




SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES
PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE



Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

BY: _____
DATE: _____

EN BANC

**ROWELL E. ABELLA and RUBEN
DE OCAMPO,**
Complainants,

A.M. No. P-21-030
**(Formerly OCA IPI No. 17-
4762-P)**

Present:

GESMUNDO, C.J.,
PERLAS-BERNABE,
LEONEN,
CAGUIOA,
HERNANDO,
LAZARO-JAVIER,
INTING,
ZALAMEDA,
LOPEZ, M.,
GAERLAN,
ROSARIO,
LOPEZ, J.,
DIMAAMPAO,
MARQUEZ,* and
KHO, JR., JJ.

- versus -

**TEODORA P. PARFAN, Court
Stenographer III, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 59, Lucena City,**
Respondent.

Promulgated:

April 5, 2022

x-----

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DECISION

PER CURIAM:

At the maelstrom of the instant administrative matter are the separate complaints filed by Rowell E. Abella (Abella) and Ruben De Ocampo (De

* No part; formerly Court Administrator.

Ocampo; collectively, complainants) against respondent Teodora P. Parfan (Parfan), Court Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Lucena City (RTC) which was formerly docketed as OCA IPI No. 14-4329-RTJ.¹

On 30 May 2016, the Court's Second Division issued a Resolution,² treating the sworn statements of complainants, both dated 22 April 2015, as an administrative complaint against Parfan.

The salient facts, as culled from the said Affidavits,³ follow.

Abella was indicted for Frustrated Homicide in a criminal case filed before the RTC, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2005-1127. De Ocampo was the father of Renato De Ocampo (Renato), the victim in the said case. Upon the instance of Presiding Judge Dinah Evangeline Bandong (Judge Bandong) of the said RTC, the parties were advised to settle their case, to which they acquiesced. Parfan, also known as "*Tita Dory*," discussed the terms of payment with the parties. In due course, it was agreed that Abella would pay De Ocampo the aggregate amount of ₱72,000.00 at the rate of ₱5,000.00 every two months.⁴

On 18 September 2013, Abella made an initial payment of ₱5,000.00 inside the court's staff room. De Ocampo was instructed by Parfan to acknowledge the same on a piece of paper attached to the case records. De Ocampo recalled that on 27 November 2013, he received only ₱4,000.00 from Abella. He reluctantly accepted the sum of money, over Parfan's assurance that the balance would be added to the next installment payment. It took one year before De Ocampo received the next payment, yet, the deficiency of ₱1,000.00 remained unremitted.⁵

On 31 March 2015, Abella and De Ocampo returned to the RTC where De Ocampo received ₱5,000.00 from a certain court employee named "Ed." Abella avouched that since 18 September 2013, he had consistently remitted his payments, then totaling ₱40,000.00, to Parfan, who, in turn, assured him that she would deliver the money to De Ocampo. As it happened, De Ocampo

¹ Formerly Misc. No. 14-09-306-RTC (Re: [1] UDK-A20130416-01 [Anonymous Complaint against Hon. Dinah Evangeline B. Bandong, former Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Br. 59, Lucena City, Quezon Province]; [2] UDK-A20130416-02 [Anonymous Complaint (under the pseudonym "*Shirley Gomez*") against Hon. Dinah Evangeline B. Bandong, Former Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Br. 59, Lucena City, Quezon Province]; and [3] UDK-A20130418-01 [Anonymous Complaint against Clerk III Eduardo Febrer and Court Interpreter Francisco Mendiolo, both of Regional Trial Court, Br. 59, Lucena City, Quezon Province]).

² Rollo, pp. 1-2.

³ Id. at 4-6.

⁴ Id. at 4.

⁵ Id. at 5.

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and Abella discovered Parfan's clandestine acts when the former informed the latter that he only received about ₱14,000.00 from Parfan. Thenceforth, Parfan appeared and talked to De Ocampo, saying "*magkwentahan na lang tayo kung magkano na ang nabigay ko sa iyo (Ruben) at magkano ang naibigay sa akin ni Rowell.*" Subsequently, she made herself scarce.⁶

On a separate occasion outside the court premises, De Ocampo attested that Parfan's child handed him ₱5,000.00 and he was made to sign anew another piece of paper. From then on, he no longer received any amount from Parfan and they lost communication.⁷

The filing of the subject administrative complaint ensued thereafter.

