and administrative cases against De Jesus before the trial courts
and the Ombudsman.
In their Joint Counter-Affidavit, De Jesus and Parungao alleged that they were mere rank-and-file employees who had no knowledge of or participation in personnel matters; that their actions in issuing the two sets of appointments were all documented and above-board; that as subordinate employees, they had no discretion on the matter of the retroactive appointments of the nine confidential staff specifically requested by the Board members; and that the re-issuance of the second set of appointments effective December 12, 2001 was duly approved by Administrator Jamora. They denied any financial damage on the part of LWUA since the retroactive payment of salaries was justified under the DBM letter approving the hiring of personnel retroactive to the date of actual services rendered by them.
The Ruling of the Ombudsman
The complaint was originally referred to the Ombudsmans Preliminary Investigation and Administrative Adjudication Bureau B, and assigned to Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer I Vivian Magsino-Gonzales (Pros. Magsino-Gonzales). After evaluating the documents on file, Pros. Magsino-Gonzales dispensed with the preliminary conference and preliminary investigation of the case. In her Decision dated September 30, 2003, she recommended the outright dismissal of the case, ratiocinating that the Ombudsman did not have the jurisdiction to resolve the issues of fraudulent appointments of the nine confidential staff and their alleged overpayment to the damage of LWUA and the government and to decide on the status of De Jesus as a dismissed employee which, in her view, belonged to the primary jurisdiction and technical expertise of the CSC.
Said recommendation was disapproved by the Ombudsman and the case was referred for review to Special Prosecution Officer Roberto Agagon (Special Pros. Agagon) of the Preliminary Investigation and Administrative Adjudication Bureau A. Without conducting a preliminary conference or investigation, Special Pros. Agagon came up with the assailed Review and Recommendation finding De Jesus and Parungao guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, gross neglect of duty, and falsification, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, respondents Rodolfo S. De Jesus and Edelwina DG. Parungao are meted out the penalty of Dismissal from the service with prejudice to re-entry into the government service.
The Ombudsman found that during De Jesus dismissal from the service at the LWUA, and despite the advice of the CSC to await the final resolution of his appeal, De Jesus illegally issued appointments to several co-terminous employees in June and August 2001. The appointments were found to have been prepared and issued by De Jesus and Parungao after the former had been terminated from LWUA, therefore, without authority to sign/act on any official LWUA document/official matter, which fact he was fully aware of, thereby making the solemnity of the documents questionable. All said appointments were, thus, found to be fraudulent, illegal, and of no legal force and effect. Since these were also prepared and initialed by Parungao, a conspiracy to commit falsification through dishonesty was found to have been present.
It was also found that the DBM approved the LWUA request on retroactivity of payment of back salaries because not all facts attendant to the illegal appointments had been disclosed to said office. The deliberate concealment of the illegal appointment papers was dishonest. The attachment of the illegal appointments to the LWUA Disbursement Voucher for payment of backsalaries, to the prejudice and damage of the government, was also cited as another deliberate concealment and distortion with false narration of facts.
The Ombudsman also viewed the second set of appointment papers as to have been issued for no apparent reason and designed to legalize the illegal appointments issued in June and August 2001. Thus, dishonesty on the part of De Jesus was found to be present for acting against a series of orders issued by the CSC and for the falsification of the illegal appointment papers.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
De Jesus and Parungao filed a petition for review with the CA on
the petition to the CA was filed, LWUA implemented the order of dismissal
against De Jesus and Parungao. Administrator Jamora issued Office Order No.
151204 notifying De Jesus and Parungao of their dismissal from the LWUA
effective at the close of office hours on
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the Motion to Dissolve TRO filed by respondents is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, let writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issue enjoining LWUA and the Office of the Ombudsman from enforcing the assailed Order and are thereby directed to maintain and/or restore the status quo existing at the time of the filing of the present petition by reinstating petitioners to their former positions pending the resolution of this case upon the filing of petitioners bond in the amount of P40,000.00 each, which will answer for whatever damages respondents may sustain in the event that the petition is not granted.
The CA found that the right to appeal from decisions of the Ombudsman imposing a penalty other than public censure or reprimand, or a penalty of suspension of more than one month or a fine equivalent to more than one months salary, granted to parties by Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (the Ombudsman Act) should generally carry with it the stay of these decisions pending appeal citing Lopez v. Court of Appeals. The right to a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was deemed to be in order because De Jesus and Parungaos right to be protected under R.A. No. 6770 was found to exist prima facie, and the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of such right.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered,
the respondents respective Motions for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated
Facura and Tuason then filed the present
Petition for Certiorari with this Court questioning the above-mentioned
Resolutions of the CA, docketed as G.R.
