EN BANC
|
MA.
MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ Petitioner, - versus - THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE,
RISA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, DANILO D. LIM, FELIPE PESTAÑO, EVELYN PESTAÑO,
RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN
(BAYAN); MOTHER MARY JOHN MANANZAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON OF PAGBABAGO; DANILO
RAMOS, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP); ATTY.
EDRE OLALIA, ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLE’S
LAWYERS (NUPL); FERDINAND R. GAITE, CHAIRPERSON, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY,
RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE); and JAMES
TERRY RIDON OF THE LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS), Respondents. FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR.,
Respondent-Intervenor. |
G.R. No. 193459 Present: CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, VELASCO, JR.,* NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
ABAD, VILLARAMA,
JR., PEREZ, SERENO,
JJ. Promulgated: March 8,
2011 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
R E S O L U T I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
For
resolution is petitioner’s “Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated
15 February 2011)” dated February 25, 2011 (Motion).
Upon
examination of the averments in the Motion, the Court finds neither substantial
nor cogent reason to reconsider its Decision.
A plain reading of the Decision could very well dispose of petitioner’s
previous contentions, raised anew in the Motion, but the Court finds it proper,
in writing finis to the issue, to draw petitioner’s attention to certain
markers in the Decision.
I
Contrary
to petitioner’s assertion that the Court sharply deviated from the ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of
Representatives,[1]
the Decision of
To
argue, as petitioner does, that there never was a simultaneous referral of two
impeachment complaints as they were actually referred to the committee
“separately, one after the other”[2] is
to dismantle her own interpretation of Francisco that the one-year bar
is to be reckoned from the filing of the impeachment complaint. Petitioner’s Motion concedes[3]
that the Francisco doctrine on the initiation of an impeachment
proceeding includes the House’s initial action on the complaint. By recognizing the legal import of a
referral, petitioner abandons her earlier claim that per Francisco
an impeachment proceeding is initiated by the mere filing of an impeachment
complaint.
Having
uprooted her reliance on the Francisco case in propping her position
that the initiation of an impeachment proceeding must be reckoned from the
filing of the complaint, petitioner insists on actual initiation and not
“constructive initiation by legal fiction” as averred by Justice Adolfo Azcuna
in his separate opinion in Francisco.
In
Justice Azcuna’s opinion which concurred with the majority, what he similarly
found untenable was the stretching of the reckoning point of initiation to the
time that the Committee on Justice (the Committee) report reaches the floor of
the House.[4] Notably, the provisions of the Impeachment
Rules of the 12th Congress that were successfully challenged in Francisco
provided that an impeachment proceeding was to be “deemed initiated”
upon the Committee’s finding of sufficiency of substance or upon the House’s
affirmance or overturning of the Committee’s finding,[5]
which was clearly referred to as the instances “presumably for internal
purposes of the House, as to the timing of some of its internal action on
certain relevant matters.”[6] Definitely, “constructive initiation by legal
fiction” did not refer to the aspects of filing and referral in the
regular course of impeachment, for this was precisely the gist of Francisco
in pronouncing what initiation means.
The
Court adhered to the Francisco-ordained balance in the tug-of-war
between those who want to stretch and those who want to shrink
the term “initiate,” either of which could disrupt the provision’s congruency
to the rationale of the constitutional provision. Petitioner’s imputation that the Court’s
Decision presents a sharp deviation from Francisco as it defers the
operability of the one-year bar rule rings hollow.
Petitioner
urges that the word “initiate” must be read in its plain, ordinary and
technical meaning, for it is contrary to reason, logic and common sense to
reckon the beginning or start of the initiation process from its end or
conclusion.
Petitioner
would have been correct had the subject constitutional provision been worded as
“no initiation process of the impeachment proceeding shall be
commenced against the same official more than once within a period of one
year,” in which case the reckoning would literally point to the “start of the
beginning.” To immediately reckon the
initiation to what petitioner herself concedes as the start of the initiation
process is to countenance a raw or half-baked initiation.
In
re-affirming what the phrase “no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated”
means, the Court closely applied Francisco on what comprises or
completes the initiation phase. Nothing
can be more unequivocal or well-defined than the elucidation of filing-and-referral
in Francisco. Petitioner must
come to terms with her denial of the exact terms of Francisco.
Petitioner
posits that referral is not an integral or indispensable part of the initiation
of impeachment proceedings, in case of a direct filing of a verified complaint
or resolution of impeachment by at least one-third of all the Members of the
House.[7]
The
facts of the case do not call for the resolution of this issue however. Suffice it to restate a footnote in the
Court’s Decision that in such case of “an abbreviated mode of initiation[, x x
x] the filing of the complaint and the taking of initial action [House
directive to automatically transmit] are merged into a single act.”[8] Moreover, it is highly impossible in such
situation to coincidentally initiate a second impeachment proceeding in the
interregnum, if any, given the period between filing and referral.
