



REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames:

*Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated **14 February 2022** which reads as follows:*

“G.R. No. 229089 (*People of the Philippines v. Boyet Murillo y Paje*). — On appeal¹ is the September 27, 2016 Decision² of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07393 affirming the February 26, 2015 Decision³ of Branch 131 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City in Criminal Case No. C-74579, finding accused-appellant Boyet Murillo y Paje (accused-appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

The Information⁴ charging accused-appellant with the crime of Murder alleges:

That on or about the 13th day of February 2005 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any justifiable cause, with deliberate intent to kill and with treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab one JONATHAN SANCHEZ Y MUTUC, a 17-year old (sic) minor, thereby inflicting upon the said victim serious physical injuries, which injuries cause (sic) his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.⁵

During his arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea of “not guilty”.⁶ After termination of pre-trial, the trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Mary Rose Oriño (Mary Rose), Ericson

¹ *Rollo*, pp. 12-13.

² *Id.* at 2-11. Penned by Associate Justice Pedro B. Corales and concurred by Associate Justices Florito S. Macalino and Rodil V. Zalameda (now a Member of the Court).

³ *Records*, pp. 439-447. Penned by Judge Ma. Teresa De Guzman-Alvarez.

⁴ *Id.* at 2.

⁵ *Id.*

⁶ *Id.* at 39-41.

Nucum (Ericson), Police Senior Superintendent Vladimir Villaseñor (PSS Villaseñor) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, and Jocelyn Rosales (Rosales). The defense presented as witnesses the following: accused-appellant and his daughter, Annalyn Murillo (Annalyn).

Version of the Prosecution:

On February 13, 2005, at around 4:00 a.m., Mary Rose was in a room on the second floor of her residence at 120 Sampaguita Street, 11th Avenue, Grace Park, Caloocan City, reading a pocketbook while her partner Jonathan Sanchez (Jonathan), was sleeping beside her.⁷ Suddenly, a man she identified as accused-appellant entered their house and stabbed Jonathan in the chest with a kitchen knife.⁸ Seeing the shocking incident unfold before her, Mary Rose shouted for help.⁹ Mary Rose further testified that she heard accused-appellant say, "*Hayup ka, hayup ka, eto sa iyo*" while stabbing Jonathan.¹⁰ The accused-appellant thereafter rushed out of the room and went downstairs where Mary Rose heard accused-appellant say, "*Bukas paglalamayan ka na*".

Other than the accused-appellant, there were seven people in the room when the incident happened, including Ericson, Jonathan's cousin.¹¹ Ericson corroborated Mary Rose's recollection of the incident and testified that he was about to go to sleep at around 4:00 a.m. of February 13, 2005 when he saw accused-appellant with a bladed weapon.¹² Out of fear, Ericson hid behind a curtain.¹³ Ericson then saw accused-appellant stab Jonathan in the chest while the latter was sleeping.¹⁴ Ericson rushed to Jonathan and, after seeing the stab wound on Jonathan's chest,¹⁵ Ericson immediately asked for help from their relatives downstairs.¹⁶ Jonathan was rushed to the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital where he was pronounced dead.¹⁷

PSS Villaseñor testified that he examined the body of the victim and prepared the Autopsy Report.¹⁸ He confirmed that the stab wound located on the left side of the victim's chest caused "hemorrhage inside the body [of the victim] that resulted to the death of the victim."¹⁹

⁷ TSN, November 11, 2009, pp. 3-4.

⁸ Id. at 3-6; TSN, February 11, 2010, p. 3.

⁹ TSN, November 11, 2009, p. 7.

¹⁰ Id. at 9.

¹¹ TSN, July 1, 2010, p. 10; TSN, November 11, 2009, p. 11.

¹² TSN, July 1, 2010, p. 5.

¹³ Id.

¹⁴ Id.

¹⁵ Id. at 6.

¹⁶ Id.

¹⁷ TSN, November 11, 2009, p. 9; TSN, 1 July 2010, p. 6.

¹⁸ TSN, June 29, 2011, p. 5.

¹⁹ Id.

