The Supreme Court, by a vote of 6-4, today reversed its November 18, 2008 decision and declared as constitutional the Cityhood Laws or Republic Acts (RAs) converting 16 municipalities into cities.

In a 35-page decision penned by Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., the Court granted the second motion for reconsideration of the Court’s November 18, 2008 decision, which had ruled that said Cityhood Laws violated secs. 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution.

Declared as valid and constitutional are RA Nos. 9389 (Baybay City in Leyte), 9390 (Bogo City in Cebu), 9391 (Catbalogan City in Samar), 9392 (Tandag City in Surigao del Sur), 9393 (Lamitan City in Basilan), 9394 (Borongan City in Samar), 9398 (Tayabas City in Quezon), 9404 (Tabuk City in Kalinga), 9405 (Bayugan City in Agusan del Sur), 9407 (Batac City in Ilocos Norte), 9408 (Mati City in Davao Oriental), 9409 (Guihulngan City in Negros Oriental), 9434 (Cabadbaran City in Agusan del Norte), 9435 (El Salvador City in Misamis Oriental), 9436 (Carcar City in Cebu), and 9491 (Naga City in Cebu). All cityhood laws, enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009 increasing the income requirement for cityhood from PhP20 million to PhP100 million in sec. 450 of the Local Government Code (LGC), explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the said increased income requirement.

Concurring were Justices Renato C. Corona, Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Lucas P. Bersamin, Roberto A. Abad, and Martin S. Villarama, Jr.

Justice Antonio T. Carpio wrote a dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices Conchita Carpio Morales, Arturo D. Brion, and Diosdado M. Peralta.

Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, and Mariano C. Del Castillo did not take part.

The Court held that consistent with its plenary legislative power on the matter, Congress can, via either a consolidated set of laws or a much simpler, single-subject enactment, impose the said verifiable criteria of viability [for cityhood]. These criteria need not be embodied in the local government code, albeit it is the ideal repository to ensure, as much as possible, the element of uniformity. Congress can even, after making a codification, enact an amendatory law adding to the existing layers of indicators earlier codified, just as efficaciously as it may reduce the same. As in this case, the amendatory RA 9009 upped the already codified income requirement from PhP20 million to PhP100 million. At the end of the day, the passage of the amendatory law is no different from the enactment of a law, i.e., the cityhood laws specifically exempting a particular political subdivision from the criteria earlier mentioned. Congress, in enacting the exempting law/s, effectively decreased the already codified indicators.

It said that based on Congress’ deliberations and clear legislative intent was that the then pending cityhood bills would be outside the pale of the minimum income requirement of PhP100 million that Senate Bill No. 2159 proposes; and RA 9009 would not have any retroactive effect insofar as the cityhood bills are concerned.

The Court held that petitioner League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP) and intervenors cannot plausibly invoke the equal protection clause precisely because no deprivation of property results by virtue of the enactment of the cityhood laws. The conversion of a municipality into a city will only affect its status as a political unit, but not its property as such, it added.

The Court said that as a matter of settled legal principle, “the fundamental right of equal protection does not require absolute equality. It is enough that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights or privileges conferred and responsibilities or obligations imposed. The equal protection clause does not preclude the state from recognizing and acting upon factual differences between individuals and classes.”

The Court held that the favorable treatment accorded the sixteen municipalities by the cityhood laws rests on substantial distinction. It noted that respondent LGUs had pending cityhood bills before the passage of RA 9009 and the year before the amendatory RA 9009, respondent LGUs had already met the income criterion exacted for cityhood under the LGC of 1991.

The Court stressed that respondent LGUs were qualified cityhood applicants before the enactment of RA 9009. To impose on them the much higher income requirement after what they have gone through would appear to be indeed unfair. “Thus, the imperatives of fairness dictate that they should be given a legal remedy by which they should be allowed to prove that they have all the necessary qualifications for city status using the criteria set forth under the LGC of 1991 prior to its amendment by RA 9009. Truly, the peculiar conditions of respondent LGUs, which are actual and real, provide sufficient grounds for legislative classification,” the Court said.

“To be sure, courts, regardless of doubts they might be entertaining, can not question the wisdom of the classification, if reasonable, made by Congress or the motivation underpinning the classification. In the same token, they do not sit to determine the propriety or efficacy of the remedies Congress has specifically chosen to extend. That is its prerogative. The power of the Legislature to make distinctions and classifications among persons is, to reiterate, neither curtailed nor denied by the equal protection clause. A law can be violative of the constitutional limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis,” said that Court.

Likewise, the Court said that the classification was also germane to the purpose of the law. The exemption of respondent LGUs/municipalities from the P100 million income requirement was meant to reduce the inequality occasioned by the passage of the amendatory RA 9009. From another perspective, the exemption was unquestionably designed to insure that fairness and justice were accorded respondent LGUs.

The Court noted that what were then the cityhood bills covering respondent LGUs were part and parcel of the original 57 conversion bills filed in the 11th Congress, 33 of which became laws `before the adjournment of that Congress. The then bills of the challenged cityhood laws were not acted upon due inter alia to the impeachment of then President Joseph Estrada and the related “jueteng” scandal investigations conducted before and the “EDSA events that followed the aborted impeachment.”

“The enactment of the cityhood laws was in a real sense an attempt on the part of Congress to address the inequity dealt the respondent LGUs. These laws positively promoted equality and eliminated the inequality, doubtless unintended, between respondent municipalities and the other 33 municipalities whose cityhood bills were enacted during the 11th Congress….Indeed, to deny respondent [local government units] LGUs/municipalities the same rights and privileges accorded to the other thirty-three municipalities when, at the outset they were similarly situated, is tantamount to denying the former the protective mantle of the equal protection clause,” the Court said.  

Justice Carpio penned the November 18, 2008, in which the Court, by a 6-5 vote, granted the petitions and nullified the 16 cityhood laws for being violative of the Constitution, specifically its sec. 10, Art. X and the equal protection clause. On March 31, 2009, a divided High Court denied the motion for reconsideration. Seven of the magistrates who participated in the deliberations and voting had already retired – Senior Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing and Justices Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Adolfo S. Azcuna, Dante O. Tinga, Minita V. Chico Nazario, and Ruben T. Reyes. Justice Reyes wrote a dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices Azcuna and Nazario. Justices Quisumbing and Martinez concurred in the majority, while Justices Santiago and Tinga did not take part.

On April 28, 2009, the Court, by a 6-6 vote, denied a second motion for reconsideration for being a prohibited pleading. Subsequently, the LGUs filed a motion on May 14, 2009 to amend the April 28, 2009 resolution. The Court, per its June 2, 2009 resolution, declared the May 14, 2009 motion adverted to as expunged in light of the entry of judgment made on May 21, 2009. Justices De Castro, taking common cause with Justice Bersamin to grant the motion for reconsideration of the April 28, 2009 resolution and to recall the entry of judgment, stated the observation, and with reason, that the entry was effected “before the Court could act on the aforesaid motion which was filed within the 15-day period counted from receipt of the April 28, 2009 Resolution.” The LGUs subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration of the June 2, 2009 resolution.