Petitioner’s
discussion on the singular tense of the word “complaint” is too tenuous to
require consideration. The phraseology
of the one-year bar rule does not concern itself with a numerical limitation of
impeachment complaints. If it were the
intention of the framers of the Constitution to limit the number of complaints,
they would have easily so stated in clear and unequivocal language.
Petitioner
further avers that the demonstrated concerns against reckoning the period from
the filing of the complaint are mere possibilities based on a general mistrust
of the Filipino people and their Representatives. To her, mere possibility of abuse is not a
conclusive argument against the existence of power nor a reason to invalidate a
law.
The
present case does not involve an invalidation of a legal provision on a grant
of power. Since the issue precisely
involves upholding an express limitation of a power, it behooves
the Court to look into the rationale behind the constitutional proscription
which guards against an explicit instance of abuse of power. The Court’s duty entails an examination of
the same possible scenarios considered by the framers of the Constitution (i.e.,
incidents that may prove to disrupt the law-making function of Congress and
unduly or too frequently harass the impeachable officer), which are basically
the same grounds being invoked by petitioner to arrive at her desired
conclusion.
Ironically,
petitioner also offers the Court with various possibilities and vivid scenarios
to grimly illustrate her perceived oppression.
And her own mistrust leads her to find inadequate the existence
of the pertinent constitutional provisions, and to entertain doubt on “the
respect for and adherence of the House and the respondent committee to the
same.”[9]
While petitioner concedes that there
is a framework of safeguards for impeachable officers laid down in Article XI
of the Constitution, she downplays these layers of protection as illusory or
inutile without implementation and enforcement, as if these can be disregarded
at will.
Contrary
to petitioner’s position that the Court left in the hands of the House the
question as to when an impeachment proceeding is initiated, the Court merely
underscored the House’s conscious role in the initiation of an impeachment
proceeding. The Court added nothing
new in pinpointing the obvious reckoning point of initiation in light of the Francisco
doctrine. Moreover, referral of an
impeachment complaint to the appropriate committee is already a power or
function granted by the Constitution to the House.
Petitioner
goes on to argue that the House has no discretion on the matter of referral of
an impeachment complaint and that once filed, an impeachment complaint should,
as a matter of course, be referred to the Committee.
The
House cannot indeed refuse to refer an impeachment complaint that is filed without a subsisting bar. To refer an impeachment complaint within an existing one-year bar,
however, is to commit the apparently unconstitutional act of initiating a
second impeachment proceeding, which may be struck down under Rule 65 for grave
abuse of discretion. It bears recalling
that the one-year bar rule itself is a constitutional limitation on the House’s
power or function to refer a complaint.
Tackling
on the House floor in its order of business a clearly constitutionally-prohibited
second impeachment complaint on the matter of whether to make the appropriate
referral goes precisely into the propriety of the referral and not on the
merits of the complaint. The House needs
only to ascertain the existence or expiry of the constitutional ban of one
year, without any regard to the claims set forth in the complaint.
To
petitioner, the intervening days from the filing of the complaint to whatever
completes the initiation of an impeachment proceeding is immaterial in
mitigating the influx of successive complaints since allowing multiple
impeachment charges would result to the same harassment and oppression. She particularly cites Constitutional
Commissioner Ricardo Romulo’s concerns on the amount of time spent if “multiple
impeachment charges”[10]
are allowed. She fails, however, to
establish whether Commissioner Romulo limited or quantified his reference to
not more than one complaint or charge.
IN
SUM, the Court did not deviate from, as it did apply the twin rule of filing and referral in the present case, with Francisco as the guiding
light. Petitioner refuses to see the
other half of that light, however.
II
Petitioner, meanwhile, reiterates her
argument that promulgation means publication.
She again cites her thesis that Commonwealth Act No. 638, Article 2 of
the Civil Code, and the two Tañada v.
Tuvera[11]
cases mandate that the Impeachment Rules be published for effectivity. Petitioner raises nothing new to change the
Court’s stance on the matter.
To
reiterate, when the Constitution uses the word “promulgate,” it does not
necessarily mean to publish in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation. Promulgation, as
used in Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution, suitably takes the
meaning of “to make known” as it should be generally understood.
Petitioner continues to misapply Neri
v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations[12] where the Court noted that the
Constitution unmistakably requires the publication of rules of procedure
pertaining to inquiries in aid of legislation.