No. 166495. Pending resolution of the said Petition, the CA rendered its
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84902, dated
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Review and Recommendation and Order are MODIFIED hereby ordering the reinstatement of petitioner Parungao as Manager of the Human Resource Management Department of LWUA with back pay and without loss of seniority. The dismissal of petitioner De Jesus from the government service with prejudice to re-entry thereto is AFFIRMED.
Tuazon and the Ombudsman filed their respective Motions for Partial
Reconsideration, while De Jesus filed his Motion for Reconsideration. These were denied by the CA in its Resolution
The CA believed that at the time De Jesus signed the two sets of appointment papers, the CSC had not divested itself of jurisdiction and authority over his dismissal case. Thus, he misrepresented his authority to do so as his dismissal was still in effect and for resolution by the CSC. The CA agreed with De Jesus that it was his ministerial duty to comply with the request of the Board members. However, he failed to perform his ministerial duty, for if he had in fact done so, the second set of appointments would not have been issued as the first set of appointments with retroactive effectivity dates would have already been submitted to the CSC.
The CA further found the request for approval to the DBM to apply the earlier granted authority to hire retroactively as a disingenuous attempt to provide a semblance of legality to the intended retroactive appointments. It held that the approval or disapproval of appointment to the government was the sole office of the CSC, and not the DBM, as the LWUA authority to take final action on its appointments was by virtue of CSCs accreditation program. De Jesus failure to submit the retroactive appointment papers as prescribed under the CSC accreditation was viewed by the CA as a concealment of such retroactivity and, thus, dishonesty. To its mind, the CSC was deliberately made unaware of what the DBM was doing, and vice versa.
Parungao was exonerated by the CA after having been found that she took steps to clarify the matter with the CSC, informed her superiors about her misgivings and the legal effects of the retroactive appointments, and published such retroactive appointments in the LWUA Quarterly Reports on Accession, thus, demonstrating her good faith.
In its Resolution denying the motions for reconsideration filed by Facura, Tuazon and De Jesus, the CA ruled, among others, that the case of De Jesus v. Sandiganbayan could not be used as basis to absolve administrative liability, as the present case was not limited solely to falsification and preparation of the two sets of appointment papers. The CA found that De Jesus failed to comply with CSC rules due to his failure to submit the first set of appointment papers to the CSC. Dishonesty was found present when De Jesus submitted the first set of appointment papers to the DBM and the second set to CSC to comply with reportorial requirements, ensuring that the DBM was unaware of what the CSC was doing and vice versa. The CSC resolutions dismissing the complaint against De Jesus were found to have no bearing as the dismissal case was already before the CSC for resolution when De Jesus affixed his signature. Thus, De Jesus had no authority to sign the appointment papers and by doing so, he defied the CSC directive recalling his reinstatement. Violation of CSC rules on appointment was found to be distinct from misrepresentation of authority to sign appointment papers.
Hence, the present Petitions for Review on Certiorari separately filed by De Jesus and the Ombudsman, docketed as G.R. Nos. 185129 and 184263, respectively.
The issues presented for resolution by Facura (now deceased) and Tuason in G.R. No. 166495 are as follows:
a. Whether or not an appeal of the Ombudsmans decision in administrative cases carries with it the suspension of the imposed penalty;
b. Whether or not petitioners were heard before the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction; and
c. Whether or not private respondents are entitled to the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
The assignment of errors presented by De Jesus in G.R. No. 184129, are as follows:
COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF CONCLUSIVENESS
OF JUDGMENT AND/OR RES JUDICATA ARISING FROM SC DECISION DATED
THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN NOT FINDING PETITIONER TO HAVE ACTED IN GOOD FAITH WHEN HE OBEYED THE PATENTLY LAWFUL ORDERS OF HIS SUPERIORS.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN STILL RELYING ON CSC RES. NO. 01-1811 AND RES. NO. 02-1090 AFTER HAVING BEEN RENDERED MOOT AND ACADEMIC BY CSC RES. NO. 03-0405.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN FINDING PETITIONER TO HAVE COMMITTED AN ACT OF DISHONESTY IN RELATION TO THE CSC ACCREDITATION PROGRAM.
PUBLIC RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND THE COURT OF APPEALS DO NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO COLLATERALLY RULE AGAINST PETITIONERS TITLE AS DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR OF LWUA.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE AS MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES THE EDUCATION AND LENGTH OF SERVICE OF PETITIONER IN THE IMPOSITION OF SUPREME PENALTY OF DISMISSAL.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN STILL FINDING PETITIONER GUILTY OF MISREPRESENTATION OF AUTHORITY AFTER EXONERATING ATTY. EDELWINA DG. PARUNGAO.