Rosales, Jonathan's sister, testified that she found out from her aunt about the death of her brother.²⁰ She further testified that her family spent ₱18,500.00 for Jonathan's funeral.²¹

Version of the Defense:

Accused-appellant interposed the defense of denial and claimed that on or about 4:00 a.m. of February 13, 2005, he was sleeping in his house at 75 Sitio Pajo, Baesa, Quezon City, with his wife and two children.²² Accused-appellant further claimed that he has known Jonathan since the latter was a child, and that some of Jonathan's relatives are accused-appellant's close friends.²³ Accused-appellant insisted that he only learned about the alleged misunderstanding with Jonathan during Mary Rose's testimony.²⁴

Accused-appellant's daughter, Annalyn, testified that she went to sleep at around 11:00 p.m. the day before the incident and that her family, including her father, were sleeping in their house at the time.²⁵ She was still asleep at the time of the incident but she testified that she woke her father up at around 5:00 a.m. of February 13, 2005 because her father had to prepare for work.²⁶

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court:

In its February 26, 2015 Decision,²⁷ the RTC rendered judgment finding accused-appellant guilty of the crime of Murder qualified by the aggravating circumstance of treachery. The RTC found that Mary Rose positively identified the accused-appellant as the perpetrator for the crime and that her testimony was corroborated by Ericson, another eyewitness to the stabbing incident. The RTC also found that accused-appellant's defense of denial deserves scant consideration especially considering that it was not physically impossible for the accused-appellant to travel from his address in Quezon City to the house of the victim and vice versa. The dispositive portion of the RTC judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused **BOYET MURILLO y PAJE GUILTY** of the crime of **Murder** qualified by aggravating circumstance of treachery and he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of **RECLUSION PERPETUA**. Likewise, he is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased the amount of PhP50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto; PhP50,000.00 as moral damages; PhP30,000.00 as exemplary damages and PhP18,500.00 as actual damages.

²⁰ TSN, February 9, 2012, pp. 4-5.

²¹ Id. at 6 - 7.

²² TSN, November 28, 2012, p. 3; TSN, 18 June 2014, p. 3.

²³ TSN, November 28, 2012, p. 4.

²⁴ Id. at 4-6.

²⁵ TSN, June 18, 2014, p. 4.

²⁶ Id. at 5.

²⁷ Records, p. 447.

SO ORDERED.²⁸

Accused-appellant appealed his conviction to the CA on March 23, 2015.²⁹ In his brief,³⁰ accused-appellant alleged that there were improbabilities in the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution and averred that the prosecution did not present sufficient evidence to hold the accused-appellant guilty for the crime charged.³¹

Ruling of the Court of Appeals:

In its September 27, 2016 Decision, the CA affirmed the RTC's judgment of conviction. The CA found that all the essential elements of Murder under Article 248 of the RPC were established by the prosecution. The CA further held that the findings of the RTC as to the credibility of witnesses deserve great weight and that the witnesses delivered categorical, convincing, and unequivocal testimonies. The CA also found that the killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. To conform with prevailing jurisprudence, the CA increased the civil indemnity, exemplary damages, and moral damages to ₱75,000.00 each, and a six percent (6%) interest *per annum* was imposed on said monetary awards, including the actual damages, from the date of finality of the Decision until fully paid.

The *fallo* of the CA's September 27, 2016 Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby **DENIED**. The February 26, 2015 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 131, Caloocan City in Crim. Case No. C-74579 is **AFFIRMED** with **MODIFICATIONS** that the civil indemnity, exemplary damages, and moral damages awarded by the Regional Trial Court to the heirs of Jonathan Sanchez are increased to P75,000.00 each, and said monetary awards, including the actual damages, are subject to 6% interest *per annum* from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.³²

In view of the CA's adverse Decision, accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 10 October 2016.³³ Both the counsel of the accused-appellant and the Office of the Solicitor General filed separate manifestations adopting their respective briefs filed before the CA as their supplemental briefs before this Court.³⁴

²⁸ Id.

²⁹ CA *rollo*, p. 8.

³⁰ Id. at 28-36.

³¹ Id. at 26-37.

³² Id at 10.

³³ Id. at 91.

³⁴ Id at 18-25.

Issue

The issue is whether or not the CA correctly affirmed the finding of the RTC that accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the RPC.

Our Ruling

The appeal is bereft of merit.

Murder is defined and penalized under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended, to wit:

ART. 248. Murder.—Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by *reclusion perpetua*, to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. **With treachery**, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.” (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the elements of the crime of Murder are the following: (a) a person was killed; (b) the accused killed him or her; (c) the killing is not Parricide or Infanticide; and (d) the killing was accompanied with any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC.³⁵

In the present case, it is undisputed that Jonathan died as a result of a stab wound inflicted on his chest. PSS Villaseñor testified that the stab wound located on the left side of the victim’s chest caused “hemorrhage inside the body [of the victim] that resulted to the death of the victim, thus.”³⁶

³⁵ *People v. Cortez*, G.R. No. 239137, December 5, 2018.