In the Resolution dated 30 May 2016, the Court directed Parfan to comment on the allegations hurled against her.⁸ On 2 October 2017, Parfan was ordered dropped from the rolls effective 2 February 2015 for having been absent without official leave.⁹ Subsequently, on 28 November 2017, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) instructed her to file a comment with a notice that should she fail to do so, her case would be submitted to the Court *sans* her explanation.¹⁰

Via the Resolution¹¹ dated 5 December 2018, the Court, upon recommendation of the OCA,¹² directed Parfan to show cause why she should not be administratively dealt with for refusing to submit her comment despite repeated directives. Therewithal, she was again ordered to tender a comment with a warning that her continued noncompliance shall impel the Court to take the necessary action and resolve the administrative complaint on the basis of the record at hand.¹³

Ensuingly, another Resolution¹⁴ was issued by the Third Division on 2 October 2019, wherein Parfan was deemed to have waived the filing of her Comment. The case was then referred to the OCA for investigation, report, and recommendation.

⁶ Id. at 4.

⁷ Id. at 4-6.

⁸ Id. at 1.

⁹ Id. at 10.

¹⁰ Id. at 8.

¹¹ Id. at 12-15.

¹² Id. at 14.

¹³ Id.

¹⁴ Id. at 22-23.

The OCA Report and Recommendation

In its Memorandum¹⁵ dated 16 June 2020, the OCA opined that the uncontroverted affidavits of Abella and De Ocampo were sufficient to hold Parfan liable for misconduct. Her failure to remit to De Ocampo the amounts she received from Abella was bolstered by the sworn statements of the complainants. The OCA ratiocinated that Parfan should have made certain that the sum paid by Abella were consistently made and actually received by De Ocampo within a reasonable time after such payments were remitted to her.¹⁶

The OCA cited *Committee on Security and Safety, Court of Appeals v. Dianco (Committee on Security and Safety)*,¹⁷ wherein this Court ordained that “to constitute misconduct, the act or acts must have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of his official duties.”¹⁸ Moreover, it is a well-ensconced principle that to be considered grave, the misconduct should entail any of the additional requirements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be evinced by substantial evidence. Absent any of the above-mentioned elements, a person charged with grave misconduct may be held responsible only for simple misconduct. Ultimately, the OCA concluded that having found no convincing proof to qualify Parfan’s misconduct as grave, she is only liable for simple misconduct pursuant to Section 46(D)(2), Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS).

Anent the imposable penalty, the OCA recommended that Parfan be fined in the amount of ₱5,000.00, citing *Re: Frequent Unauthorized Absences of Hernaez*.¹⁹

Issues:

The problems cast in legal setting in this case are:

- 1) Is Parfan guilty of simple misconduct only?
- 2) What law or rule should be applied in imposing the appropriate offense and penalty?

¹⁵ Id. at 24-26.

¹⁶ Id. at 24-25.

¹⁷ 760 Phil. 169 (2015).

¹⁸ *Rollo*, p. 26.

¹⁹ 583 Phil. 1 (2008).

The Court's Ruling

We modify the findings of the OCA and rule that Parfan is guilty of gross misconduct.

Jurisprudence defines misconduct as “a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer.”²⁰ Withal, to constitute misconduct, the act or acts must have a direct connection to and be related with the discharge of the person's official duties.²¹

The OCA aptly relied on *Committee on Security and Safety*, where We enunciated that:

Misconduct in office has a definite and well-understood legal meaning. By uniform legal definition, it is a misconduct such as affects his performance of his duties as an officer and not such only as affects his character as a private individual. In such cases, it has been said at all times, it is necessary to separate the character of the man from the character of the officer x x x. It is settled that misconduct, misfeasance, or malfeasance warranting removal from office of an officer must have direct relation to and be connected with the performance of official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect and failure to discharge the duties of the office x x x.²²

Case law teaches Us that for misconduct to be deemed grave, the act must entail any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to transgress the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be validated by substantial evidence. Succinctly, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or blatant nonobservance of an established rule must be apparent in a charge of grave misconduct.²³

In the recent case of *Neri v. Office of the Ombudsman*,²⁴ the Court demystifies the terms “corruption” and “flagrant disregard of rules” in this wise:

Corruption is an “act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses [their] station or character to procure some benefit for [them]self or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.”

²⁰ *Committee on Security and Safety, Court of Appeals v. Dianco, et al.*, 760 Phil. 169, 191 (2015).

²¹ *Id.*

²² *Id.*, citing *Manuel v. Calimag, Jr.*, 367 Phil. 162, 166 (1999).

²³ See *Committee on Security and Safety, Court of Appeals v. Dianco*, *id.* at 191-192.

²⁴ G.R. No. 212467, 5 July 2021.

Flagrant disregard of rules, on the other hand, is present when there is an “open defiance of a customary rule” or “repeated voluntary disregard of established rules” or when an officer “arrogated unto [them]self responsibilities that were clearly beyond [their] duties.