The issue presented for resolution by the Ombudsman in G.R. No. 184263 is as follows:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE EXISTS AGAINST RESPONDENT PARUNGAO FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSE OF DISHONESTY WHICH WARRANTS HER DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE .
THE RULING OF THE COURT
G.R. No. 166495
The issue of whether or not an appeal of the Ombudsman decision in an administrative case carries with it the immediate suspension of the imposed penalty has been laid to rest in the recent resolution of the case of Ombudsman v. Samaniego, where this Court held that the decision of the Ombudsman is immediately executory pending appeal and may not be stayed by the filing of an appeal or the issuance of an injunctive writ, to wit:
7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as
amended by Administrative Order No. 17 dated
SEC. 7. Finality and execution of decision. Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the motion for reconsideration.
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal.
A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly enforced and properly implemented. The refusal or failure by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure shall be a ground for disciplinary action against such officer. [Emphases supplied]
The Ombudsmans decision imposing the penalty of suspension for one year is immediately executory pending appeal. It cannot be stayed by the mere filing of an appeal to the CA. This rule is similar to that provided under Section 47 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
In the case of In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, Secretary of the DPWH, we held:
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman are clearly procedural and no vested right of the petitioner is violated as he is considered preventively suspended while his case is on appeal. Moreover, in the event he wins on appeal, he shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal. Besides, there is no such thing as a vested interest in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office.
the ruling in the above cited case, this Court, in Buencamino v. Court of
upheld the resolution of the CA denying Buencaminos application for
preliminary injunction against the immediate implementation of the suspension
order against him. The Court stated therein that the CA did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in denying petitioners application for injunctive relief
because Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman was amended by Administrative Order No. 17 dated
Respondent cannot successfully rely on Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 12. Effect of appeal ― The appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to be reviewed unless the Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just.
In the first place, the Rules of Court may apply to cases in the Office of the Ombudsman suppletorily only when the procedural matter is not governed by any specific provision in the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. Here, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended, is categorical, an appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory.
Moreover, Section 13 (8), Article XI of the Constitution authorizes the Office of the Ombudsman to promulgate its own rules of procedure. In this connection, Sections 18 and 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 also provide that the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to "promulgate its rules of procedure for the effective exercise or performance of its powers, functions and duties" and to amend or modify its rules as the interest of justice may require. For the CA to issue a preliminary injunction that will stay the penalty imposed by the Ombudsman in an administrative case would be to encroach on the rule-making powers of the Office of the Ombudsman under the Constitution and RA 6770 as the injunctive writ will render nugatory the provisions of Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Clearly, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman supersedes the discretion given to the CA in Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court when a decision of the Ombudsman in an administrative case is appealed to the CA. The provision in the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman that a decision is immediately executory is a special rule that prevails over the provisions of the Rules of Court. Specialis derogat generali. When two rules apply to a particular case, that which was specially designed for the said case must prevail over the other. [Emphases supplied]
Thus, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 17, is categorical in providing that an appeal shall not stop an Ombudsman decision from being executory. This rule applies to the appealable decisions of the Ombudsman, namely, those where the penalty imposed is other than public censure or reprimand, or a penalty of suspension of more than one month, or a fine equivalent to more than one months salary. Hence, the dismissal of De Jesus and Parungao from the government service is immediately executory pending appeal.
The aforementioned Section 7 is also clear in providing that in case the penalty is removal and the respondent wins his appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the removal. As explained above, there is no such thing as a vested interest in an office, or an absolute right to hold office, except constitutional offices with special provisions on salary and tenure. The Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman being procedural, no vested right of De Jesus and Parungao would be violated as they would be considered under preventive suspension, and entitled to the salary and emoluments they did not receive in the event that they would win their appeal.
The ratiocination above also clarifies the application of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 7 of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. The CA, even on terms it may deem just, has no discretion to stay a decision of the Ombudsman, as such procedural matter is governed specifically by the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The CAs issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction, staying the penalty of dismissal imposed by the Ombudsman in this administrative case, is thus an encroachment on the rule-making powers of the Ombudsman under Section 13 (8), Article XI of the Constitution, and Sections 18 and 27 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Office of the Ombudsman the authority to promulgate its own rules of procedure. The issuance of an injunctive writ renders nugatory the provisions of Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.
CA, however, cannot be blamed for so ruling because at that time the Courts rulings
were not definite and, thus, nebulous.
There were no clear-cut guidelines yet.