³⁶ TSN, June 29, 2011, pp. 5-6.

[FISCAL LARIEGO]:

And these injuries that you noted on the body of the victim, Doctor, will you please render an opinion on the cause of his death?

[P/SENIOR SUPT. VILLASEÑOR]:

The first injury was a stabbed (sic) wound located at the left side of the chest and this was a penetrating stabbed (sic) wound and this caused injury to the vital organs of the body like the ascending aorta of the heart and this caused the hemorrhage inside the body that resulted to the death of the victim, ma'am.³⁷

PSS Villaseñor also confirmed that it is not possible that the injury is self-inflicted:

[ATTY. ANTONIO, JR.]:

Would it be possible, sir, that this injury could be self-inflicted?

[P/SENIOR SUPT. VILLASEÑOR]:

No, sir.

Q: Why is it not, sir?

A: Considering the location of the wound which is located on the upper part of the chest, if it will be self-inflicted, or let (sic) say that victim was to commit suicide, it would be awkward to do, sir, the stab wound on the chest.³⁸

In accused-appellant's brief, the defense claimed that there are improbabilities in the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses. The defense assailed the testimony of Mary Rose and Ericson by claiming the following:

(1) [Mary Rose's] account is improbable as it is very unlikely for the culprit to attack his victim in a room full of people;³⁹

(2) Considering the small area of the room which the victim and his family were occupying at the time of the incident, it was impossible for the [Ericson] to effectively conceal his presence from the Accused-Appellant without being noticed;⁴⁰

(3) If it were true that [Ericson] was at the vicinity at the time of the killing, then, [Ericson] should have tried his best to stop the accused-appellant in his tracks, or at least created a commotion so as to get the attention of the other inhabitants to ultimately distract the accused-appellant;⁴¹ and

³⁷ Id.

³⁸ TSN, June 29, 2011, p. 11.

³⁹ *Rollo*, p. 33

⁴⁰ Id.

⁴¹ Id.

(4) Considering “the swiftness of the incident, the supposed eyewitness’ fearful disposition, and the limitation and deficiency in vision and attention [because of the possible darkness of the surroundings in the early morning], it is hardly possible that [Ericson] could ascertain, without doubt, the identity of the malefactor.”⁴²

Upon a careful review of the records of the case, We agree with the findings of the CA and the RTC that the testimonies of eyewitnesses Mary Rose and Ericson were “categorical, convincing, and unequivocal” and absent any showing of ill or improper motive as they both positively identified the accused-appellant as the assailant of Jonathan.⁴³

Mary Rose and Ericson both testified that they know the accused-appellant because he is their neighbor.⁴⁴ Mary Rose further claimed that, prior to the incident, she saw accused-appellant once every week when she goes to the store⁴⁵ while Ericson claimed that he has known accused-appellant for a “very long time” prior to the incident.⁴⁶ Even accused-appellant testified that he knew the victim Jonathan since Jonathan was still a child and that he considers some of latter’s relatives as his “*kumpares*” or close friends.⁴⁷

Both Mary Rose and Ericson also testified that the area where the incident took place is well-lit. Mary Rose testified that the fluorescent light in the middle of the room was turned on as she was reading a pocketbook when she saw accused-appellant suddenly enter their house and stab Jonathan.⁴⁸ Ericson, in his testimony, also confirmed that there is a light in the middle of the room where the incident took place.⁴⁹

Despite accused-appellant’s insistence that Ericson should have attempted to stop or distract the assailant, this Court has held that there is no standard form of human behavioral response when confronted with a frightful experience, to wit:

There is no standard form of human behavioral response when confronted with a frightful experience. Not every witness to a crime can be expected to act reasonably and conformably with the expectations of mankind, because witnessing a crime is an unusual experience that elicit[s] different reactions from witnesses, and for which no clear-cut, standard form of behavior can be drawn.⁵⁰

⁴² Id.

⁴³ Id. at 7.

⁴⁴ TSN, November 11, 2009, pp. 19 and 21; TSN, July 1, 2010, p. 8.

⁴⁵ TSN, November 11, 2009, p. 21.

⁴⁶ TSN, July 1, 2010, p. 9.

⁴⁷ TSN, November 28, 2012, p. 4.