It cannot be stressed enough that public service demands utmost honesty and discipline; a public servant must constantly demonstrate an utter sense of rectitude. Veritably, for the people’s approbation and confidence in the judiciary to be preserved, Court employees, from the simplest to the highest of ranks, must be paragons of probity and justness; they should eschew any conduct that would dwindle public trust in the Courts.

Appositely, *Dela Rama v. De Leon (Dela Rama)*²⁵ elucidates that:

The Judiciary demands the best possible individuals in the service and it had never and will never tolerate nor condone any conduct which would violate the norms of public accountability, and diminish, or even tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the justice system. As such, the Court will not hesitate to rid its ranks of undesirables who undermine its efforts towards an effective and efficient administration of justice, thus, tainting its image in the eyes of the public.²⁶

The case at bench can find similitude in *RE: (1) Lost Checks Issued to the Late Melliza, former Clerk II, MCTC, Zaragga, Iloilo; and (2) Dropping from the Rolls of Ms. Andres*,²⁷ where this Court declared Esther Andres (Andres) guilty of Grave Misconduct for having misappropriated the missing checks. Albeit there was no direct evidence establishing that she actually took the checks, We relied on the substantial circumstantial evidence while also taking into account the sworn testimonies of her co-employees. So, too, the Court considered Andres’s abrupt leave of absence from work after the incident transpired and her inopportune tender of resignation while the case was awaiting investigation as *indicia* of guilt. Like Parfan, Andres also failed to appear during the proceedings before the investigating body. Thence, the ultimate penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government service was imposed upon Andres.

In *Office of the Court Administrator v. Carbon III*,²⁸ respondent Carbon III’s act of demanding and receiving money from a party litigant was considered Grave Misconduct, a grave offense punishable by dismissal from the service. Correspondingly, Carbon III did not present any evidence in his

²⁵ A.M. No. P-14-3240, [Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-3835-P], 2 March 2021.

²⁶ *Id.*

²⁷ 537 Phil. 634 (2006).

²⁸ 674 Phil. 10 (2011).

defense and ceased from reporting for work without any approved leave of absence. Howbeit, since the penalty of dismissal was deemed inefficacious given that Carbon III was already dropped from the rolls, the Court imposed an administrative fine of ₱40,000.00 with accompanying forfeiture of all the retirement or separation benefits he may be entitled to, except accrued leave credits. Moreover, he was pronounced disqualified from any future government service.

Corollary thereto, the verdict in *Dela Rama*²⁹ is quite illuminating. There, the respondent was adjudged guilty of Gross Misconduct for her act of deceiving the complainant that she could help in the filing of the intended case for annulment of marriage for a package fee of ₱65,000.00. Eventually, the complainant and her witnesses were able to substantiate the initial payment of ₱20,000.00 through a check issued to the respondent.

In the case at bench, the OCA explicitly declared that the uncontested affidavits of the complainants were enough to hold Parfan liable for misconduct. As the officer assigned by the court to facilitate the amicable settlement of the dispute between the complainants, she was duty-bound to make sure that the monies paid by Abella were actually received by De Ocampo — *a responsibility which Parfan failed to faithfully fulfill*.

Nevertheless, contrary to the recommendation of the OCA, the Court finds Parfan guilty of Gross Misconduct. Incontrovertibly, Parfan's act was attended by elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, and a flagrant indifference to an established rule given that she unlawfully used her official position as a court personnel to obtain some benefit for herself, specifically the misappropriation of Abella's payments, which is antithetical to her official duties, the rights of the complainants, and established rules.

Accordingly, We increase the penalty to be imposed upon Parfan. The OCA relied upon the Court's ruling in *Hernaes*,³⁰ where a fine of only ₱5,000.00 was imposed instead of that equivalent to three months' salary considering the presence of a mitigating circumstance, *i.e.*, therein respondent's various illnesses. However, *Hernaes* is not on all fours with the circumstances obtaining in the instant case. In *Hernaes*, We decreed that:

However, records bear out that respondent has been suffering from a variety of illnesses. Under Section 53(a) of the Uniform Rules, the physical fitness or unfitness, as in this case, of respondent may be considered a mitigating

²⁹ *Dela Rama v. De Leon*, supra note 20.

³⁰ See *Re: Frequent Unauthorized Absences of Hernaes*, supra note 19.

circumstance in the determination of the penalties to be imposed. Thus, a fine of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) is more proper and reasonable.³¹

Here, the records do not make out the existence of such mitigating circumstance that would warrant the imposition of the same amount of fine.