Even the initial ruling in Samaniego
[O]nly orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases imposing the penalty of public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary shall be final and unappealable hence, immediately executory. In all other disciplinary cases where the penalty imposed is other than public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary, the law gives the respondent the right to appeal. In these cases, the order, directive or decision becomes final and executory only after the lapse of the period to appeal if no appeal is perfected, or after the denial of the appeal from the said order, directive or decision. It is only then that execution shall perforce issue as a matter of right. The fact that the Ombudsman Act gives parties the right to appeal from its decisions should generally carry with it the stay of these decisions pending appeal. Otherwise, the essential nature of these judgments as being appealable would be rendered nugatory. [Emphasis in the original].
Having ruled that the decisions of the Ombudsman are immediately executory pending appeal, The Court finds it unncessary to determine whether or not Facura and Tuason were heard before the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
G.R. Nos. 184129 & 184263
The Court now looks into the issue of whether De Jesus was rightfully dismissed from the government service, and whether Parungao was righfully exonerated by the CA.
Conclusiveness of Judgment
De Jesus contends that under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment and/or res judicata, the present case is bound by the decision of this Court in De Jesus v. Sandiganbayan.
The original complaint filed with the Ombudsman by Facura and Tuason spawned two cases, an administrative proceeding docketed as OMB-C-A-0496-J, which is the subject of this present case, and a proceeding for the determination of probable cause for the filing of criminal charges docketed as OMB-C-C-02-0712-J.
to the criminal charges, probable cause was found to be present by the
Ombudsman, and nine (9) informations for falsification of public documents were
separately filed against De Jesus and Parungao with the Sandiganbayan docketed
as Criminal Case Nos. 27894-27902. After
his Motion to Quash was denied, De Jesus filed a petition for certiorari with
this Court docketed as G.R. Nos. 164166 & 164173-80, entitled De Jesus v. Sandiganbayan.
This petition was resolved on
a result, the criminal cases filed with the Sandiganbayan were consequently
De Jesus cited the case of Borlongan v. Buenaventura to support his argument that this administrative case should be bound by the decision in De Jesus v. Sandiganbayan. In Borlongan, similar to the situation prevailing in this case, the complaint-affidavit filed with the Ombudsman also spawned two cases a proceeding for the determination of probable cause for the filing of criminal charges, and an administrative case subject of the petition. In said case, this Court found that its factual findings regarding the proceeding for the determination of probable cause bound the disposition of the factual issues in the administrative case under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, as both the probable cause proceeding and the administrative case require the same quantum of evidence, that is, substantial evidence. Furthermore, the factual backdrop in the proceeding for the determination of probable cause, which this Court declared as insufficient to hold respondents for trial, was the same set of facts which confronted this Court in the administrative case.
On the other hand, the Ombudsman, Tuason and LWUA raised the jurisprudential principle that the dismissal of a criminal case involving the same set of facts does not automatically result in the dismissal of the administrative charges due to the distinct and independent nature of one proceeding from the other. They further countered that the only issue resolved in De Jesus was the absence of mens rea, which was not a mandatory requirement for a finding of falsification of official documents as an administrative offense; and although it was found that there was no absolutely false narration of facts in the two sets of appointment papers, the issue in this administrative case was not limited solely to falsification of official documents. It was further contended that the evidence and admissions in the administrative case were different from the evidence in the criminal case, thus, the findings in the criminal case could not bind the administrative case. Finally, they argued that the doctrine of res judicata would only apply to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to administrative matters.
The Court agrees with De Jesus insofar as the finding regarding the falsification of official documents is concerned.
Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. - The effect of
a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the
x x x
(b)In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and
(c)In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
The principle of res judicata lays down two main rules: (1) the judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties and their privies and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action either before the same or any other tribunal; and (2) any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which a judgment or decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claims or demands, purposes, or subject matters of the two suits are the same. The first rule which corresponds to paragraph (b) of Section 47 above, is referred to as "bar by former judgment"; while the second rule, which is embodied in paragraph (c), is known as "conclusiveness of judgment."
As what is involved in this case is a proceeding for the determination of probable cause and an administrative case, necessarily involving different causes of action, the applicable principle is conclusiveness of judgment. The Court in Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City explained such, to wit:
The second concept - conclusiveness of judgment- states that a fact or question which was in issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 ). Identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity of issue.
Justice Feliciano, in Smith Bell & Company (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals (197 SCRA 201, 210 ), reiterated Lopez v. Reyes (76 SCRA 179 ) in regard to the distinction between bar by former judgment which bars the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand, or cause of action, and conclusiveness of judgment which bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action.