If the Constitution warranted the publication of Impeachment Rules, then
it could have expediently indicated such requirement as it did in the case of
legislative inquiries.
The
Constitution clearly gives the House a wide discretion on how to effectively
promulgate its Impeachment Rules. It is
not for this Court to tell a co-equal branch of government on how to do so when
such prerogative is lodged exclusively
with it.
Still, petitioner argues that the
Court erred when it ruled that “to require publication of the House Impeachment
Rules would only delay the impeachment proceedings and cause the House of
Representatives to violate constitutionally mandated periods…” She insists that the Committee, after
publishing the Impeachment Rules, would still have a remainder of 45 days out
of the 60-day period within which to finish its business.
Petitioner is mistaken in her
assertion. Note that the Court discussed
the above-mentioned scenario only “in cases where impeachment complaints are
filed at the start of each Congress.”
Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution contains relevant
self-executing provisions which must be observed at the start of the
impeachment process, the promulgation of the Impeachment Rules
notwithstanding.
Petitioner rehashes her allegations
of bias and vindictiveness on the part of the Committee Chairperson, Rep. Niel
Tupas, Jr. Yet again, the supposed
actuations of Rep. Tupas partake of a keen performance of his avowed duties and
responsibilities as the designated manager of that phase in the impeachment
proceeding. Besides, the actions taken
by the Committee were never its Chairperson’s sole act but rather the
collective undertaking of its whole 55-person membership. The Committee members even took to voting
among themselves to validate what actions to take on the motions presented to
the Committee.
Indubitably, an impeachment is not a
judicial proceeding, but rather a political
exercise. Petitioner thus cannot
demand that the Court apply the stringent standards it asks of justices and
judges when it comes to inhibition from hearing cases. Incidentally, the Impeachment Rules do not
provide for any provision regarding the inhibition of the Committee chairperson
or any member from participating in an impeachment proceeding. The Committee may thus direct any question of
partiality towards the concerned member only.
And any decision on the matter of inhibition must be respected, and it
is not for this Court to interfere with that decision.
Except for the constitutionally
mandated periods, the pacing or alleged precipitate haste with which the
impeachment proceeding against petitioner is conducted is beyond the Court’s
control. Again, impeachment is a highly
politicized intramural that gives the House ample leg room to operate, subject
only to the constitutionally imposed limits.[13] And beyond these, the Court is duty-bound to
respect the discretion of a co-equal branch of government on matters which
would effectively carry out its constitutional mandate.
FINALLY, the Court has, in its
February 15, 2011 Decision, already lifted its September 14, 2010 Status Quo Ante Order[14] which,
as said Order clearly stated, was “effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court.”[15] Such “further order” points to that part of
the disposition in the February 15, 2011 Decision that directs the lifting of
the Status Quo Ante Order.
The lifting of the Status Quo Ante Order is effective
immediately, the
filing of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration notwithstanding, in the same
way that the Status Quo Ante Order
was made effective immediately, respondents’ moves to reconsider or recall it
notwithstanding. There is thus no
faulting the Committee if it decides to, as it did proceed with the impeachment
proceeding after the Court released
its February 15, 2011 Decision.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
I maintain my dissenting
vote with J. Brion
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
(NO PART) PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
|
On sabbatical leave (no vote) ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice I certify that J. Brion maintains his dissent ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
I maintain my vote to join the dissent of Justice
Brion TERESITA
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice I maintain my vote with the dissent of J.A. Brion DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice |
|
I maintain my vote with the dissent of J.A. Brion LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice I maintain my position in
my separate opinion in the main case |
I maintain my vote in my concurring and dissenting opinion MARIANO C. Associate Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
|
JOSE Associate Justice |
JOSE CATRAL Associate Justice |
MARIA
Associate
Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I hereby certify that the
conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* No part.
[1] 460 Phil. 830 (2003).
[2] Motion for Reconsideration, p. 8.
[3] Motion for Reconsideration, p. 9: “From these entries, it is clear that each impeachment complaint was the subject of separate and distinct referrals. Following Francisco, upon the referral of the First Impeachment Complaint to the respondent Committee, an impeachment proceeding against petitioner Ombudsman has already been initiated.” (underscoring supplied)
[4] Vide Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 1054-1055.
[5]
[6]
[7] Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 3, par. (4).
[8] Decision
of
[9] Motion for Reconsideration, p. 36.
[10] Vide II Record of the Constitutional Commission, p. 282 (July 26, 1986).
[11] 220 Phil. 422 (1985); 230 Phil. 528 (1986).
[12] G.R. No. 180643,
[13] Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, supra.
[14] Rollo, pp. 264-267.
[15]