⁴⁸ TSN, November 11, 2009, p. 15; TSN, February 11, 2010, p. 9.

⁴⁹ TSN, July 1, 2010, p. 11.

⁵⁰ *People v. Magallano, Jr.*, G.R. No. 220721, December 10, 2018, citing *People v. Del Prado*, 618 Phil. 674, 682 (2009).

Hence, Ericson could not be faulted for his response to such a shocking incident as seeing his family member stabbed in front of him. Moreover, family members who have witnessed the killing of their loved one usually strive to remember the faces of the assailants.⁵¹ In the case of *People v. Dillatan, Sr.*,⁵² this Court has held that “the most natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the features and faces of their assailants and observe the manner in which the crime is committed,” viz.:

First, this Court has ruled that common human experience tells us that when extraordinary circumstances take place, it is natural for persons to remember many of the important details. This Court has held that the most natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the features and faces of their assailants and observe the manner in which the crime is committed. Most often the face of the assailant and body movements thereof, create a lasting impression which cannot be easily erased from a witness' memory. Experience dictates that precisely because of the unusual acts of violence committed right before their eyes, eyewitnesses can remember with a high degree of reliability the identity of criminals at any given time.

Thus, if family members who have witnessed the killing of a loved one usually strive to remember the faces of the assailants, this Court sees no reason how both parents, who witnessed the violence inflicted, not only upon themselves, but especially upon their son, who eventually died by reason thereof, could have done any less. It must be stressed that Henry and Violeta were seated together atop their motorcycle when Dillatan grabbed her bag and Garcia fired at them. In fact, Violeta was embracing her son, Homer, when a single bullet struck them. Both accused-appellants, at that time, were both less than a meter away from the victims. Hence, despite the swiftness of the assault upon them, Henry and Violeta could not have mistaken the identity of accused-appellants as the persons responsible for the attack.”⁵³

Accused-appellant further claims that witnesses PSS Villaseñor and Rosales do not have personal knowledge of the incident. As correctly held by the courts below, the witnesses are required to have personal knowledge only of the facts for which their testimonies were being offered.⁵⁴ PSS Villaseñor's testimony was offered to prove that he conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of Jonathan and that he prepared Medico-Legal Report No. M-125-05⁵⁵ while Rosales' testimony was offered to prove that her family spent ₱18,500.00 for funeral expenses.⁵⁶ The testimonies of PSS Rosales and Villaseñor were not offered to prove the details of the stabbing incident but the civil aspect of the case and the results of the examination of the body of the victim, respectively.

As to accused-appellant's allegation that it is improbable that accused-appellant or any person would attack a person in a small room and in the

⁵¹ *People v. Del Rosario*, G.R. No. 189580 (Resolution), 657 Phil. 635, 644 (2011), citing *People vs. Cawaling*, 355 Phil. 1, 31-32 (1998) and *People v. Lovedorial*, 402 Phil. 446, 457-458 (2001).

⁵² G.R. No. 212191, September 5, 2018.

⁵³ Id. Citations Omitted.

⁵⁴ See RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, Section 36.

⁵⁵ Records, p. 301.

⁵⁶ TSN, February 9, 2012, p. 6; records, p. 304.

presence of many witnesses, We agree with the CA's finding that "it is not unusual for perpetrators of killings to commit their bestial acts in front of witnesses."⁵⁷ In addition, regardless of the fact that the crime was committed in a small room with many people, the incident occurred at 4:00 a.m. while most of the occupants of the room, including Jonathan, were asleep. We thus also agree with the CA's finding that accused-appellant likely "took advantage of the time to evade detection and ensure success of his evil design without resistance from the victim."⁵⁸

Indeed the circumstances of the crime clearly show that the killing of Jonathan was accompanied by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. The elements of treachery are: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means of execution was deliberate or consciously adopted.⁵⁹ Considering that the accused-appellant deliberately chose to attack early in the morning while Jonathan was asleep and unable to defend himself or to retaliate, it is apparent that treachery attended the killing of the victim.