The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or questions which were in issue and adjudicated in former action are commonly applied to all matters essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation. Thus, it extends to questions necessarily implied in the final judgment, although no specific finding may have been made in reference thereto and although such matters were directly referred to in the pleadings and were not actually or formally presented. Under this rule, if the record of the former trial shows that the judgment could not have been rendered without deciding the particular matter, it will be considered as having settled that matter as to all future actions between the parties and if a judgment necessarily presupposes certain premises, they are as conclusive as the judgment itself.
Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them. Simply put, conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action.
Although involving different causes of action, this administrative case and the proceeding for probable cause are grounded on the same set of facts, involve the same issue of falsification of official documents, and require the same quantum of evidence substantial evidence, as was similarly found in Borlongan, and correctly relied upon by De Jesus.
It was ruled in De Jesus that there was no reasonable ground to believe that the requisite criminal intent or mens rea was present. Although the presence of mens rea is indeed unnecessary for a finding of guilt in an administrative case for falsification of official documents, it was expressly found by this Court in De Jesus that there was no absolutely false narration of facts in the two sets of appointment papers. The pertinent portion is quoted hereunder as follows:
intent must be shown in felonies committed by means of dolo, such as
falsification. In this case, there is no reasonable ground to believe
that the requisite criminal intent or mens rea was present. The
Ombudsman assails the first set of documents with dates of appointment earlier
Hence, the finding that nothing in the two sets of appointment papers constitutes an absolutely false narration of facts is binding on this case, but only insofar as the issue of falsification of public documents is concerned, and not on the other issues involved herein, namely, the other acts of De Jesus and Parungao which may amount to dishonesty, gross neglect of duty, grave misconduct, being notoriously undesirable, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, as charged in the complaint.
Contrary to Tuason and LWUAs contentions, the factual finding of this Court in De Jesus as to the absence of falsification is based on the same evidence as in this administrative case. There are, however, other evidence and admissions present in this case as cited by Tuason and LWUA which pertain to other issues and not to the issue of falsification.
Meanwhile the doctrine in Montemayor v. Bundalian that res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative powers, has been abandoned in subsequent cases which have since applied the principle of res judicata to administrative cases. Hence, res judicata can likewise be made applicable to the case at bench. Thus, given all the foregoing, the factual finding in De Jesus that there was no false statement of facts in both sets of appointment papers, is binding in this case.
Even granting that the principle of conclusiveness of judgment is inapplicable to the case at bench, this Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the factual findings in De Jesus based on a careful review of the evidence on record. The existence of malice or criminal intent is not a mandatory requirement for a finding of falsification of official documents as an administrative offense. What is simply required is a showing that De Jesus and Parungao prepared and signed the appointment papers knowing fully well that they were false.
The Court, however, believes that in this case, at the time each set of appointment papers were made, De Jesus and Parungao believed they were making true statements. They prepared and signed the first set on the basis of the inter-office memoranda issued by the Board members appointing their respective confidential staff conformably with DBM approval. The second set was prepared to correct the retroactive appointments to conform to the CSC reportorial requirements, and the same was also approved by Administrator Jamora. There was no reason for De Jesus and Parungao to believe such to be false. Irregular it is perhaps, not being in conformity with the CSC rules on accreditation, but not false. Therefore, this Court finds that no falsification of official documents occured.
Legality of Reinstatement and Authority to Sign
The CA held that, as evinced from CSC Resolution No. 011811, which ordered LWUA to conduct an investigation, the CSC had not divested itself of jurisdiction and authority over De Jesus dismissal case at the time he issued and signed both sets of appointment papers. The CA ruled that in doing so, he defied the CSC directive recalling his reinstatement.
De Jesus argues that, his title is not open to indirect challenge and can only be assailed in a proceeding for quo warranto; and that absent any judicial declaration, he remained to be a de jure officer, and even if he were only a de facto officer, his acts were done under color of authority and, thus, valid and binding. De Jesus further argues that the pendency of his appeal to the CSC did not render his reinstatement illegal, as he had no choice but to rely on the regularity of the LWUA board resolution which reinstated him, and this reinstatement should have rendered superfluous the CSC resolution ordering investigation. He further contends that it was wrong for the CA to rely on the CSC resolutions which were interlocutory. Since CSC Resolution No. 030504 ultimately dismissed the case against him and in effect nullified his prior dismissal from LWUA, he should be considered as never having left his office. Said CSC resolution should have also rendered the previous CSC resolutions moot and academic.