At this juncture, a discussion of the apposite parts of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS) is deemed imperative. Section 52 of URACCS states that:

SEC. 52. *Classification of Offenses.* — Administrative offenses with corresponding penalties are classified into grave, less grave or light, depending on their gravity or depravity and effects on the government service.

A. The following are *grave offenses* with their corresponding penalties:

x x x x

3. Grave Misconduct

1st offense — Dismissal

Explicitly, the URACCS classifies Grave Misconduct as a grave offense punishable by dismissal from the service for the first offense. Correspondingly, the commission of the said offense for the first time does not attenuate its seriousness. Section 58(a) of the URACCS reinforces the profundity of the offense by supplying additional sanctions concomitant with dismissal:

a. The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it that of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government service, unless otherwise provided in the decision.

Subsequently, A.M. No. 18-01-05-SC was implemented by the Court on 2 October 2018, which amended Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. The appurtenant portions of the said issuance read:

NOW, THEREFORE, the Court resolved to:

x x x x

³¹ Id.

2. APPROVE the recommendation of the Technical Working Group to amend Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following modifications under Sections 1, 2, 4, 6, 9, 11, 12 thereof:

x x x x

Rule 140

DISCIPLINE OF JUDGES OF REGULAR AND SPECIAL COURTS, JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, COURT OF TAX APPEALS, COURT ADMINISTRATOR, DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR AND ASSISTANT COURT ADMINISTRATOR

x x x x

Section 21. *Classification of Charges.* — Administrative charges are classified as serious, less serious, or light.

Section 22. *Serious Charges.* — Serious charges include:

x x x x

3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct;

x x x x

Section 25. *Sanctions.*—

A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. *Provided, however,* that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) months but not exceeding six (6) months; or

3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

A supplemental Resolution³² to A.M. No. 18-01-05-SC further amended the pertinent sections of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, viz.:

AMENDMENTS TO RULE 140
OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT

RULE 140

DISCIPLINE OF JUDGES OF REGULAR, SPECIAL OR SHARI'AH COURTS, PRESIDING JUSTICES AND ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, COURT OF TAX APPEALS, AND SHARI'AH HIGH COURT, COURT ADMINISTRATOR, DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATORS AND ASSISTANT COURT ADMINISTRATORS, AND PERSONNEL OF THE JUDICIARY

x x x x

SEC. 22. *Serious Charges*. — Serious charges include:

x x x x

3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct or of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, and grave offenses under the Civil Service Laws and Rules[.]

Apropos thereto, *Dela Rama* elucidated—

Notably, Rule 140 has its own nomenclature and classification of penalties different from the URACCS. As applied to this case, De Leon's offense would be labelled as "grave misconduct" under the URACCS, while it would be "gross misconduct" under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. The latest amendment of Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, is clear that grave offenses under the Civil Service Laws and Rules is tantamount to a gross misconduct.³³

Upon that score, the Court gave an edifying explication in the same case on the proper application of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court to personnel of the Judiciary, as follows:

In the interest of a uniform application of charges and imposition of penalties in administrative cases involving Judiciary personnel, we will apply Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court since it is the prevailing rule

³² Approved on 7 July 2020.

³³ *Dela Rama v. De Leon*, supra note 25.

at present, unless the retroactive application of Rule 140 would not be favorable to the employee. Otherwise stated, if the application of Rule 140, as amended would be prejudicial to the employee, then the framework of rules prevailing at the time of the commission of the offense should apply (e.g., the URACCS in this case). This mirrors the rule in Criminal Law that penal laws shall have a retroactive effect if the same is favorable to the accused — which the Court, as a matter of policy now adopts.

Close scrutiny and comparison of Section 25, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court and Section 58(a) of the URACCS will lead us to the conclusion that Rule 140 is not prejudicial to herein respondent, and thus, must be applied to this instant case. x x x

x x x x

While the exemption from forfeiture of accrued leave credits is not explicit in the URACCS, case law is nevertheless consistent that the same is not included in the forfeited benefits as it is considered as earned remuneration similar to salaries.

In contrast, Section 25(A)(1), Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

1. Dismissal from the service; forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. *Provided, however,* that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits.

Thus, since the application of Rule 140, as amended, is not unfavorable to herein respondent, then it must be applied in this case.³⁴

Ergo, *Dela Rama* instructs that Rule 140 of the Rules of Court may be applied retroactively in cases involving personnel of the Judiciary only if such application would not be prejudicial to the personnel concerned. To this end, the nature of the offense and penalties enumerated under Rule 140, as well as the appropriate framework of rules such as the URACCS must be juxtaposed with one another to determine whether or not the application of Rule 140 acts to the prejudice of the court employee charged with an administrative offense.

