A conviction based on circumstantial evidence must exclude the possibility that some other person committed the crime.

Thus held the Supreme Court’s Third Division, in a Decision penned by Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan granting the petition for review on certiorari filed by Julius Enrico Tijam (Tijam) and Kenneth Bacsid (Bacsid). The petition challenged the rulings of the Court of Appeals which had affirmed the findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicting Tijam and Bacsid for Theft.

Tijam and Bacsid were charged in 2017 following allegations made by Kim Mugot (Mugot) that on August 18, 2017, while rushing inside a bus along with other commuters, Mugot was suddenly pinned against the bus door by Bacsid and that shortly after, Mugot noticed his Samsung Galaxy A7 cellphone missing from his right pocket. This prompted Mugot to alight the bus and look for Bacsid, whom he found in the bus unloading area receiving the cellphone from Tijam. Mugot then yelled, “Magnanakaw!” and a struggle ensued between them, causing the cellphone to fall on the ground, damaged.

Tijam and Bacsid, however, denied they took Mugot’s cellphone. According to Tijam, he was on his way home when he met Bacsid at the bus waiting area, and while exchanging pleasantries, Tijam saw a cellphone on the ground and picked it up and showed it to Bacsid. When Mugot emerged and grabbed the cellphone, it fell on the ground.

The RTC found Tijam and Bacsid guilty of Theft since they were found in possession of the cellphone moments after Mugot lost it, applying the disputable presumption that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and doer of the whole act. The RTC was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, prompting the present petition before the Court.

In resolving the petition, the Court stressed that the burden to overcome the presumption of innocence of the accused lies with the prosecution. Thus, evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own weight and should not draw strength from the weakness of the defense.

The Court added that in the absence of direct evidence, circumstantial evidence may be sufficient for conviction if: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

Further, the circumstances must constitute an unbroken chain that leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others as the guilty person. The circumstances must also be consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilt, said the Court.

In a charge of Theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the prosecution must prove all of the following elements: (1) there is taking of personal property; (2) such property belongs to another; (3) the taking was done with intent to gain; (4) the taking was done without the consent of the owner; and (5) the taking is accomplished without violence or intimidation against person or force upon things.

In the case of Tijam and Bacsid, the prosecution relied on the following circumstances to prove their guilt of Theft: (i) Mugot saw Bacsid pin the former against the bus door while boarding; (ii) After entering the bus, Mugot noticed his cellphone missing from his right pocket; (iii) Mugot alighted from the bus and saw Bacsid walking back to the bus waiting area; and (iv) Mugot saw Tijam hand over the former’s cellphone to Bacsid.

The Court, however, found that the combination of these circumstances does not establish all the elements of Theft under the RPC.

“[T]he only overt acts remotely connecting Bacsid to the purported Theft are Mugot’s allegations that Bacsid pinned [Mugot] against the bus door and thereafter, walked back to the waiting area. By no stretch of the imagination may the act of pinning someone establish the unlawful taking of property,” said the Court.

As for Tijam, the Court found that “the only conspicuous deed hinting at Tijam’s participation is the fact that he held Mugot’s cellphone and allegedly handed the same to Bacsid at the passenger waiting area. However, there is nothing in the records to indicate that Mugot saw Tijam inside the bus or show that the latter was there when [Mugot’s] cellphone was purportedly stolen.

The Court also noted Mugot’s narration that he was rushing inside the bus with other commuters, thus it was not impossible for the purported theft to have been committed by someone else.

On the lower courts’ finding that Tijam’s possession of the cellphone proves that he and Bacsid conspired to steal it from Mugot, the Court reiterated its ruling in the 2004 case of Mabunga v. People that courts should not indiscriminately apply presumptions in criminal cases, including the disputable presumption under Section 3(j) of the Rules on Evidence that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and doer of the whole act.

Thus, before an inference of guilt arising from possession of recently stolen goods can be made, the following must be proven by the prosecution: (1) that the crime was committed; (2) that the crime was committed recently; (3) that the stolen property was found in possession of the defendant; and (4) that the defendant is unable to explain his possession satisfactorily, said the Court.

Applying this to Tijam and Bacsid, the Court held that Tijam satisfactorily explained that he saw the cellphone lying on the pavement, and thus picked it up. “Such explanation is plausible in view of Mugot’s own narration that there was an onslaught of passengers rushing inside the bus, which could have caused [Mugot] to drop his cellphone.”

The Court also noted that it was not proven that Mugot saw Tijam inside the bus or anywhere near the bus when the cellphone was lost or stolen. Neither was it established that Bacsid had possession of the cellphone.

“Tijam’s possession having been explained, the legal presumption is disputed and thus, cannot be the sole basis for the conviction. To hold otherwise, will be a travesty of justice as criminal convictions necessarily require proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt,” the Court ruled.

Given that the disputable presumption relied upon by the lower courts was sufficiently rebutted, and that the totality of the circumstances failed to point to Tijam and Bacsid, to the exclusion of all others, as the malefactors, the Court concluded that the guilt of Tijam and Bacsid had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, entitling them to acquittal. (Courtesy of the Supreme Court Public Information Office)

Full text of G.R. No. 251732 (Tijam and Bacsid v. People, July 10, 2023) at: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/251732-julius-enrico-tijam-y-noche-and-kenneth-bacsid-y-ruiz-vs-people-of-the-philippines/

Full text of the Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa at: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/251732-concurring-opinion-justice-alfredo-benjamin-s-caguioa/

Full text of the Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh at: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/251732-dissenting-opinion-justice-maria-filomena-d-singh/