De Jesus also cites CSC Resolution Nos. 07-0633 and 07-0146, which relate to other complaints filed against him, and which recognize the legality of his reinstatement and affirm CSC Resolution No. 030504 as res judicata. He argues that this case should be bound by the three aforementioned CSC resolutions under the principle of res judicata.
brief review of the relevant facts is necessary to resolve the issue at hand. LWUA
dismissed De Jesus on
Thus, prior to the CSC resolution recalling his reinstatement and declaring it illegal and void, De Jesus cannot be faulted for relying on the LWUA board resolution reinstating him as Deputy Administrator. Furthermore, the CSC resolution recalling his reinstatement and declaring it illegal and void was issued only after the appointment papers were prepared and signed. Thus, there was no misrepresentation of authority on the part of De Jesus when he signed the appointment papers because he did so after he was reinstated by the LWUA Board and before such reinstatement was declared illegal and void by the CSC.
More important, the dismissal case against him was ultimately dismissed, thereby conclusively establishing his right to his title and position as Deputy Administrator of LWUA.
Duties under the CSC Accreditation Program
The CA also found that De Jesus failed to comply with the CSC rules under the Accreditation Program due to his failure to submit the first set of retroactive appointment papers to the CSC. Such failure was said to constitute a concealment of the retroactivity from the CSC and, thus, dishonesty on his part. Parungao, on the other hand, was reinstated by the CA after having been found that she took steps to clarify the matter with the CSC; that she informed her superiors about her misgivings and the legal effects of the retroactive appointments; and that she published such retroactive appointments in the LWUA Quarterly Reports on Accession, thus, demonstrating her good faith.
De Jesus argues that, as Deputy Administrator, it was not his responsibility to comply with the CSC rules under the Accreditation Program. He contends that the CA itself recognized this fact when it stated that it was the responsibility of the LWUA Administrator to know and implement the terms and conditions of accreditation. The CA even further stated that it was the Human Resources Management Officer who had the responsibility of preparing and submitting the appointment papers with the ROPA.
On the other hand, Tuason and LWUA argue that under Executive Order (E.O.) No. 286, the Office of the Deputy Administrator has direct supervision over the HRMD, and so De Jesus should be held liable for failure to submit the first set of appointment papers in accordance with the CSC rules.
Under CSC Resolution No. 967701 granting LWUA authority to take final action on its appointments under the CSC Accreditation Program, the following was said to have been violated:
6. That for purposes of immediate monitoring and records keeping, the LWUA shall submit within the first fifteen calendar days of each ensuing month to the CSFO two copies of the monthly Report on Personnel Actions (ROPA) together with certified true copies of appointments acted upon;
7. That failure to submit the ROPAs within the prescribed period shall render all appointments listed therein lapsed and ineffective;
8. That appointments issued within the month but not listed in the ROPA for the said month shall become ineffective 30 days from issuance;
x x x
culled from the CSC letter
The LWUA Administrator/appointing authority shall:
- Take final action on all appointments that he issues/signs;
- Exercise delegated authority to take final action on appointments following the terms and conditions stipulated in the Resolution and within the limits and restrictions of Civil Service Law, rules, policies and standards;
- Assume personal liability for the payment of salaries for actual services rendered by employees whose appointments have been invalidated by the CSNCRO.
On the other hand, the Human Resources Management Officer shall:
- Ensure that all procedures, requirements, and supporting papers to appointments specified in MC No. 38, s. 1997 and MC Nos. 11 and 12, s. 1996 have been complied with and found to be in order before the appointment is signed by the appointing authority;
x x x
- Prepare and submit within the first fifteen calendar days of each ensuing month to the CSFO concerned two copies of the monthly ROPA together with certified true copies of appointments issued and finally acted upon; and
x x x
Under LWUA Office Order No. 205.01, Administrator Jamora authorized De Jesus to sign appointment papers of appointees to vacant plantilla positions in LWUA which were previously approved by the Administrator or the Board of Trustees. Thus:
In the exigency of the service and to facilitate/expedite administrative works, the Deputy Administrator, Administrative Services, is hereby authorized under delegated authority to act on and sign for and in behalf of the Administrator, documents such as Office Orders, Appointment Papers, Inter-Office Memoranda and other administrative documents including communications to CSC and/or DBM relating to filling up of vacant positions, either by promotion or recruitment, as well as transfer of personnel, which have been previously cleared/approved in writing by the Administrator, or by the Board of Trustees, as the case may be. Also delegated is the authority to act and sign for and in behalf of the Administrator, the Notice(s) of Salary Adjustment (NOSA) and Notice(s) of Salary Increment (NOSI). [Emphases supplied]
It is clear from the above that the responsibility to submit within the first fifteen (15) calendar days of each ensuing month to the CSFO two copies of the monthly ROPA together with certified true copies of appointments acted upon lies with the Human Resources Management Officer (HRMO), namely, Parungao. Even granting that De Jesus, as Deputy Administrator, has direct supervision over the Human Resources and Management Department, it is the HRMO who is expressly tasked with the duty to submit to the CSC the ROPA with true copies of appointments finally acted upon. Therefore, De Jesus, as Deputy Administrator, cannot be held liable for such failure to submit the first set of appointment papers with the ROPA as prescribed under the CSC accreditation rules.