Strikingly, on 22 February 2022, the Court issued the Resolution³⁵ in A.M. No. 21-08-09-SC, which introduced the following amendment to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court:

³⁴ *Dela Rama v. De Leon*, supra note 25; original citations omitted.

³⁵ Further Amendments to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.

Section 24. Retroactive Effect. - All the foregoing provisions shall be applied to all pending and future administrative cases involving the discipline of Members, officials, employees, and personnel of the Judiciary, without prejudice to the rules of the Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards of the Supreme Court insofar as complaints against Members of the Supreme Court are concerned.

Au fond, the prevailing rule is that the penalties under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court apply to all unresolved and future administrative cases involving judges and personnel of the Judiciary, regardless of the time the illicit act or conduct was committed and without giving any weight to the prejudice caused to the employee concerned, thereby renouncing the distinction ordained in *Dela Rama* between Rule 140 of the Rules of Court and other applicable frameworks of rules like the URACCS.

Here, when Parfan, a court stenographer, perpetrated the acts complained of between 2013 and 2015, the URACCS remained applicable to court personnel. All the same, by dint of the provisions of A.M. No. 21-08-09-SC which effectively abated the *edict* in *Dela Rama*, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court finds retroactive application to this case. Consequently, by virtue of Section 22, Rule 140, as amended by A.M. No. 18-01-05-SC, Parfan's acts ineludibly constitute **gross misconduct, a serious charge** punishable by dismissal from the service.

We now proceed to pass upon the propriety of the imposable penalty. To recollect, **A.M. No. 21-03-17-SC**³⁶ further amended Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, thereby increasing the imposable fine in serious charges. Under the new rule, acts constituting gross misconduct is a serious charge punishable by a fine of more than ₱100,000.00 but not exceeding ₱200,000.00.

To capsulize, Parfan was charged with not remitting to De Ocampo the payments made by Abella as part of the settlement of their case. The consistent and categorical statements of the complainants, *who were initially opposing parties to the criminal case*, bear the badges of truth that Parfan misappropriated the money remitted to her in her official capacity. Verily, the payments sought to put an end to Abella and De Ocampo's legal strife, but Parfan embezzled the same.

The Court likewise discerns Parfan's caustic reaction when she heard the complainants discussing her unscrupulous act. Indeed, if it were true that she handed over to De Ocampo all payments made by Abella, she could have

³⁶ Amendments to the Fines Provided in Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court; effective 31 May 2021.

courteously furnished them a copy of her computation and/or receipts. However, she opted not to do so.

Lastly, Parfan's unexplained absences without official leave following the filing of the administrative complaints, accompanied by her repeated refusal to comply with Our directive to file a comment or explanation, are indubitable and unequivocal *indicia* of guilt.


***In epitome*, Parfan is liable for gross misconduct under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and in view of her supervening separation from the service, which precludes the Court from imposing the penalties of dismissal or suspension, she should be meted a fine in the amount of ₱105,000.00.**


A final word. It is quite desolating to enforce the ultimate penalty especially to a judicial employee in the realm. Yet, it is exigent that the Court effectuates its paramount duty — that is to ensure that the law is conscientiously applied across the border and regardless of social status or rank, lest the credence of the people in the Judiciary be enfeebled.


WHEREFORE, respondent Teodora P. Parfan, Court Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Lucena City, is found **GUILTY** of Gross Misconduct. She is hereby imposed a **FINE** of one hundred five thousand pesos (₱105,000.00) with **FORFEITURE** of whatever retirement benefits may be due her, except accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations. The fine is **ORDERED** deducted from any remaining accrued leave benefits. Otherwise, she will be personally liable therefor, to pay the same directly to this Court.


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
WE CONCUR:



ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO
Chief Justice



ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice



MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice



ALFREDO BENJAMINS S. CAGUIOA
Associate Justice



RAMON PAUL L. HERNANDO
Associate Justice



AMY C. LAZARO JAVIER
Associate Justice


HENRI JEAN PAUL B. INTING
Associate Justice



RODIL N. ZALAMEDA
Associate Justice


MARIO V. LOPEZ
Associate Justice



SAMUEL H. GAERLAN
Associate Justice


RICARDO R. ROSARIO
Associate Justice


JHOSEP Y. LOPEZ
Associate Justice



JAPAR B. DIMAAMPAO
Associate Justice

*NO part. participated as
CRA Administrator*


JOSE MIDAS P. MARQUEZ
Associate Justice


ANTONIO T. KHO, JR.
Associate Justice

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MARIA LUISA M. SANTILLA
Deputy Clerk of Court and
Executive Officer
OCC-En Banc, Supreme Court