In issues involving the credibility of witnesses, the Court has consistently held that the findings of the trial court are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect unless it "overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which will alter the assailed decision or affect the result of the case," to wit:

The Court has ruled, time and again, that when the issues involve matters of credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies, and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect. This is so because it is the trial court that has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses; and the trial court is in the best position to discern whether or not the witnesses are telling the truth. Generally, the appellate courts will not overturn the trial court's findings unless it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which will alter the assailed decision or affect the result of the case.⁶⁰

In contrast to the overwhelmingly clear and convincing evidence presented by the prosecution, the accused-appellant denies any knowledge of the crime in his testimony. In the case of *People v. Seguisabal*,⁶¹ this Court held that the defenses of denial and alibi cannot defeat the positive identification of eyewitnesses, and for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused-appellant must prove "(a) that he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of

⁵⁷ *Rollo*, pp. 7-8, citing *Velasco v. People*, 518 Phil. 780, 798 (2006).

⁵⁸ *Id.* at 8.

⁵⁹ *People v. Torres, Sr.*, G.R. No. 190317, 671 Phil. 482, 491 (2011), citing *People v. Lacaden*, G.R. No. 187682, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 784, 799..

⁶⁰ *People v. Silvederio III*, G.R. No. 239777, July 8, 2020, citing *People v. Cirbeto*, 825 Phil. 793, 805-806 (2018) and *People v. Agalot*, 826 Phil. 541, 550 (2018).

⁶¹ G.R. No. 250330, March 18, 2021.

the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime during its commission.”

The Court finds no reason to disturb the findings of the lower court that accused-appellant’s weak defense of denial and alibi cannot defeat the positive identification of eyewitnesses, whose testimonies were strengthened by the corroborative testimony of Martinez. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, denial and alibi is negative, self-serving and undeserving of any weight in law. Thus, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove (a) that he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime during its commission.”⁶²

Although the defense presented witnesses, including the accused-appellant, to show that the accused-appellant was present at another place, particularly in his family’s new residence at 75 Sitio Pajo, Baesa, Quezon City, at the time of the perpetration of the crime, the defense failed to present evidence to show that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime during its commission. As observed by the RTC, it was not physically impossible for the accused-appellant to go to the scene of the crime and to his residence at 75 Sitio Pajo, Baesa, Quezon City since the victim’s house is less than hour away and few vehicles ply the streets in the early morning.⁶³

In view of the foregoing, the evidence of the prosecution clearly showed that all the elements of Article 248 of the RPC are present in the instant case. The accused-appellant was positively identified by credible witnesses to be the assailant who killed Jonathan in the early morning of February 13, 2005. Considering that there is no showing that the accused-appellant and Jonathan were relatives of one another, the killing is not Parricide or Infanticide. It is also apparent that treachery, one of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC, attended the killing of Jonathan.

Anent the imposable penalty, Article 248 of the RPC, as amended, provides that the crime of Murder is punishable by *reclusion perpetua* to death. As held in the case of *People v. Jugueta*, “when the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition of *reclusion perpetua* only, there being no ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court rules that the proper amounts should be ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages and ₱75,000.00 exemplary damages, regardless of the number of qualifying aggravating circumstances present.”⁶⁴ There being no ordinary aggravating circumstance, We affirm the imposed amount of damages as modified by the CA. However, as regards the award of ₱18,500.00 as actual damages, we modify the same by deleting the award of actual damages, and in lieu thereof, award temperate damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00.⁶⁵

⁶² *Id.*, citing *People v. Narciso*, 440 Phil. 964, 977 (2002) and *People v. Macaranas*, 811 Phil. 610, 624 (2017).

⁶³ Records, p. 476.

⁶⁴ *People v. Jugueta*, 783 Phil. 806, 840 (2016).

⁶⁵ See *id.* at 846-847.


WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby **DISMISSED**. The September 27, 2016 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07393 is hereby **AFFIRMED** with **MODIFICATIONS** in that accused-appellant **BOYET MURILLO y PAJE** is found **GUILTY** of Murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of *reclusion perpetua*. He is ordered to pay the heirs of deceased Jonathan Sanchez the following:

1. ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity;
2. ₱75,000.00 as moral damages;
3. ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
4. ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages.

Interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per *annum* shall be imposed on the aggregate amount of the monetary awards computed from the finality of this Resolution until full payment.

SO ORDERED.”

By authority of the Court:


TERESITA AQUINO TUAZON
 Division Clerk of Court *by a/s*
 18 MAY 2022

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THE DIRECTOR (reg)
 Bureau of Corrections
 1770 Muntinlupa City

HON. PRESIDING JUDGE (reg)
 Regional Trial Court, Branch 131
 Caloocan City
 (Crim. Case No. C-74579)

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*with copy of CA Decision dated 27 September 2016
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