The authority to exercise the delegated authority to take final action on appointment papers is lodged in the LWUA Administrator. The only duty of De Jesus is to sign appointment papers previously approved by the Administrator or Board. Thus, De Jesus duty to sign appointment papers is only ministerial in nature, while the discretionary power to take final action on appointments remains lodged in the LWUA Administrator. De Jesus is, thus, bound only to sign appointment papers previously approved by the LWUA Administrator or Board, in accordance with LWUA Office Order No. 205.01, having no power to exercise any discretion on the matter.
In exercising his ministerial duty of signing the appointment papers, De Jesus obeyed the patently lawful order of his superior. CSC Resolution No. 967701 does not charge De Jesus with the duty to know and comply with the rules of the Accreditation Program, that being the province of the LWUA Administrator and HRMO, as expressly provided for in the CSC letter. Therefore, so long as the appointment papers were approved by the Administrator or Board, the order to sign them is patently lawful. Hence, De Jesus cannot be faulted for obeying the patently lawful orders of his superior. Furthermore, there is no evidence on record to indicate that he acted in bad faith, as what he did was in conformity with the authority granted to him by LWUA Office Order No. 205.01.
The same, however, cannot be said of Parungao. As HRMO, she was expressly charged with the duty to prepare and submit within the first fifteen calendar days of each ensuing month to the CSFO concerned two copies of the monthly ROPA together with certified true copies of appointments issued and finally acted upon. Thus, she must necessarily be aware that failure to submit the ROPAs within the prescribed period shall render all appointments listed therein lapsed and ineffective, and that appointments issued within the month but not listed in the ROPA for the said month shall become ineffective 30 days from issuance. Knowing this, she should never have given her approval by initialing the first set of retroactive appointments as she should have known that they would be ineffective under the CSC accreditation rules.
No Dishonesty, Mere Confusion
With the finding that the request for approval of the DBM to apply the earlier granted authority retroactively was a disingenuous attempt to provide a semblance of legality to the intended retroactive appointments, the CA held that the approval or disapproval of appointment to the government was the sole office of the CSC, and not the DBM. Furthermore, dishonesty was found present when De Jesus submitted the first set of appointment papers to the DBM and the second set to the CSC, apparently to ensure that the DBM was unaware of what the CSC was doing and vice versa.
A careful perusal of the records will show that the request for approval to the DBM, characterized by the CA as an attempt to provide a semblance of legality, was the act of Administrator Jamora and not of De Jesus or Parungao. The request letter to the DBM was signed by Jamora. Therefore, neither De Jesus nor Parungao can be held liable for the act. The Court also failed to find any evidence on record that De Jesus deliberately ensured that DBM was unaware of what the CSC was doing and vice versa. It has already been discussed that De Jesus only duty was to sign the appointment papers in accordance with the LWUA office order granting him authority to do so. All responsibilities relating to the reportorial requirements pertain to Parungao as the HRMO.
Furthermore, the appointment papers provided to the DBM were referenced by Administrator Jamora in his request letter, and not by De Jesus or Parungao. The first set of appointment papers was never submitted to the CSC not because the retroactivity of the appointments was being concealed, but precisely because it was realized that such did not comply with the reportorial requirements. Given the foregoing, there could have been no dishonesty on the part of De Jesus and Parungao.
Instead, it appears that the root of the dilemma in the case at bench lies in confusion rather than dishonesty. This confusion pertains to the misunderstanding of the roles of the CSC and the DBM vis-a-vis the issuance of appointment papers. Such confusion can be gleaned from the brief to Administrator Jamora signed by De Jesus and initialed by Parungao, stating that the issues on the retroactive appointments and overpayments were deemed settled with the reply letter of the DBM on the retroactive implementation of the authority previously granted.
The CA correctly stated that the approval or disapproval of appointment to the government is the sole office of the CSC, and not the DBM, as the very authority given to LWUA to take final action on its appointments is by virtue of CSCs accreditation program. Thus, the DBM approval to retroact its previously granted authority to hire the LWUA confidential staff is subject to an appointment validly issued in accordance with CSC rules. In other words, the DBM approval for retroactivity presupposed valid appointments. DBMs approval was mistakenly understood to pertain to both the back salaries and the validity of the staffs appointments when, in fact, DBMs approval related only to LWUAs authority to hire and not to the validity of the appointments of the hired personnel. Therefore, back salaries should only have been due upon the effectivity of valid appointments, which is within the authority of the CSC to approve, and not of the DBM.
refers to a persons "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in
principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud,
deceive or betray."
The absence of dishonesty on the part of De Jesus and Parungao is supported by
their good faith in complying with the orders of Administrator Jamora. Their
good faith is manifested in several circumstances. First, their brief to Administrator Jamora,
stating that the issues on the retroactive appointments and overpayments were
deemed settled with the reply letter of the DBM, demonstrates that they actually
and honestly believed that the letter had in fact resolved the issue. Second, their
to Administrator Jamora explained that the appointment papers with retroactive
effectivity dates would be violative of the provisions of CSC Res. No. 967701 and CSC
Omnibus Rules on Appointments Rule 7, Section 11. Third, an informal
held with the CSC Field Director to seek advice regarding the retroactive
appointments, wherein it was suggested that the appointments be re-issued
Parungao - Guilty
Of Simple Neglect of Duty
Simple neglect of duty is defined as the failure to give proper attention to a task expected from an employee resulting from either carelessness or indifference. In this regard, the Court finds Parungao, as HRMO, guilty of simple neglect of duty. Given her duties under the CSC Accreditation Program, she should have been aware of the reportorial requirements, and of the fact that it is the CSC which has authority over appointments, and not the DBM. Had she given the proper attention to her responsibility as HRMO, the first set of appointment papers would never have been issued, thereby avoiding the present predicament altogether.
When a public officer takes an oath of office, he or she binds himself or herself to faithfully perform the duties of the office and use reasonable skill and diligence, and to act primarily for the benefit of the public. Thus, in the discharge of duties, a public officer is to use that prudence, caution and attention which careful persons use in the management of their affairs. Parungao failed to exercise such prudence, caution and attention.
Simple neglect of duty is classified under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service as a less grave offense punishable by suspension without pay for one month and one day to six months. Finding no circumstance to warrant the imposition of the maximum penalty of six months, and considering her demonstrated good faith, the Court finds the imposition of suspension without pay for one month and one day as justified.
(1) in G.R. No. 166495, the petition is GRANTED.
(2) in G.R. No. 184129, the petition is GRANTED,
and in G.R. No. 184263, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed
a. ordering the reinstatement of Rodolfo S. De Jesus as Deputy Administrator of the LWUA with full back salaries and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of his removal; and
b. finding Human Resources Management Officer Edelwina DG. Parungao GUILTY of Simple Neglect of Duty and hereby imposing the penalty of suspension from office for one (1) month and one (1) day without pay.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
* Designated as an additional member in lieu of
Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, per raffle dated
 Rollo (G.R. 166495), pp. 235-237, 307-314. Penned by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga with Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta, concurring.
 Rollo (G.R. 184129), pp. 73-99. Penned by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga with Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta, concurring.
 438 Phil. 351 (2002).
 G.R. Nos. 164166 & 164173-80,
 G.R. No. 175573,
 Administrative Order
No. 7, dated
 Buencamino v. CA,
G.R. No. 175895,
 G.R. No. 150274,
 G.R. No. 175895,
 See Section 3, Rule V, Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.
 Republic Act No. 6770.
 SEC. 12. Effect of appeal. The appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to be reviewed unless the Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just. [Emphasis supplied]
 Supra note 36.
 G.R. No. 169241,
 Supra note 32.
 Rollo (G.R. 184129), p. 406.
 G.R. No. 167234,
 Supra note 32.
 Ombudsman v. Torres, G.R. No. 168309,
 Montemayor v. Bundalian, 453 Phil. 158 (2003).
 Noceda v. Arbizo-Directo, G.R. No. 178495,
 Alamayri v. Pabale, G.R. No. 151243,
 G.R. Nos. 76265 and
 Noceda v. Arbizo-Directo, G.R. No.
 Borlongan v.
 Supra note 48.
 Supra note 32 at 405-406.
 453 Phil. 158, 169 (2003).
 Borlongan v.
 Supra note 48.
 Rollo (G.R. No. 184129), pp. 469-471.
Failure of Various Employees to Register their Time of Arrival and/or Departure
from Office in the Chronolog Machine, A.M. No. 2005-21-SC,
 Rollo (G.R. 184129), pp. 485-487.
 Salumbides v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 180917,